

The Effect of Confucianism on Future Birth Rates in South Korea and Japan

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Abstract

South Korea and Japan adhere to Confucianism as the foundation of significant values and norms in their social systems. Confucianism is closely related to the patriarchal system, which makes it difficult for women in South Korea and Japan to prosper and get the right to a decent job because it only addresses women as “servants of the family.” The gender prejudice experienced by these women created the Shampoo generation in South Korea and the Satori generation in Japan. This article seeks to answer the question, “How did South Korean and Japanese women start the liberal feminist trend movement based on self-rationality?” The author analyzed data from South Korean and Japanese women who act self-rationally by refusing to marry and have children using qualitative research methods and rational choice theory. So, with declining birth rates, the tendency of this generation of Shampoo and Satori ultimately threatens the demographic stability of the country and will threaten the country’s future.

Keywords

patriarchy; confucianism; satori generation; gender; birth rate



I. Introduction

Confucianism is a philosophy that describes interpersonal interactions and behavior. Confucianism establishes moral rules on “appropriate” attitudes and behaviors and significantly impacts communication patterns and interpersonal relationships in East Asia, as demonstrated by case studies of South Korea and Japan. During the Yi dynasty (1392–1910), Confucianism arrived and became the primary reference of the State of South Korea, and the South Korean Government developed it over the following 500 years as Yugyo. Similarly, during the Tokugawa shogunate (1603-1867), Confucianism entered Japan and was utilized as a reference in establishing the nation during the Meiji administration (Tamai, 2002).

The emphasis on values and morals is established as a norm of “filial piety,” which is frequently intended and becomes a characteristic of Confucianism in South Korea. Until now, Confucianism has been a fundamental culture of South Korean society, regulating morality in fields such as lifestyle, patterns of social relations across generations, genders, and even the legal system in South Korea itself (Levi, 2013). Family life is bound by the existence of relationships between family members. Relationships in the family can be viewed from the dimensions of blood relations and social relations (Djamarah in Hendra, Y. et al. 2019). Like Japan, Confucianism promoted nationalism by teaching about the relationship between the emperor and the people using the expression “father and son.” As a result, the type of loyalty began to be stressed (Tamai, 2002). Confucianism had also influenced the division of sub-work in the family in Japan from pre-Meiji periods when males were the primary breadwinners and women became caretakers and nurturers, regarded as the highest expression of a woman’s femininity the main goal of women.

Rank	Country	Score	Change	Change	Change
100	Paraguay	0.683	4	+0.011	+0.028
101	Nepal	0.680	4	+0.009	+0.132
102	Sri Lanka	0.680	-2	+0.004	-0.040
103	Fiji	0.678	3	+0.008	n/a
104	Malaysia	0.677	-3	+0.002	+0.027
105	Hungary	0.677	-3	+0.003	+0.007
106	China	0.676	-3	+0.003	+0.020
107	Ghana	0.673	-18	-0.016	+0.007
108	Korea, Rep.	0.672	7	+0.014	+0.056
109	Kenya	0.671	-33	-0.029	+0.023
110	Belize	0.671	1	+0.008	n/a
111	Sierra Leone	0.668	3	+0.007	n/a
112	India	0.668	-4	+0.003	+0.066
113	Guatemala	0.666	-6	-0.002	+0.059
114	Myanmar	0.665	-26	-0.024	n/a
115	Mauritius	0.665	-6	+0.002	+0.032
116	Malawi	0.664	-4	+0.002	+0.020
117	Timor-Leste	0.662	7	+0.025	n/a
118	Angola	0.660	7	+0.027	+0.056
119	Benin	0.658	-1	+0.003	+0.080
120	United Arab Emirates	0.655	1	+0.013	+0.063
121	Japan	0.652	-11	-0.010	+0.008



Source: Gender Gap Index Report 2019

Within the parameters of the “Gender Gap Index” assessment issued by the World Economic Forum, four frameworks are considered in looking at the level of the gender gap in a country, including economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment. In education and health, South Korea and Japan are superior in both ways. But success in the two framework points above does not guarantee that South Korea and Japan can explore the lowest gender gap in the world. South Korea ranks 108th in the gender gap, and Japan is ranked 121st out of 153 countries globally (Forum, 2020). It is a terrible situation for the two developed countries. When a country advances in different areas such as the economy, education, health, and state industrialization, thought and action on the gender gap should decrease, but this does not apply to South Korea and Japan.

This article attempts to find the root cause of why in Confucian countries such as South Korea and Japan, there are the same liberal feminist movements as the Shampoo generation and Satori generation, young women who are reluctant to marry and bear children in terms of trends, situations, conditions, and consequences in more depth.

II. Research Method

2.1 Qualitative Research

The researchers utilized qualitative research methods in this study. As in this study, the authors tried to use this type of case study, “The influence of Confucianism on future birth rate declines in South Korea and Japan,” with the type of “experiential description” that would dig deep into the causes of Shampoo generation phenomena in South Korea and Satori generation in Japan. It can reduce future birth rates through interpretive means of data collected through the study of literature and would be processed into an interpretation.

2.2 Rational Choice Theory

Coleman says that the rational choice theory focuses more on social systems in sociological reasoning. Rational choice theory may also explain macro events mediated by internal causes, particularly in individual aspects. Because it discusses people’s attitudes who generate social patterns based on structural interventions or existing social patterns, the rational choice theory focuses more on extracting individual components. Coleman also believes that individual interactions produce larger phenomena not intended or predicted in advance (Coleman, 2013).

III. Results and Discussion

3.1 Shampoo Generation Movement in South Korea and Satori Generation in Japan

In this study, researchers analyzed that the phenomenon of declining birth rates in South Korea and Japan has one common root problem: the impact of the patriarchal system distributed by Confucianism, which increasingly disrupts economic activity and society, especially young people. Thus, the concept of patriarchy and Confucianism applied in all sectors of life can be a pathology because the patriarchal and sexist social system is considered an abnormal climate for young South Koreans and Japanese today.

This concern finally created a liberal feminist movement based on the meaning of self-rationality, as happened in the trend of the “Shampoo generation” in South Korea and the trend of “Generation Satori” in Japan. This trend is a social phenomenon in South Korean and Japanese society where people have decided not to marry due to several factors of gender inequality in their countries. Many young people in Japan and South Korea release important values between generations, especially the values and norms passed down by their parent’s generation. Therefore, it can be concluded that the younger generation in Japan and South Korea will eventually have to face the extinction of their future expectations, both in economic, social, cultural, development, growth aspects of the country, and so on (Seo, 2019).

The Shampoo and Satori generations were born under a stagnating economic condition. However, their stability has been damaged by the absence of a significantly declining labor population and a non-permanent job situation with lower job security than longer responsibilities and working hours (Nae, 2017). The Shampoo generation and Satori generation are seen as generations that lack ambition, minimize or reduce risk, and are separate from the material aspect (Kelts, 2014).

3.2 Situation

Japan understands the problem since the country is dealing with an aging population, which is one of the fundamental reasons for the gender gap. With Kathy Matsui’s Womenomics program, Japan has been experimenting with the idea of reducing the gender gap since 1999. Matsui believes that the Japanese Womenomics program will make it easier for women to pursue careers while increasing reproduction rates in Japan. Matsui’s logic was eventually approved by Abe and was reported in a Wall Street Journal article and his speech at the United Nations (Kinmonth, 2020). But the reality is, in 2018, the New York Times once published an article entitled “*Want More Babies? You Need Less Patriarchy*” dan “*How feminism could save Japan from demographic doom.*” Both articles focused on case studies of phenomena in Japan. The articles explain that outside the United States included in developed countries have a high fertility rate. But the fact is that the low fertility rate in the world is in Japan, which is an economically developed but socially conservative country, so there are women who have professional opportunities but have to shoulder a large burden on their families because of male dominance in Japan.

In the Womenomics program, women in Japan are also now willing to perform the same as male employees with workloads that require overtime and placement in offices located far enough from where they live for several years following the contract period or tenure (*tanshin funin*) that they agreed to (Putri & Iskandar, 2018). Female workers in Japan are also required to work without interruption, even though they are faced with a child-rearing situation. The role of equality is a form of the Womenomic program carried out by Shinzo Abe to increase women’s participation in the economic sector and increase the potential contribution of women to look more active. However, the fact is that the field

is very different. Young Japanese women who have careers are considered “office flowers” because they are only given simple job responsibilities such as making tasks or recurring reports, serving tea, making copies of jobs, and the sad thing is that they will eventually be replaced by younger female workers (Ogaswara, 1998).

South Korea is confronted with the same population dilemma as Japan for the first time. Both countries face a societal reality in which followers of the Satori generation and the Shampoo generation gather to undo the intention of marriage to accomplish and retain their goals. Their logic also directly influences the country’s fertility rate, which is lower than the mortality rate. The decline in the birth rate will immediately produce a situation where the country’s economic growth potential will continue to worsen, particularly in terms of very few future employment levels.

The decline in the birth rate is a form of resistance and concern felt by the women’s society of South Korea and Japan regarding the social burdens formed by Confucianism, such as the high cost of education, housing, commodities, and also concerns in the world of work, such as maintaining employment status, wages, and positions because it must be recognized that in the system of work in South Korea and Japan, women have less chance of getting a job than men. According to Noritoshi Furuichi’s book, young Japanese no longer seek an identity in their work or their parents’ ideals. Many young Japanese graduates prefer to work in temporary jobs or contracts that offer fewer incentives or pay less than full-time positions. As a result, young Japanese people find it difficult to consider marriage or have children (Ministry of Health, 2021).

The result of a case study of the Shampoo generation trend in South Korea was an act of self-freedom above self-rationality. South Korean women may fight for their equality claims by using the humanitarian ideals they learn about gender injustice, such as patriarchal and sexist system patterns in the labor force. The topic of women’s discrimination, according to liberal feminism, centers around economic and political involvement. In supporting South Korean society’s economic difficulties, many South Korean women promote their worldview through liberal feminist thought and deeds of self-rationality, with the challenge of “pursuing equal opportunities and rights.” Furthermore, South Korean women emphasize the rational aspect of “respecting individual freedom.” The right to choose is not granted for no reason. They do the action of the Shampoo generation trend due to the strict work system or office in South Korea.

Women in South Korea and Japan have very little chance of getting jobs in public and private companies. Female workers usually experience apparent discrimination in the office, which, among other things, means it is very difficult to get a promotion even though the performance is equal to or better than that of other male workers. Furthermore, women employees have found it extremely difficult to earn the same wage as males in the past. Furthermore, female workers are frequently excluded from the company’s project plans since it is considered unpatriotic to be loyal to the organization. Women taking many pregnancy and maternity leave set the standard for female loyalty. Companies in South Korea would suffer significant losses due to the leave, even though work is a humanitarian practice that should be implemented in every company and throughout the country.

There is a particularly concerning pattern for women in South Korea, where employment discrimination over patriarchy. Regarding discrimination, there is an assumption that South Korean companies have adopted so far that women will only make a loss to the company if the company concerned must continue to “*maintain workers who must take care of personal needs.*” The intended personal need is that women in South Korea are faced with only one choice: their whole life will continue to be devoted to serving the family. So, South Korean women will face the big risk of losing a lot of jobs,

positions, and salaries and the financial stigma if they do not work. Conversely, suppose these women choose to work. In that case, society's special designation is that they are "not whole women." Because of the stigmas that women face in South Korea, many women in their 30s and 40s go through a crisis characterized by high-stress levels. The pattern is driven by a patriarchal system propagated by Confucian traditions, lifestyle choices that influence marriage, parental roles, values, and norms between genders that will depress labor market numbers. So, the formation of a nuclear family is the last option in forming a family in South Korea and impacts the pattern of decreasing birth rates (Song & Ahn, 2018).

The movement of South Korean women ultimately made little change. According to data provided by the Global Economy, there is an increase in women's participation in the field of work of 53.77% (GlobalEconomy, 2021). According to the data, South Korean women have successfully fought for men's rights. They also continue to battle to keep their employment because of the large involvement of South Korean women in the labor force; thus, the higher their reasoning toward their dependents and duties for themselves and their families, the more they must earn. Because of the large proportion of women in the labor force, many Korean women are afraid to have children. It is since their current accomplishments were not simple. They have to fight for many things, and if they get married and have children, they are faced with a difficult life choice, namely the social norms of Confucianism that develop in South Korean society.


Similarly, many young women before the Satori generation consider marriage only a stepping stone before marriage. The norm regarding child and family education, which is the responsibility of women in Japan, is the main aspect that must be prioritized over work and career (Rauch, 1992). During the economic boom era born in 1947–1949, women in Japan aged 20–24 had a pattern of leaving their jobs in favor of dedication to their nuclear family, namely taking care of the family and parenting. Some Japanese women aged 45–49 eventually return to work as part-time workers. However, the involvement of Japanese women in companies is generally only temporary because the main purpose of Japanese women is to help a little to add to the family economy. So, the mention of male chauvinism for the cultural tradition of workers and companies dominated by men, the lack of career opportunities, and very inadequate jobs such as part-time work or low-wage contracts, there is no security. Many conditions must be met (Nae, 2017). The lack of support for women to work from their male partners is a picture of the marginalization of women in Japan. However, women in Japan have now moved to fight the tradition in Japan through their participation in the career field (Averianova & Nae, 2016). As many as 70% of women in Japan have been involved in their participation in the economic sector. As many as 30% of women in Japan work in the part-time sector, and leadership roles are still quite low. However, Japanese women who predicate a college education have entered the full-time or permanent employment sector.

Returning to South Korea's societal reality: Women in South Korean culture have just one option in the context of Confucianism: commit themselves to their families till the end of their life. Furthermore, the woman can work with her husband and his family. Almost all companies in Korea and Japan will reduce the pay of female employees who take maternity leave, have a child, or stop working for an extended period. So many women regret it and eventually adopt a more sensible approach and freely defend their rights to enjoy life. That is working without having children. As for some of the statements made by Korean women who are reluctant to have children in their lives, they are reported on the BBC news channel (Maybin, 2018) such as;

“In this modern era, the struggle to achieve a job as it has been done today is tough, and if an individual wants to have children, then they must have their own home, which is impossible in Korea.” -Anon

“I don’t want to feel the pain of giving birth. After all, it will hurt my career”, “I would never plan to have a child, never.” – Jang Yun-Hwa, 24 years

South Korea has a gender gap in the empowerment of its workers. Female workers’ mobility and time series are frequently used to justify their distribution in local businesses. The company’s view is that maternity leave, marriage leave, etc., is considered detrimental. The EPL (Employment Protection Legislation) also stipulates that the female workforce in South Korea is below average. In addition, the EPL found that the dismissal rate in South Korea was categorized as exceeding the EPL limit of 1.45, while the dismissal rate in South Korea itself was 1.63. The same goes for the wage gap in South Korea. Women are usually placed in low to middle positions only. Many women are also not promoted to undergo an office project plan because they cannot maintain their loyalty to the company. The data shows that the strata gap between genders in the world of work in South Korea can be an obstacle to the development and development of women’s productivity (Cho & Lee, 2015).



Source: Journal of Sustainability 2015

On the statistical image above, it can be seen that there is a disparity in salaries and workers in various countries, as in the case study of South Korea and Japan, where there is a very drastic difference between men and women. In addition to income and seats in the economic sector for South Korean and Japanese women, when women have earned what they aspire to be a permanent job in a company both domestically and privately, they will be realistic in keeping the job to support themselves and their families. Female workers will face long-term salary cuts or reductions if they take maternity or marital leave. Women believe that their rights are difficult and that their achievement thus far with many sacrifices would be in vain if they have children later in life (Cho & Lee, 2015).

There is also a form of gender discrimination experienced by female workers in Japan known as “*mata-Hara*” maternity harassment. Female workers are abused both physically and mentally during pregnancy, childbirth, and raising children. A survey conducted by the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (RENGO) revealed that one in five female workers (20.9%) experienced a melee. As a result of the *Mata-Hara*, many Japanese women delayed, if not refused, to carry out the marriage. Some female workers abort because they don’t want to lose their jobs since many Japanese companies lay off their female workers if they find out they are pregnant. But there is no definitive law by the Japanese Government to protect female workers from *Mata-Hara* (Putri & Iskandar, 2018).

There is a statement made by Japanese women regarding their reluctance to get married are summarized in The Japan Times news, such as;


“I thought, if I get married, I will just have to do more housework. I wanted to figure out how to live on my own” – Sanae Hanaoka

The meaning of Hanaoka's quote is that many women in Japan have started delaying or are reluctant to carry out the traditional step, namely marriage. The percentage of working women has now reached a fairly high level compared to before. Women in Japan are also tired of being demanded to be able to handle everything. Therefore, many Japanese women take more rational steps for their problems, namely avoiding the norms or culture of a society that developed from Confucianism and will bind them and will hinder their careers (Rich, 2019).


Japanese women are increasingly reflecting their rational choices by pursuing their interests, talents, and hobbies instead of adapting to gender roles traditionally shared through Confucianism. Working for women is a way to survive and a means of self-actualization. Japanese women now also have careful considerations before marriage, such as mutual relationships between couples with the benchmark of “the extent to which prospective partners are willing to share household duties and about raising children” and so on (Mirza, 2016). This movement exists because of the rights discrimination experienced by female workers, even though they have educational backgrounds and the same work potential as men as a trigger. This change began with women who were more concerned with careers and began delaying marriage, not wanting to get married (*Bankouka*). It occurred due to improving gender equality in Japan (Prayogo & Iskandar, 2018).

The situation became complicated for women to get and maintain jobs in Japan and South Korea because of the patriarchal system established by Confucianism. Lifestyle patterns in the modern era, such as the rapidly increasing cost of living, are also a strong encouragement for the next generation of children to change their thinking patterns to be more realistic about the situation, especially women (Mahmoudi, 2017). Women ultimately face special challenges such as pursuing a career, balancing the family economy, and working as domestic labor for their families and their husbands' families. Such special challenges can affect a woman's movement in her fertility or regenerative choices in the future (Hye & Kim, 2017).

3.3 Consequences



Source: BBC World Service, Seoul (Maybin, 2018)



Source: Japan Forward, 2020 (Kinmonth, 2020)

Suppose we want to complete the women’s rights movement in South Korea and Japan against discrimination in our jobs. In that case, the Government and society should gradually eliminate patriarchal norms that are too binding in society. But this is impossible because the generation of parents and the results of moral values applied to their children and grandchildren for Confucianism and patriarchy itself are difficult to escape. Therefore, the Government does several things to resolve the phenomenon in South Korea and Japan in anticipation of population degradation that will destroy life in the two countries. It such as preparing a task force providing incentives to its citizens, especially women, and guaranteeing the lives of children in the nation’s successor agency.

	2000	2020	2050
Japan	17.2	28.5	37.8
South Korea	7.2	15.6	38.2
Thailand	8.6	16.2	35.9
Singapore	7.2	17.9	32.6

Source: Sung Ho Chung 2013:32

Based on the data provided by the United Nations, it is clear that with a low rate of birth stability, the aging process of the population and the depopulation of the countries of South Korea and Japan will be very fast. Both South Korea and Japan are projected to begin a drastic population decline in 2025 and 2030 (Chung, 2013). The consequences of South Korea’s future decline in birth rates will be seen in the long term, when the older generation, aged 65 and above, will dominate the population of South Korea and Japan (Mahmoudi, 2017).

The decline in birth rates can already be seen because some schools in South Korea have been neglected and unmanageable because many primary and secondary schools have closed since 2005. From 1982 to 2016, 3,725 schools in South Korea were closed due to student shortages. The loss in numeracy is equivalent to the closure of 113 schools each year (Teh, 2021). Similarly, Japan experienced school breakups of up to 400–500 schools per year starting from elementary to secondary school. The cause is none other than the great decline in the birth rate in Japan. You can see that the peak of the wave of elementary school students in Japan was 13.4 million people, and it decreased drastically to 6.77 million people (Nobou, 2012).

Furthermore, there is the influence of Japan’s declining birth rate, which may appear to be little adjustments but has a significant impact in that small city in Japan are on the verge of collapse. Due to Japan’s low birth rate in small cities, while adolescents and adults migrate to cities. Japan and South Korea also have fairly high empty house presentations, commonly referred to as “ghost houses.” In 2018, Japan had empty homes

at 13% and South Korea at 6.7%. The percentage of these two countries is greater than the percentage of other developed countries such as the United Kingdom and France (Post, 2021).

3.4 Solutions offered by the Government

The South Korean Government formulated several policies to address this low birth rate, such as medical assistance for less fertile couples, social protection for child labor, childcare services, and family reconciliation facilities. Family reconciliation facilities are important because the number of divorces in South Korea has increased significantly, which means the problem comes from the married couple and the in-laws. The Government also provides child care facilities at work (Fleckenstein & Lee, 2014). The South Korean Government also deploys tax incentives for international marital migrations, one method to secure the workforce population, marriage, birth, and sociodemographic structure (Ra & Jang, 2014).

Another effort reported by the official BBC news channel said that starting in 2022, every child born with South Korean citizenship will be given cash as a bonus of 2 million won. The South Korean Government also seeks the fee to help parents go into labor, and there is also an incentive of 300,000 won given to the baby every month until the baby reaches the age of one year. The monthly incentive will increase every year, reaching 500 thousand won, which will be enforced in 2025 (Nariswari & Chozanah, 2021). In addition, it also reduces the abortion rate in South Korea by providing regulations regarding the prohibition of ultrasound before the age of the fetus is even seven months old. This policy is an effort by the South Korean Government to break the stigma of Confucianism in South Korean society that baby boys are more beneficial than baby girls. The policy of banning ultrasound before the age of 7 months of the fetus is also said to be a form of progress and appreciation for women's rights. Previously, the abortion rate in South Korea was very high.

There have also been efforts by the Japanese Government since the 1990s to control the decline in birth rates by increasing employment opportunities for women and expanding child care services. However, fertility rates only edged up by 1.26 in 2005 and finally had to keep falling again in 2016 until now. The new policy that has been updated is to provide economic support to every child born, child development care, higher child support, and free education programs. Shinzo Abe also provides pre-school education services to every child in Japan that can be deposited for free from 3–5 years of age (Times, 2020). Abe has also voiced the Womenomics program to improve women's participation and well-being. However, the reality is that women in Japan have to fight hard to get a job. Higher education can also attract the potential for decent jobs. Society's mindset towards the traditional role of women both in the household and in the workplace can change (Parvazian, Gill, & Chiera, 2017). *Mata Hara* also contributed to the decline in fertility rates in Japan. It starts from the case of *Mata Hara*, which makes women afraid of getting pregnant and giving birth to the womb to avoid discrimination and keep their jobs. But the Japanese Government has not taken any more action on this.

Many of the family's young couples and women have established that if patriarchy continues to bind social life and its rules, they will inevitably have to continue to live their lives following the rationality they have and are still reluctant to have children over the intensive babies the Government offers. Both the South Korean and Japanese governments adopt a slightly erroneous method of treating this problem, focusing on 'minimizing the fall in birth rate' rather than social inequality, which is at the foundation of this trend's

problem (Shampoo & Satori). As a result, Japanese and South Koreans are still hesitant to marry and bear children from their wombs.

IV. Conclusion

People in Japan and South Korea make Confucianism a guiding model in their lives, both in value and morality. Confucianism spreads patriarchal and sexist thinking in many aspects, including family and work. Confucianism teaches us that boys are more beneficial than girls. Androcentrism ultimately makes it difficult for women to develop and get a suitable and decent job according to their background and expertise. For this form of discrimination to be obtained, the trend of the Satori generation in Japan and the Shampoo generation in South Korea on the burden of burdensome social systems such as family servants and livelihoods that must be faced both for themselves and their families. They make the rationalist actions of Japanese and South Korean women reluctant to commit to having children.

Both the South Korean Shampoo generation and the Satori generation appear to be concerned about why they are still hesitant to form a marital institution. When young individuals in South Korea and Japan come from less established social backgrounds, they will consider having a career and a solid income for their lives. Maintaining economic stability is a difficult task, especially for women. Both trends strongly illustrate significant concerns from declining marriage rates and childbirth. The impact of the regeneration system in both countries is minimal and will put both countries on the verge of collapse in the future. The countries of South Korea and Japan will face the aging situation of their countries, minimal human resources, and the rotation of the economic wheels that are becoming increasingly difficult in the coming days.

So, the reflection of the action of the Shampoo generation and the Satori generation trend itself is where women can be included in the public domain and be involved in society. Each person has the right to make the best option for herself in a given situation, which is especially important for South Korean and Japanese women who live in the system's most patriarchal area. So, the "right" must still be given above the moral value of "goodness" based on individual rights. Koreans have the right to choose what is good for themselves, including focusing and maintaining their career path, which has been very difficult to obtain. In this economic issue, South Korean and Japanese women will continue to fight for their framework through liberal feminist thinking, "the pursuit of equal opportunities and rights," and becomes a whole human part of that rationality (personhood). Rationality is a type of self-awareness of the reaction that is not beneficial for their life choices that are present in both generations.

Suppose the Government does not address the problem of its roots, namely Confucianism, which restricts freedom of expression and women's rights in South Korea and Japan. In that case, the Shampoo and Satori generation trends will be tough to eliminate. Government should be more sensitive and quicker to address this issue to boost birth rates in South Korea and Japan and avoid further population decline.

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