Collaborative Governance in the Implementation of Special Autonomy in Papua

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Abstract

The Special Autonomy Policy in Papua is an effort by the Indonesian government in dealing with a number of problems that exist in Papua related to poverty, lagging development, response to conflict situations and overcoming the separatist movement. In the implementation of the Special Autonomy policy, a collaborative approach is needed so that all stakeholders can be well involved, namely state and non-state actors. The purpose of this study is to analyze Collaborative Governance in implementing the Special Autonomy Policy in Papua. The method used in this research is qualitative with interviews, focus group discussions, observation and literature study. The research locations were carried out in Jakarta and Jayapura Papua in 2018-2021. The purpose of this study is to analyze Collaborative Governance in the Special Autonomy policy in Papua. In this study, using the theory and concept of collaboration on the theory of Wanna (2008) which consists of the planning stage, program implementation stage, resource management stage and the monitoring and evaluation stage of Special Autonomy. The results show that in Collaborative Governance, the Special Autonomy Policy in Papua is in the planning stage at the medium-low level of collaboration, the implementation stage is at the lowest collaboration level, the resource management stage is in the low collaboration stage, while the supervision stage is in the low collaboration level.

Keywords

Collaborative governance; special autonomy; Papua

I. Introduction

Indonesia is a multiethnic country with 34 provinces. Aceh Province, Papua Province, and West Papua Province are three provinces in Indonesia that have exceptional autonomy. Jayapura is the capital of Papua Province, and Manokwari is the capital of West Papua Province (BPS, 2019). West Papua is the worldwide name for the Papua provinces and West Papua (McGibbon, 2004). Special Autonomy is the central government's policy in response to the pressure from the Papuan people who seek independence and separation from Indonesia (national disintegration), yet this demand is founded on Papua's low confidence in the Indonesian government's credibility (Musa'ad, 2009).

The central government's response to the conflict situation in Papua at the time was Special Autonomy (SA), which began with the preparation of the TAP MPR Number IV of 1999 at the MPR RI and culminated in the passage of Law No. 21 of 2001 concerning Papua's Special Autonomy during the presidency of President Megawati. Policymakers of the time assumed that if the Papuan people's welfare was improved, the yearning for independence would fade away, hence special autonomy was the best answer at the moment (Yusran, 2006). This notion appears to be incorrect, because even though development has occurred (SA has been valid for more than 19 years); it does not appear to have eliminated the desire of some Papuan communities to be independent until now.

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(Katharina, 2017). Even the LIPI Road Map analysis demonstrates that the special autonomy policy is viewed as a political solution (to diminish independence) rather than a welfare solution (LIPI, 2014).

It is recognized that Papua faces various issues, based on the opinions of several experts summoned by the Special Committee of the DPR RI during the development of the Special Autonomy Law for Papua. The issue is the Papuan people's low level of welfare (measured in four areas: education, health, economy, and infrastructure), but experts also believe that the most pressing issue to be resolved at that time is the issue of differences of opinion regarding Papua's integration into the Republic of Indonesia. In addition, the desire to preserve the value system, tradition, or civilization of Papuan (Rasyid, 2001). The conflict in Papua is still characterized by violence, and the existence of armed groups seeking independence has hampered the government's efforts to develop the province. In 2019, armed groups carried out 24 sporadic shootings, resulting in dozens of deaths and injuries (Wilpret, 2018; "The Papuan Workers' Murder," 2018).

In Papua, some challenges can be classified as wicked problems, and it is not enough to address them by working together; instead, collaboration should be used. Collaboration entails partnering with other parties and carrying out diverse efforts or procedures with the same purpose (Wanna, 2008). Collaboration takes a lot of money and resources, it is delicate, it needs to be handled properly and regularly, it entails mutual trust and obligations, and it has its own set of challenges (Huxham 2005; Entwistle and Martin 2005; Agranoff 2001, Bardach 2001). As a result, collaboration is not easy and takes a great deal of dedication, trust, clarity, and shared goals and planning phases, as well as mutual understanding and working relationships (Huxham and Vangen, 2000).

Stakeholder participation and collaboration are important generally. In Papua, interest is a critical aspect in the establishment of special autonomy. According to Korten, growth can be carried out to improve human dignity, as described in the concept of "human-centered development". According to Donahue and Zeckhauser, government employees will be better equipped to carry out their responsibilities and provide quality public services if they collaborate with the private sector, people, or community groups. This is being attempted to be used to the implementation of special autonomy in Papua, referring to various instances where special autonomy has brought some peace to a conflict, such as the Moro people in the Philippines (Bertus, 2021).

Collaboration between stakeholders in Papua is critical to strengthen special autonomy and expedite special autonomy goals for the people's welfare while suppressing the separatist movement. This problem will be raised in this study, with the research question "How Collaborative Governance in implementing Special Autonomy in Papua Province?" This article examines the implementation of Special Autonomy in the areas of education, health, infrastructure, and the people's economy from 2001 to 2020. In the years 2019-2020, the research was carried out in Jayapura City, Papua Province.

II. Review of Literature

2.1 Collaborative Governance

The term "collaboration" was first employed in the nineteenth century as industrialization progressed, resulting in increasingly complex organizations and the addition of labor divisions. Collaborative governance is regarded as beneficial, innovative, and transformational (Wanna, 2008). Donahue and Zeckhauser (2011) said of Governance Collaborative as "A word referring to the conditions under which government officials
endeavor to achieve the public mandate through a partnership with private, collective, or individual companies."

According to the viewpoint presented above, the government must interact with other parties, such as private corporations or other groups, to complete the task. One of the reasons for establishing Collaborative Governance is to achieve better results. As indicated by Ansell and Gash (2008), Bingham and O'Leary (2008), Cooper, Bryer, and Meek (2008), Fung (2006), and Sirianni (2009) collaborative development governance is rapidly expanding in breadth in knowledge administration.

Anglo-Saxon countries are promoting Collaborative Governance as part of good governance as they develop. After undergoing new reforms in public management, Anglo-Saxon countries with strong executive governments and the Westminster system have demonstrated a tradition of strong coordination between government agencies and little ministerial autonomy when compared to continental Europe and Asia. Public institutions in Anglo-Saxon countries openly acknowledge the need for cross-jurisdictional Collaborative Governance between government and commercial entities.

The cornerstone to this Collaborative Governance technique is an agreement between two or more stakeholders to exchange information, roles, functions, and responsibilities under a Collaborative Governance and process that they jointly agreed upon. Collaborative work can be defined as a cross-sectoral collaboration that involves relationships between multiple parties to achieve common goals. As a result, Collaborative Governance is based on the values of a win-win situation for all parties involved. Munt offers keywords that are relevant to the definition of Collaborative Governance, such as "working together." "The keyword denotes the presence of features of collaborative work between several stakeholders to achieve common goals. This is what sets collaboration apart; it is not always about achieving a common goal. Collaboration between stakeholders with a common aim leads to collaborative governance.

To cite Wildavsky (1973), the Collaborative Governance idea has six elements that distinguish it from other conceptions, the first of which is cooperation in developing commonality, consistency, and harmonizing cooperative actions among stakeholders. On the second dimension, Collaborative Governance can be viewed as a method of negotiating and reaching an agreement. Third, central supervisory, vetting, and coordinating tasks may be part of Collaborative Governance. Fourth, Collaborative Governance entails the use of authority, the ability to persuade, and encouragement to reach a goal. The fifth dimension is likewise linked to future commitment and objectives, as well as expected conduct when organizing cooperative actions. The sixth dimension fosters personal and internal incentives to commit to initiatives, decisions, instruction organizations, or strategic destinations (Wildavsky, 1973).

John Wanna (2008) defines Collaborative Governance conceptually through his many works, stating that Collaborative Governance has two dimensions. The magnitude or degree of Collaborative Governance is the first dimension. The setting, goal, and motivation of collaborative activities are the second dimension. The patterns of activities and the amount of clarity of Collaborative Governance activities are grouped in the first dimension, which is related to the scale or degree of Collaborative Governance. If it is compared to a commitment ladder, it goes from the bottom (random Collaborative Governance) to the top (extensive integration) (Described in Table 1). The desire and motivation that underpins the presence of Collaborative Governance may be distinguished in the second dimension, which is related to context, goals, and choices, as well as the motivation of players who seek Collaborative Governance.
Table 1. Scale or Degree of Collaborative Governance Wanna 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Collaborative Governance</th>
<th>What activities do</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Highest level:</strong></td>
<td>1. Interaction is transformative between stakeholders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• High normative</td>
<td>2. Involvement and empowerment are carried out substantively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• High commitment to collaboration</td>
<td>3. Seek consensus among stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Highest political risk</td>
<td>4. Coalition development between government and non-government actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle-high level:</strong></td>
<td>1. Involvement of stakeholders in the decision-making process or policy and its implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Normative orientation is quite strong</td>
<td>2. Transfer decision-making capacity to clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• High political risk</td>
<td>3. More complex innovations in the policy-making process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intermediate Level</strong></td>
<td>1. Formal commitment between institutions in deliberation and collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Commitment to involving various parties</td>
<td>2. Merging government strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Moderate political risk</td>
<td>3. Engagement of formal training and co-financing initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle-low Level:</strong></td>
<td>1. Joint Production Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The operational form of collaboration is task/problem-oriented</td>
<td>2. Technical improvements in producing policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• There are some political risks</td>
<td>3. Support in fulfilling obligations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Direct consultation or consultation with clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Using systematic evaluation data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Announce to the public based on the choice of target users</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lowest level:</strong></td>
<td>1. Adjustment using the negotiation process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Minor adjustments to operations</td>
<td>2. Utilization of discussion and feedback mechanisms with clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Low political risk</td>
<td>3. Looking for information related to the needs and expectations of other parties</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: John Wanna (2008)

Wanna (2008) also revealed that there are 4 (four) types of Collaborative Governance that accommodate good cooperative relations within the government and between the government and the external in performing duties and government responsibilities. Those are (1) internal government Collaborative Governance, which includes institutions and bureaucrats, (2) Collaborative Governance between governments, which includes institutions of different types, and (3) Collaborative Governance among government responsibilities. These four types of Collaborative Governance demonstrate that it all starts with a relationship between two or more stakeholders. Look at the four models based on the given information. Collaborative Governance is said to have arisen as a response to the community's development of knowledge and institutional capability. Amid the complexity of the problems and challenges faced by the government in establishing policies and providing public services for the community, knowledge has encouraged the development of institutional capacity and specialization amid society. As a result, when the government alone cannot carry out the government's duties and responsibilities and other parties outside the government can assist the government's work, the involvement of external parties must be made easier to support the government's work in carrying out its duties and responsibilities. Collaborative Governance has the potential to bridge the gap between improved policy solutions and societal acceptance. Collaborative Governance, when properly executed, allows the government to take the lead and gain an advantage. Collaborative Governance, if not effectively executed, can lead to culprits blaming one
other when their expectations are not realized.

The conceptual basis in this study will be John Wanna's (2008) Collaborative Governance notion, as explained above. Wanna will be used to determine the degree of Collaborative Governance between the community, government, and private sector in implementing Special Autonomy in Papua New Guinea. While Wanna's notion of four forms of collaborative governance will be utilized to examine the Collaborative Governance model between the community, government, and corporate sector, particularly in terms of planning and human resources.

2.2 Special Autonomy

The autonomy package in a country is determined by the results of discussions between the government and the rebel movement, according to McGibbon (2004) in the journal of policy studies. SA should have been the result of negotiations between the Indonesian political elite and the rebel elite seeking independence in Papua. In Indonesia, Papua's SA is the outcome of less negotiation than consensus between local officials and scholars, with no connection to the rebel elite seeking independence.

Maksum (2011) contends that for Papua, 2 major values, stability and growth, are required to ensure long-term progress. As a result, two design choices for the Papua Special Autonomy are proposed: (1) establishing the national authority as the fundamental force; and (2) accommodating autonomy for the Papuan people. The policy orientation is clear for the welfare of the Papuan people, especially the Papuan people, according to the Special Autonomy Law. As a result, budget allocations for several development sectors, including education, health, the people's economy, and infrastructure development, are determined. At the time, the awarding of SA was seen as a "gong" from the Indonesian government's many participatory policy attempts to conquer Papua and prevent it from becoming dangerous again. It is referred to as a "gong" because the policy of giving Special Autonomy is seen as the final answer to a variety of problems in Papua. This strategy is the culmination of several prior policies for Papua (Katharina, 2017).

The Special Autonomy Law's goal is to repress the yearning for independence while also improving the welfare of the Papuan people by putting education, health, and infrastructure first. According to Article 36 of Law Number 21 of 2001, a minimum of 30% of income from oil and natural gas mining must be spent on education and a minimum of 15% on health and nutrition improvements. While additional funds in the context of implementing SA are largely meant for financing infrastructure development, the emphasis on infrastructure development is stated in Article 34 paragraph (3) letter f (SA Law, 2001).

SA for Papua Province is essentially an instrument (dubbed legal and political means) for the DPR RI and the President to assure two very important things: the welfare of the inhabitants of Papua Province, particularly indigenous Papuans, improves dramatically soon. It takes little time and improves national unity and integrity in Papua Province, as well as the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia's integrity and integrity (Secretary-General of the DPR, 2001). The substance of the Special Autonomy Law, which outlines the intricacies of the autonomy of the Papua Province, has various features of these two primary issues.

The government's execution of SA Papua as one of its policies to promote the welfare of the people of Papua has resulted in several improvements, particularly in the area of development. From 2001 to 2018, 105,186,133,268,500 trillion Rupiahs in Special Autonomy funds were disbursed (see Table 1).
Table 2. Recapitulation of Special Autonomy Fund Receipts
Papua and West Papua Province 2002-2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>SA + DTI FUND</th>
<th>SA FUND+ DTI+ RPH OIL AND GAS</th>
<th>TOTAL (Rp)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PAPUA (Rp) In Rupiah</td>
<td>WEST PAPUA (Rp) In Rupiah</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1,382,300,000,000</td>
<td>1,382,300,000,000</td>
<td>1,382,300,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1,539,560,000,000</td>
<td>1,539,560,000,000</td>
<td>1,539,560,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1,642,617,943,000</td>
<td>1,642,617,943,000</td>
<td>1,642,617,943,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1,775,312,000,000</td>
<td>1,775,312,000,000</td>
<td>1,775,312,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2,913,284,000,000</td>
<td>2,913,284,000,000</td>
<td>2,913,284,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>4,295,748,000,000</td>
<td>4,295,748,000,000</td>
<td>4,295,748,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3,920,142,897,000</td>
<td>680,000,000</td>
<td>4,600,142,897,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>3,489,796,098,000</td>
<td>1,844,894,148,000</td>
<td>5,334,690,246,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3,494,864,788,000</td>
<td>2,109,175,944,000</td>
<td>5,604,040,732,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>3,957,459,547,550</td>
<td>2,256,346,528,950</td>
<td>6,213,806,076,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>4,404,830,707,000</td>
<td>2,396,913,909,000</td>
<td>6,801,744,616,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>4,927,378,620,000</td>
<td>2,711,026,623,000</td>
<td>7,638,405,246,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>6,777,070,560,000</td>
<td>3,135,979,274,000</td>
<td>9,913,049,834,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>7,190,429,880,000</td>
<td>3,347,805,961,000</td>
<td>10,538,235,841,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>7,382,551,859,000</td>
<td>3,636,018,379,000</td>
<td>11,018,570,238,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>8,205,152,407,000</td>
<td>3,468,473,730,000</td>
<td>11,673,626,137,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>8,020,854,115,000</td>
<td>4,280,145,350,000</td>
<td>12,300,999,465,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>75,319,353,421,550</td>
<td>29,186,779,846,950</td>
<td>105,186,133,268,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Processed from BPS Papua Province in 2018 and Ministry of Home Affairs in 2019

Special autonomy for the Papua Province is a recognized and granted authority to the Papua Province to administer and manage the interests of the local community on its initiative, based on the aspirations and fundamental rights of the Papuan people (SA Law, 2001). It is more important for the Province and the Papuan people to administer the government and regulate the use of natural resources in the Papua Province in line with statutory requirements for the maximum benefit of the Papuan people as part of the Indonesian people. This authority also includes the ability to empower the Papuan people's socio-cultural and economic potential; including ensuring that indigenous Papuans are given proper roles through representatives of tradition, religion, and women. Its role is to participate in formulating regional policies and determining development strategies (Explanation of the Special Autonomy Law, 2001).

III. Research Method

From June 2018 to November 2021, this study was done in Jakarta and Jayapura. With qualitative data gathering and questionnaire dissemination, this study adopted a post-positivist paradigm. Interviews, observations, focus group discussions, documentation, and the distribution of questionnaires were used to gather data. Stakeholders in Papua who run special autonomy, traditional leaders, religious leaders, and women's leaders are key informants. Informants include SA stakeholders as well as senior informants from other Jakarta ministries. Employees of the provincial government, particularly the Papua Provincial Education Office, the Papua Provincial Health Office, the Provincial Bappeda, and the Public Works Office, were given the questionnaires. Before being processed, data was collected, reduced, and triangulated.
IV. Result and Discussion

There are four essential principles offered to officials in Papua based on Law No. 21 of 2001, the first of which is regulating the authority between the central government and local governments and implementing it with various idiosyncrasies. Second, recognize and respect the Papuan people's basic rights, as well as their strategic and fundamental empowerment. Third, implement good governance, which includes, a) increased community participation, including representatives of culture, religion, and women. b) Development is directed optimally to meet the basic needs of the indigenous Papuan people. c) Government governance and implementation of transparent development and table accounts for the community. And d) government governance and implementation of transparent development and table account for the community. Fourth, there is a clear delegation of authority, duties, and obligations between the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary, particularly when it comes to representing indigenous Papuans (Law on Otsus Papua, 2001). These concepts aim to create justice, equality, and the rule of law, as well as human rights respect and welfare acceleration so that people can flourish more swiftly (Agustinus, 2013). One of the informants indicated in an interview that the local government did not carry out SA’s mandate for two reasons: either the local government did not comprehend and could not finance it, or the local administration purposefully took time to prepare for Papuan independence.

The implementation of SA in Papua Province and West Papua Province is still not successful or deemed a failure, according to the results of interviews with various informants. Papua Province's Human Development Index is consistently lower than that of other provinces, both before and after Special Autonomy (BPS, 2019). According to one of the FGD participants from Bappenas, the HDI of Papua and West Papua Provinces increased, although they were still in the bottom half. Bappenas agrees that Papua looks different now than it did before SA was implemented, that is, it looks different from various development infrastructures that have already been observed in Papua (Bappenas, 2019). However, current development is seen as insufficient to improve wellbeing, particularly for indigenous Papuans, and many see special autonomy as a failure (MRP, 2015). The following is the information gathered regarding SA’s failure:

### Table 3. Evaluation of Various Parties on the Failure of Special Autonomy Papua

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Evaluato</th>
<th>Reason Failure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1.  | MRP      | - Incomplete delegation regulations arranged.  
|     |          | - MRP Authority restricted.  
|     |          | - Strategic sectors not working (management function, people original Papua as an object, working area is limited, less transparency, accountability, and control social.  
|     |          | - Unclear and unclear allocation of special autonomy funds certain.  
|     |          | - The main actor implementing Otsus is only the Provincial Government Papua |
| 2.  | Ministry of Home Affairs | - Government management that has not been maximized synergize.  
|     |          | - Poor inter-regional relations were harmonious.  
|     |          | - Lack of horizontal coordination between institutions area.  |
| 3.  | UGM      | - Authority and resources are not matched by the capacity of government.  
|     |          | - The asymmetrical design is not followed by development institutional.  
|     |          | - The policy deliberation room that limited.  
|     |          | - The discontinuity between community needs and policy.  |
| 4.  | LIPI     | - Loss of trust from the people Papuans.  
|     |          | - Weak moral and political legitimacy.  |

*Source: Processed by researchers from various sources, 2019*
With the assumption of SA failure, poor or insufficient implementation of Collaborative Governance could be the cause. Meanwhile, Wanna (2008) describes the degree of collaborative governance in the implementation of the Special Autonomy Policy in Papua as follows:

4.1 Special Autonomy Planning: Mid-Low Collaborative Governance

The MRP and the DPRP are rarely involved and do not communicate with the executive, particularly the local government, because local governments have not involved the community in determining programs or activities to be carried out. This is similar to what one FGD participant remarked, who, while being a member of the Papuan government, had no idea what program was planned to be implemented with SA monies.

"This condition is subjective," one of the Bappeda Papua informants said. It is citing various factors such as the Papuan provincial government's busy schedule, which prevents them from conducting socialization or hearings, local government concerns about pressure or a critical attitude from the public demanding transparency of SA funds, and the local government's lack of understanding about the things that should be done in the planning process.

4.2 Implementation of Special Autonomy: The lowest level of Collaborative Governance

Infield observations, the level of participation and cooperation between communities, local government, and the commercial sector does not appear to be very high. The government links Perdasus and Perdasi to special autonomy in Papua based on the FGD results, however, many people are unaware of the DPRP and MRP members. "People in the village commonly inquire what kind of monster SA is?" said one of the interview participants. What funding are available, and what are the benefits?" The initiative to enhance SA is said to have failed due to a lack of socialization and clarity. Many members of society genuinely want to assist and participate in special autonomy, but are unsure how to do so.

4.3 Resource Management: Low-level Collaborative Governance

According to observations made in the field and at research sites, the federal government has urged local governments to improve the quality and individual capabilities of many bureaucrats to raise competence in carrying out special autonomy, but this has not shown to be effective. One of the reasons for Collaborative Governance's failure to implement special autonomy in Papua is that the local government's human resources, particularly the bureaucracy, are not ready, and the governance is ineffective. Many SA monies are misappropriated and used for purposes they should not be. Collaborative Governance is at a higher level of low for this stage.

4.4 Special Autonomy Monitoring and Evaluation: Collaborative Governance Low

In this fourth type of collaborative governance, stakeholders such as local governments and central governments, in general, have many inadequacies, particularly in terms of monitoring and evaluating the Special Autonomy Fund, according to observations. The MRP and Bappenas undertook special autonomy studies that were considered unsuccessful. Collaborative Governance is at a low level at this time.
4.5 Collaborative Governance Model in the Implementation of Special Autonomy

Since the implementation of special autonomy between the central government and the private sector is quite collaborative, but local governments are not in line and are not ready, analysis using the theory of Wanna's Collaborative Governance model shows model Collaborative Governance third (Middle-level low on planning) and fourth Collaborative Governance (Lowest level).

a) Collaborative Governance between government and external (private) third parties especially concerning the supply of goods and services infrastructure development services are running quite well;

b) Collaborative Governance between government and society Individuals, especially native Papuans, as well as representatives from the Papuan People's Assembly and the DPRP, have not been very involved, let alone related to health, education, and the people's economy

Collaborative Governance of all stakeholders in Papua's special autonomy is a critical aspect that serves as the foundation for process transformation and the advancement of people's welfare in the province. Of course, to gain community support, people must be included in all decision-making processes. Community participation and collaborative governance are projected to boost motivation, satisfaction, unity, confidence, and commitment to all decisions made, not just for indigenous Papuans but also for migrants. There is both internal and external government potential in enabling stakeholder collaborative governance in Papua.

V. Conclusion

In the Collaborative Governance stage, there is a degree of Collaborative Governance in the implementation of special autonomy, which includes (1) planning, (2) program implementation, (3) human resource management, and (4) SA monitoring and evaluation. No, no one shows Collaborative Governance at a high level, but there is one that shows Collaborative Governance at a low level for each relationship that was formed.

To establish sustainable Collaborative Governance, stakeholders in the management of SA finances and the SA program must continue to be supported through various measures to boost community participation, in this case, the Native Papuan, youth organizations, and NGOs. To achieve positive Collaborative Governance, the collaborative concept advantage must be used to improve the outputs and outcomes of the special autonomy policy in Papua so that the achievement of Indonesia's autonomy program might be aided. If special autonomy is to continue to be carried out in the future, it is vital to enhance human resources in Papua, particularly the bureaucracy that will carry out effective governance and stringent oversight.

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Papua