

Non-military Defense in Border Areas: A Case Study of the Indonesia-Malaysia Border in West Kalimantan

Sahrhun Gultom¹, Irdam Ahmad², Anwar Arifin³, Edi Suhardono⁴, David Yacobus⁵

¹Doctoral Program, Universitas Pertahanan Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia

²Professor, Universitas Pertahanan Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia

^{3,4,5}Universitas Pertahanan Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia

sahrhuns105@gmail.com

Abstract

This study aims to explore the various problems faced by stakeholders, especially decision makers, in overcoming the complexities at the border between Indonesia and Malaysia in West Kalimantan. We obtained the latest conditions from in-depth interviews with 12 informants who were directly related to decision making at the location. We also conducted a series of focus group discussions and roundtable discussions to sharpen the multidimensional problems faced. We found that the problems on the border of West Kalimantan cover the dimensions of ideology, politics, technology, public safety, socio-culture, and the most important and the underlying is the economy, while legislation is not included. This study also proposes a hierarchy of dimensions of threats faced in border areas, which may also be applied in a similar context. We conclude that in overcoming the problem of non-military threats, mutual awareness among decision makers, especially BNPP, which is the leading institution in border area management, must be prioritized.

Keywords

borders; West Kalimantan; institutional synergy; non-military threat



I. Introduction

A thorough examination of the complexities of situations in border areas would reveal multidimensional vulnerabilities. This issue also can be identified across Indonesia's border areas. Indonesia, as a country with an advantageous geographical location, shares both land and maritime borders with 10 countries. Across the land, accumulated boundaries length between Indonesia and Malaysia (2,062 km), Papua New Guinea (821 km), and Timor Leste (269 km) equal 3,152 km long (Irawan, 2019). Malaysia and Timor Leste also share maritime borders with Indonesia, as well as Singapore, the Philippines, Australia, Vietnam, India, Thailand, and the Republic of Palau. (Ayuni, 2018) with 111 frontier and outermost small islands as borderlands (Irawan, 2019). Tensions that lead to conflict tend to be caused by disputes or claims about territorial boundaries. Whereas territory is a type of sovereign state that plays an important part in the current understanding of sovereignty and geographic power (Ayelet, 2020).

Sovereignty is strongly tied to defense, particularly how well the defense posture gets developed by changing the development of strategic dynamics and recognizing threats towards increasing complexity national security. This intricacy stems from the fact that borders friction is a multidimensional problem with multiple issues. Border issues have been

identified as a real or actual threat in the Indonesian Defense White Paper (BPPI) by the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia (2015). Consequently, threat classification applies not only to the military but also to non-military, even a combination of the two or a hybrid. BPPI also highlighted the effects of threats that could have repercussions in a multitude of dimensions, including ideology, politics, economy, socio-culture, technology, public safety, as well as legislation.

Defense and security scholars also studied non-military threats in border areas. Aside from military threats, Buzan (1983) divides threats into four categories that have an impact on national security: political, social, political, and ecological risks. Matthews (1989) and Suhrke (1999) add social aspects, particularly moral and cultural aspects, as well as environmental and economic aspects against the current globalization landscape, which Burgess (2007) sharpens by including the sub-fields of migration, climate change, water resources, energy, health, and transnational organized crime, which includes illicit trade such as drugs, arms, and human trafficking, among others.

These illicit activities are linked and extremely vulnerable to being carried out in the context of the spectrum of threats at the border, notably in the economic sector. Border areas can be exploited as access points for capital inflows, goods, and services as factors of production in the economy. Clark (1994), classifies the effects of national boundaries on the economy into two levels: primary, whose effects are not seen directly but have a macroeconomic impact, and secondary, whose effects are felt at the local level as a micro consequence, particularly for individuals living in rural areas. Similar situations can be found in several Indonesian border locations.

Indonesians residing near the border are at risk, and they have a proclivity to migrate their livelihoods to neighboring countries. Tens of thousands of people migrate to the Philippines from eight islands in the northern waters of Sulawesi due to economic incentives such as education and health, as well as comparably better infrastructure (Frederik, 2011). Economic factors are also seen in various border regions on the island of Borneo between Indonesia and Malaysia. This condition was discovered in Sebatik island and Tawau in the eastern part (Siregar, Rahmansyah, & Saepudin, 2019) and Entikong and Tebedu in the western part of Kalimantan (Bariyah & Lau, 2019). The need for productive labor resources from foreign countries is also a primary driving force for migration, both seasonal and permanent, which is aided by the numerous legal and unauthorized border crossings.

According to the Directorate General of Immigration of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights in 2018 (Irawan, 2019), Indonesia has 66 Cross-Border Posts (PLB) around the country. Riau Islands (23), West Kalimantan (13), North and East Kalimantan (7), Papua (17), and East Nusa Tenggara (6) are all managed by DG of Immigration. Since 2016, seven National Cross-Border Facilities (PLBN) have been established, including three across West Kalimantan, three in East Nusa Tenggara, and one in Papua, all of which are operated by the National Border Management Agency (BNPP). The implementing authority is not restricted to these two institutions, which of course, are also supported by officials from the armed forces and police.

There seem to be multiple authorities with different responsibilities in border areas, but given the fact that there are still many violations at the border as previously described, it should be a concern. We aim to examine and enhance our understanding of these situations by using West Kalimantan, Indonesia's border with Malaysia, as a case study. The presence of PLB and PLBN in the area makes it interesting to investigate, particularly in terms of structures and the impact of policies.

The primary goal of this study is to assess and categorize multidimensional problems that arise in the border area between Indonesia and Malaysia in West Kalimantan. Furthermore, we investigate the significance of multi-stakeholder institutions in addressing the region's multidimensional challenges or threats, particularly within the consideration of the non-military defense context. The study's findings are expected to simplify the intricacy of the challenges that occur at the border.

II. Review of Literature

Borders are caught between whether necessary or being disregarded in a world that is increasingly 'shrinking' due to globalization. Globalization intensifies the movement of factors of production such as goods, services, capital flows, labor, and technology, even information, as well as environmental spillovers and externalities across national borders (Albrow & King, 1990; Newman, 2003; Joshi, 2009; Schultz, 2015). On the other hand, conflicts, tensions, frictions, and eventually at some point: wars, have frequently happened in border areas. From 1816 to 2007, at least 598 territorial disputes resulted in tension and conflict, 64 of which became wars, with an average of 60 disputes per year over the last half-century, including but not limited to: i) homeland defense; ii) disputed ownership of territory; iii) general border issues; iv) opportunistic territorial disputes; v) state system changes; vi) border violations; and vii) other territorial disputes (Schultz, 2015; Reiter, 2016; Gibler, 2017; Crisher, 2021). In this section, we investigate at how the border dynamics, starting with its conceptualization, and advancing from a regional regional scale to various border locations in West Kalimantan, as our main focus.

2.1 Borders in Borderless World

Depending on the situation, boundaries have a variety of definitions and terminology purposes. According to Hansen (1977), a border area is a subnational territory whose economic life is directly and profoundly influenced by its closeness to international borders. Clark (1994) uses the term boundary as well, defining it as an ambiguous boundary line associated to the extension of an undiscovered area that is constrained by a zone that surrounds the boundary line. Because the border is designed to be a protector from internal and external threats as well as a territorial determinant, it must be handled in terms of designation, delimitation, demarcation, and administration (Jones, 1945; Newman & Paasi, 1998).

Border locations are frequently identified with military terminology due to the impression of these threats, especially since, as earlier mentioned, there is a tendency for tension and friction to occur in the region. Furthermore, borders are linked to four threat factors: intensity, temporal (rather than spatial) comprehension, probability, and a measure of seriousness (Buzan, 1983). However it's not all. According to some, the concept of the border itself is divided into two types: hard borders with military or police guards attached to a fence or wire wall, and soft borders with open, regulated, and controlled borders. (Carens, 1995, Chavez, 2012; Espejo, 2013). Andreas (2003), on the other hand, distinguishes between border and guarding with the military and police. The military's responsibility is to prevent military threats between countries, whereas police escort is more focused on transnational threats posed by cross-border non-state actors.

Ullah & Kumpoh (2018) classify the spectrum of border area mobility openness into three theories or perspectives: i) open; ii) closed; and iii) moderate or porous. The closed border theory contends that the redistribution of socioeconomic imbalances at national boundaries must be carried out centrally, whereas the open border theory emphasizes the

freedom of the population to migrate across borders, allowing for those who are less fortunate to be pursuing the goal of a better life (Carens, 1995; Miller, 2013). The porous boundary theory, on the contrary, contends that income redistribution and 'regular' migration are not mutually exclusive strategies (Benhabib, 2004).

Surprisingly, the previous explanation seems to have a tendency toward disparity and welfare redistribution, which is directly tied to economic motives. Andreas (2003), previously discussed economic borders, which focused on controlling or regulating domestic procedures pertaining to tariffs, quotas, taxes, customs, and currency exchange rates between bordering countries. The procedure in argument is simply a limitation or border in an economic context, which, when accompanied by a territorial dispute and the possible involvement of defense authorities from both sides of the bordering country, can exacerbate the welfare of the surrounding community. In this context, Schultz (2015) uses the phrase dampen "economic integration".

Border restrictions and challenges have already been discussed and studied from many viewpoints in the discourse. Borders are not only physical barriers, but also cultural, social, territorial, geographical, political, sexual, racial, and physiographic variation (seas, mountains, deserts) that influence human lives and representations, thereby affecting people's daily routines (Lunden, 2004; Houtum, 2005; Ullah & Kumpoh, 2018; Vollmer, 2019). The impact of borders on people's daily life, particularly how individuals perceive and fear border dangers and vulnerabilities in the context of human security (Zulkipli & Askandar, 2021). The significance of these boundaries may also be seen in Southeast Asia, where natural borders are categorized as 'excellent,' as opposed to borders established by humans or intentionally labeled as 'bad,' according to Houtum (2005). However, it would be too a priori, and the perception tends to be binary when viewing the challenges in this field solely from a black and white perspective.

Southeast Asia's borders are often porous. Migration of population and labor in the region has occurred since the decade of 1870, when the border was still loose and free, as compared to since the 1970s until now, when the movement has become increasingly diverse and diversified, particularly in the internal region, which, worse, actually facilitates transnational crimes such as smuggling, migration, and human trafficking of women and children. (Kaur, 2004; Ullah & Kumpoh, 2018). Furthermore, most SEA countries have long-standing and unresolved territorial disputes, as well as being frequently connected with rural poverty, lawlessness, and informal economies; hence, boundaries in SEA fall into practically all of the categories (Eilenberg, 2012; Ullah & Kumpoh, 2018). Several studies done by Eilenberg (2008, 2009, 2011, 2014), illustrate how boundaries in Southeast Asia, particularly in West Kalimantan and Sarawak, are difficult to maintain, owing to the establishment of many irregular and frequent engagement spaces and act as a stumbling block to formal economic practice or in other words: ungovernability.

2.2 A Tale of Two Provinces: West Kalimantan and Sarawak

The connection between these two locations is complicated. On the one hand, the two territories are historically and legally separated by a demarcation line. According to Wulandari, *et al.* (2009), the history between these two locations is influenced by the existence of two colonies Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Both had adopted the border-line determination of these two countries in the Treaty of London on June 20, 1891 which was followed by the Boundary Agreement signed in London on September 28, 1915, and the Boundary Convention, which was signed in The Hague on March 26, 1928. The treaties resulted in the division of territory over Borneo Island by drawing a line from east to west, separating the island's territory into two areas of power: Sarawak and Sabah

(which are parts of Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam), and to the south, more commonly known as Borneo, which is part of the Republic of Indonesia.

On the other hand, the two enjoy a tight relationship because they share life experiences and are descended from close tribal relatives. Despite the physical limits that have been created, the socio-cultural boundaries between Indonesia and Malaysia are never obvious due to socio-cultural life of society influences each other and is tightly tied in kinship relationships, particularly among the Malay and Dayak tribes (Bangun, 2018). However, it is difficult to deny that there are still several issues at the boundary between the two locations.

The border between West Kalimantan and Sarawak includes a 966-km line with 50 paths connecting 55 villages in West Kalimantan with 32 villages in Sarawak; however, there is still a lot of borderland involving illegal crossings, drug syndicates, kidnapping, autotheft, smuggling, and infiltration of illegal immigrants from the Indonesian border to the Malaysian border (LAN, 2004, in Karim, 2015; Jalli & Sualman, 2020). Bariyah & Lau (2019) finds that more than 98% of West Kalimantan total export are mostly consumed in Sarawak, more than 200.000 thousands labor in Sarawak came from Indonesia. Border restrictions can include inadequate facilities and infrastructure, the length of the country's geographical limits, a shortage of security personnel, and overlapping authorities between organizations and ministries in controlling border areas (Zulkarnain & Roisah, 2018). Even border issues have the ability to threaten not just the social economy but also ideology and sovereignty through the spread of terrorism, arms trade, drug distribution, and illegal trade in fish, fuel, wood, and sand (Ayuni, 2018).

According Yani (2008), Ayuni (2018) & (Mustafa, 2020), some of the Indonesian citizens recruited by the Malaysian government are aware that they are Indonesian citizens, but because they get a job offer with a considerable salary then they choose the job without considering that attitude or such actions can actually harm and violate the laws and regulations of the State of Indonesia. They also recruited as Askar Watania, the border guard as well as the reserve component of the Malaysian border guard which is also ready for emergencies or on the battlefield, as well as in safety operations to help authorities deal with natural calamities.




Figure 1. West Kalimantan Map

Source: Author's

Sarawak equipped with three official border crossings: Biawak (Kuching Division), Tebedu (Kuching Division), and Lubok Antu (Sri Aman Division) and reinforcement is also

supported by the Sarawak Regional Government, which plans to construct walls or fences in crucial spots along the Malaysian and Indonesian borders, as well as a 1,032 km highway worth 24 billion ringgit (Zulkipli & Askandar, 2021; Zufriзал, 2021). In the implementation of government politics in the regions, it is not possible to only prioritize one aspect (economics) but it is important to pay attention to other aspects, namely environmental sustainability so that the implementation of green government is very important in supporting environmental sustainability in the political process of government in the regions (Dama, 2021). The Government of the Republic of Indonesia was formed to protect the whole of the Indonesian people (Angelia, 2020). Indonesia, on the other hand, is aiming to build 850 kilometers of road along the West Kalimantan-Sarawak border, as well as establish border development centers in Aruk, Entikong, Nanga Badau, Jasa, and Jagoi Babang with allocated budget of around two trillion rupiah (approximately USD 150 million) by Indonesia's central government (Bariyah & Lau, 2019).

III. Research Methods

We employed qualitative approach and data analysis technique from Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña (2020) and conducting in-depth semi-structured interviews with over 60 questions on 12 informants and a series of group discussions. We identified and selected the informants purposively from relevant government institutions, including two Directorate Generals of the Ministry of Defense (Kemhan), the National Border Management Agency (BNPP), the National Agency for Disaster Management (BNPB), the Border Security Task Force (Satgas Pamtas), the Regional Military Command (Kodam) XII Tanjungpura, and a Border Post representative. The information we have obtained has been refined and deepened through a series of Focus Group Discussions and Round Table Discussions which were held four times between February 2019 to January 2021 with BNPP representatives and academics from Indonesia Defense University as discussion participants. We also examine regulatory paperwork and keep track of border management reports.

IV. Discussion

In this section, we will provide an overview of West Kalimantan as well as the specific locations on which we will concentrate our research. We also formulated several findings from in-depth interviews and focus groups with regard to the BPPI's non-military threat dimension (2015). Ideology, Politics, Economics, Socio-Cultural, Technology, and Public Safety are among these dimensions. In addition, we identify the appropriate authorities in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.

4.1 Overview of West Kalimantan

Table 1. Number of Subdistric and Village/Urban Village by Regency/Municipality of West Kalimantan Province, 2019

Regency/Municipality	District	Villages/Urban Villages
Sambas Regency	19	193
Bengkayang Regency	17	124
Landak Regency	13	156

Mempawah Regency	9	67
Sanggau Regency	15	169
Ketapang Regency	20	262
Sintang Regency	14	407
Kapuas Hulu Regency	23	282
Sekadau Regency	7	87
Melawi Regency	11	169
Kayong Utara Regency	6	43
Kubu Raya Regency	9	118
Pontianak City	6	29
Singkawang City	5	26
Kalimantan Barat	174	2 132

Source: Head of Central Bureau of Statistics Regulation Number 3/ 2019, May 6 2019, on Code and Name of Regional Level of Data Collection

West Kalimantan is divided into 14 regencies/cities, 174 sub-districts, and 2,132 kelurahan/villages, as shown in the table above. The boundary pillars that mark the nearly 1000 km long border between Indonesia and Malaysia in West Kalimantan total 15,542 pillars. Then, with the establishment of three new PLBNs in Aruk, Entikong, and Badau, the movement or migration of people from and to Indonesia and Malaysia has begun to be documented. According to BNPP internal data, it reached 226,936 passers-by in 2020. The Entikong PLBN has the most passengers with 122,833, followed by the Aruk PLBN with 84,626 and the Badau PLBN with 19,481 passengers, although this figure is still considered underreported due to the prevalence of 'rat trails,' which are illegal alternative routes. The high number is due to economic reason, as our informant from BNPP agreed:

“The high number of Indonesian citizens at both departure and arrival points is due to Indonesian citizens' high reliance on Malaysia, particularly for employment and meeting basic needs at lower prices than in Indonesia. The majority of Indonesian citizens who cross the border are seasonal migrant workers ”.

Another informant stated that, in addition to employment, the gap in infrastructure development such as roads, markets, schools, and bridges was a factor causing social, educational, and other gaps, which in turn affected the people in border areas' sense of nationalism and nationality. The number of border communities that use Malaysian products because they are cheaper and easier to obtain than domestic products is also a common issue at the border as well as the difficulty of getting basic necessities at affordable prices. In order to get daily necessities, they have to travel quite a distance, so people choose to shop in Malaysia. The high price is caused by the high cost of transportation from the district or

provincial capital to the sub-district or to villages in border areas, especially those whose positions are still isolated.

Human trafficking is an ongoing issue at the border. Many of the Indonesian citizens apprehended lacked official documents and attempted to pass through unofficial channels or the rat trails. The majority of them will work in the plantation industry or as domestic helpers. This is supported by the findings of an interview with the Head of PLBN Entikong, who stated that a number of border crossers at PLBN admitted to being promised jobs in oil palm plantations and the household sector. Violations in the rat trails are mostly dealt with by TNI patrol officers, who then hand them over to the authorized officer at the nearest security post. This is supported by the findings of interviews with informants from the Border Security Task Force, who stated:

"In every handling of violations such as border crossing violations, smuggling of goods, smuggling of animals/animals, and drug smuggling, the Border Security Task Force, has procedures that have been standardized and applied in the form of handling measures beginning with security at the time of the incident, carrying out a brief examination/interrogation in order to obtain information and further information in the implementation of future prevention efforts, then delegating the perpetrators, evidence, and cases to the relevant parties/agencies in accordance with their fields."

In the table below, we summarize the threats associated with border crossings and the authorities in charge of dealing with them:

Table 2. Matrix of Threat in Cross Border

Threats	Customs	Immigration	Quarantine	Security
Narcotics				X
Illegal Entry		X		
Illegal Trading	X		X	
Illegal Trafficking		X		X
Illegal Logging				X
Illegal Smuggling			X	X
Illegal Weaponry				X

Source: Authors

In terms of delegation of authority, we discovered that BNPP should have control over the border management process, particularly those related to threats that arise outside the context of military defense. Based on Article 6 of Presidential Regulation No. 12 of 2010, BNPP can coordinate with 20 ministries and agencies in the implementation of BNPP's main functions as a leading actor. However, we discovered that there were still differences in the border management paradigm, particularly in recognizing a threat.

According to the results of interviews with several informants, the term "non-military defense" was not yet known among Ministries/Agencies outside the defense sector, as well as local and subnational governments. One of high level official from BNPP explains:

"There is no term 'non-military threat' and 'non-military defense' in BNPP planning documents, such as: Grand Design for Management of State Boundaries and Border Areas 2011-2025; National Border Management Master Plan 2015-2019. Defense, security, and the rule of law are always mentioned in these documents."

While our BNPB informant stated that the terms "non-military defense" and "non-military threats" were only learned from reading the news, they were not fully understood, and they had never received socialization from the Ministry of Defense.




Figure 2. Assessment of Threat Hierarchical Dimensions

Based on the existing findings, we develop a simple model that describes the current situation in West Kalimantan's land border area in terms of non-military threats, as shown in Figure 2 above. We categorize threats into levels and groups. According to the research findings, the economic dimension is the most prominent when compared to other dimensions, followed by threats to public safety and socio-culture, and finally political and technological issues. The most serious non-military threat is ideological, which is a hidden danger that can influence people's attitudes. Legislation was not identified as a non-military threat in this study. However, economic threats will eventually affect other dimensions, and in the end, all dimensions of these threats will increase.

Economic threats are the primary cause of violations along the West Kalimantan-Malaysia land border. To deal with economic threats, a defense system that can fortify border areas against multidimensional threats such as money laundering, natural resource control,

illegal logging, illegal mining, a flood of foreign products, economic inequality, unemployment, and poverty, suboptimal infrastructure use, energy crisis, food crisis, and digital economy investment is required. Infrastructure development for the land border areas of West Kalimantan, Malaysia, such as opening new Border Patrol Inspection Roads, constructing markets or economic centers in border areas, and making the border areas the main focus.

V. Conclusion

Threat identification is the first step in developing plans, strategies, and tactics for anticipating them. The steps are, of course, disrupted from the start if the stages preceding identification, namely awareness and understanding, are not met. This study emphasizes the significance of a cohesive and comprehensive strategy among policymakers who have the primary task as well as support and responsibility, whether directly or indirectly. In order to overcome problems outside the military's authority in border areas, the BNPP, as a leading institution, must adapt intelligently.

This study also specifically proposes a threat model framework that stakeholders can use. Furthermore, this model can be replicated when confronted with other border areas, both in Indonesia and in other countries. As a follow-up, additional derivative strategies, priorities, and action plan steps must be realized. We propose it as a possible future research topic.

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