I. Introduction

Security sector is referred as the mechanisms created by the state to protect the rights of its citizens, maintain order, and ensure stability and security. Police as a prominent actor whose functions include at least three things, crime detection and prevention, maintaining public order, and serving the public interest (UNODC, 2011). In many developing countries, police are considered as part of a security establishment and also law enforcement. Jones defines the police as an organized institution in maintaining peace and maintaining social order through law enforcement, crime investigations, and as information intermediaries (Jones, 2008). Development is a systematic and continuous effort made to realize something that is aspired. Development is a change towards improvement. Changes towards improvement require the mobilization of all human resources and reason to realize what is aspired. In addition, development is also very dependent on the availability of natural resource wealth. The availability of natural resources is one of the keys to economic growth in an area. (Shah, M. et al. 2020)

In recent decades, police in developing countries have experienced police reform, both structurally and culturally. This is a consequence of the social and political changes taking place in the country. The relationship between the state and the police as an institution is very dynamic and often reflects changes in the police force, for example, interventions of the ruling political parties or to a certain extent the police's key actors and
political parties within a certain period. The two relations, of course, have an impact on the performance of the police as public servants and the independence of the police in general. Essentially, police reform demands a change in the police's body. The main reason behind police reform is the idea that the police are a political tool. The difference between accountability and operational control of the police is still a matter of debate. The consequence is that the creation of professional, fully independent and objective police services is hampered by the idea that the police are only one of the political instruments possessed by the state authorities.

Changes in the police force also took place in the Southeast Asian region. A wave of political change that occurred in the countries of Southeast Asia in the late 90s created a new political climate. One impact is police and military reform, for example, the police of Indonesia, Thailand, and Philippines. The presence of police reform in the country occurred because of a change in the political system from authoritarian to democracy. Besides, the lack of public trust in the police, which is a hallmark of public relations and the police is also a major factor hampering police reform. Without public trust in the police, policing by consent will be difficult to achieve. Thus, the police in these three countries still have a long way to go to achieve police reform that is in line with expectations and accordance with democratic values.

II. Review of Literature

The conceptual framework is a line of thought on a relationship between one concept and another to be able to provide an overview and direct assumptions related to the variables to be studied (Pandiangan, 2015; Pandiangan et al., 2021; Tobing et al., 2018). It can be used in various fields of work and is most commonly used to visually explain the main concepts or variables and the relationships between them that need to be studied. The conceptual framework is expected to provide an overview and direct assumptions regarding the variables to be studied (Asyraini et al., 2022; Octiva et al., 2018; Pandia et al., 2018; Pandiangan et al., 2022). The conceptual framework provides guidance to researchers in formulating research problems (Octiva et al., 2021; Pandiangan et al., 2018). The research conceptual framework is the link or relationship between one concept and another from the problem to be studied. The conceptual framework is obtained from the concept of science/theory that is used as the basis for research (Octiva, 2018; Pandiangan, 2018; Pandiangan, 2022).

Police reform refers to changes in the police institutional body both structurally, legally, and culturally. The goal is to ensure that policing becomes more effective, more accountable, and more responsive to the needs of all members of society within a framework of democratic security sector governance. Police reform aims to improve police interactions with other security sectors, such as the courts, the executive, legislative, or an independent who has a supervisory function shown in Figure 1.
Police reform is crucial as a public security institution considering the politics, law, and social dynamics thus it has to be adjusted based on changing security needs (DCAF, 2016). Furthermore, police reform is essential for the development of a stable democracy, the creation of an open market economy and the development of political and social structures that represent the values and needs of society (Downes, 2004). The success and effectiveness of police reform depends on the state due to the structure of the police itself. Police are supervised directly under the President therefore the state has the authority to decide important strategies, both operational and tactical strategies.

Police reform requires coordination among many stakeholders. The central government, collectively with the local government, must actively support the reform resolution while convincing other stakeholders to support the reform. In this case, those stakeholders include supervisory institutions, management authorities, and civil society organizations. Furthermore, in certain cases such as peacemaking, international actors can assist the police reform led by the central government (DCAF, 2016). Police reform generally consists of four main phases as shown in Figure 2, namely strategic assessment, strategic planning, implementation, and evaluation.
III. Result and Discussion

As parts of Association of South East Asian Nations, Indonesia, Thailand, and Philippines share many similarities including police institutions. It includes the structure and culture of the police, police reform agenda, to its police reform’s obstacles. Even though it has been around for more than two decades, police reforms haven't been accomplished completely. Most likely obstructed by numerous reasons, including political intervention, internal corruption, and abuse of authority that still occurs in police institutions in those countries.

In socio-political aspects, Indonesia and Philippines are both archipelagic countries. Both also adhere to a presidential republic system, whose head of state is led by directly elected president. Unlike the two, Thailand is a parliamentary unitary state governed by the prime minister and adheres to a constitutional monarchy with a king as their main leader. Indonesia, Thailand, and Philippines use a bicameral legislative system which consists of the upper house and the lower house. In Indonesia, the house of representatives (DPR) represents the lower house and the regional representative council (DPD) represents the upper house. Whereas in Thailand and the Philippines consists of the senate as the upper house and the house of representatives representing the lower house. Moreover, the democratic status of these three countries are different. In Indonesia and the Philippines, the democratic status is categorized as partly free. Although the degree of freedom in both countries - which in some aspects are low - both still carry out democratic values thus still acknowledged as democratic countries. Unlike Indonesia and Philippines, Thailand has suffered a rollback in democracy since the 2014 military coup which thai leadership was taken over by the military junta. Even though Thailand is no longer classified as democratic country, their democratic values are somewhat shared among citizens such as civil liberties.

Table 1. Comparative Political Systems in Indonesia, Thailand, and Philippines

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Source: Compiled from Various Sources

Both government structure and democracy index of a country directly and indirectly influences the police structurally and culturally. It is expected that parliaments in a parliamentary political system have a bigger role in police governance as the government will closely follow the politics in parliament. Meanwhile, in a presidential system, the president has more leverage to govern by executive decree which decreases the role of parliament. In countries with centralized structure, parliament has a greater role in police governance than in federated countries. It is more likely due to limited parliament’s role compared to local authorities over police. Moreover, the government system also plays a part in the police system. Parliaments in countries which implement parliamentary systems have a greater role in determining policies or directives for national police. Whereas in a presidential country, executive power determines and influences the police (Aguja and Born, 2017).

In some cases, police forces are also influenced by democratic index of the country. In countries that tend to be free and hold democratic values, police institutions are more
likely to be independent or more regulated. The police force is commonly led by an appointed police chief whose appointment is through a specific mechanism and approved by the parliament or certain authority. Contrarily in authoritarian and not free countries, police institutions are supervised by the armed forces, become paramilitary wings, and generally led by the leader of the armed forces. This also applies to external regulatory bodies. Predominantly, free and democratic countries have higher chances to have external oversight institutions whose functions are to oversee the police’s performance and have a certain degree of authority (Aguja and Born, 2017).

3.1 Police in Indonesia

The National Police of the Republic of Indonesia (Polri) is the police institution in Indonesia. Constitutionally, Polri is directly commanded by the President of the Republic of Indonesia. The National Police is led by the National Police Chief (Kapolri) whose position is equivalent to the minister. In general, Kapolri serves for around 3 years. Despite being appointed directly by the President, the appointment of Kapolri is not entirely the president’s prerogative. According to Polri law, the president must obtain written approval from the DPR to appoint a new National Police Chief. In the process, the commission responsible for the legislative will evaluate — through due diligence and suitability — the candidates nominated by the President and then the DPR decides whether to approve or not. In this case, DPR as the legislative body has an important role in approving or declining presidential nominations for Kapolri, as well as having legal authority to make laws, oversee and approve Polri’s budget. Furthermore, there is an external oversight body, the National Police Commission (Kompolnas) which is mandated to monitor and supervise the performance of the National Police. Kompolnas was formed to support the president in formulating policies related to the National Police including in providing input for nominating candidates for the National Police. However, even so, Kompolnas is still far from being an independent oversight body due to its closeness to Polri. It is based on the fact that Kompolnas is directly under the President and its members consist of former members of Polri, government and high-ranking officials, such as ministers.

The Indonesian National Police is an inherent and inseparable part of Indonesian history. Polri’s involvement spotted since the war of independence, the period of rebellion, until today. The establishment of Polri was marked during the independence period when the police were formed to assist the Indonesian army against the Dutch and Japanese occupations during the 1945-1948 period. During the struggle for independence, this era was known as the era of Polri Perjuangan. The beginning of the preparation of the National Police was marked by the appointment of RS Soekanto as Chief of the National Police. President Soekarno appointed RS Soekanto as Chief of the National Police after the first cabinet meeting on 29 September 1945. The appointment coincided with President Soekarno’s order to form national police, or what is now known as the Polri — which then turned under the prime minister's responsibility through PP No. 11/SD in 1946.

Indonesian Police underwent many modifications before 1961, such as its displacement from under the Prime Minister, part of the Ministry of Defense and under the coordination of several departments such as the Public Prosecutor, the Ministry of Law, etc. Later in 1961, the integration of the police into Indonesian Armed Force (ABRI) strengthened the militaristic culture in Indonesia. Essentially, the approach occurs in many countries where police’s developments are through the armed forces’ interventions (Muradi, 2017). Following the integration, Polri faced political pressure and intervention openly. Polri became a political target by political parties and elites to gain support.
Moreover, several Polri officials tried to approach the political elite for personal interests in the form of promotions (Muradi, 2017).

To a certain degree, changes in government regimes have an effect on changes in the police force. Likewise in Indonesia, the transition from the old order to the new order contributed to the development and changes within the National Police. At the end of the old order era, police were integrated into the armed forces and further strengthened during the new order era. During the New Order Era, Polri was paralyzed and controlled by new order regime policies through the Ministry of Security and Defense and the leader of the Armed Forces as the Polri’s direct commando (Muradi, 2017). As a paramilitary wing of ABRI, Polri left as an institution without autonomy which impacts Polri’s militaristic management in nature, not civilian-oriented.

The fall of Soeharto's new order regime after 32 years pushed Polri to get out of their unfavorable situation. In April 1999, the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) passed a resolution establishing the National Police (Polri), as a separate institution while the remaining three branches of the armed forces (army, navy, and air force) united into the National Military. Both tasks were divided; Polri is assigned with security and order matters, while the military deals with national defense. In July 2000, through Presidential Decree No. 89 of 2000, Polri was transferred from the Department of Defense to the President's office. Then, in August 2000, the constitutional amendment stated the scope of the police's authority, namely to 'maintain security and public order', 'protect, guard, and serve the public', and to 'enforce the law'.

At the beginning of the reform era in 1998, the main agenda was to combat corrosive corruption. One of the main targets is to reform the Polri’s organizational structure into an independent body separated from military organizations (Nurmandi, 2016). Since Polri’s police reform agenda was introduced, they planned a gradual reform program ‘grand strategy’ from 2005 to 2025. The program is divided into three phases. The first five years, from 2005 to 2009, is the 'building trust' phase; the second phase, from 2010 to 2014, the 'build partnership' phase; and the latest phase, from 2015 to 2025, is the 'striving for excellence' phase. With the aforementioned fall of the new order era, it marked a checkpoint of the Polri reform agenda (Hidayat, 2016).

Even though there seems to be progress, the police reform agenda faces serious obstacles. One of the reasons is the position of the Police itself. In Indonesia, Muradi says at least four things that hinder the National Police in optimizing and maximizing its role and function within the framework of the reform agenda (Muradi, 2015). These obstacles include, first, the politicization of the police by political authorities. One perfect example is a case during President Abdurahman Wahid which he replaced the Police Chief unilaterally on the basis of personal interests without parliamentary approval led to the impeachment of President Abdurahman Wahid (Muradi, 2014).

Second, regarding the Polri’s roles and functions which were considered ineffective by the public. Misuse and abuse of authority often done by the police, from extortion, taking personal advantage, to corruption makes Polri's image unfavorable to the public’s eyes. A survey conducted in 2011 by the National Police itself showed that 33.4 percent of its respondents were dissatisfied with the police. Corruption is considered to be a major barrier factor in increasing public trust and support for the Indonesian police (Davies et al., 2016). In fact, public trust in police services is important in policing and police reform.

Third, the internal problems in the institution. As a part of the state’s apparatus, the Police cannot be separated from bureaucratic practices which tend to make the administration process complicated. Furthermore, the unpreparedness of the National Police in changing its police’ paradigm—civilian rather than militaristic — after being
separated from ABRI. Until this day, police are still trapped in hierarchical and institutional arrogance that should no longer be prioritized.

Finally, issues related to the external parties and agencies. On one hand, the dispute of the division of authority between the National Police and the Armed Force (TNI) after being disjointed. On the other hand, the National Police still has to face other legal institutions such as the Attorney General’s Office, the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, and with the KPK in terms of authority. These potentially lever up frictions and conflicts between the National Police and aforementioned agencies due to lack of coordination which led to public’s distrust of the police.

3.2 Police in Thailand

The Royal Thai Police (RTP) is a Thai Police force led by a Commissioner General. Initially the RTP was under the supervision of the Prime Minister, but since the military junta in 2014 the RTP is supervised by the military junta. The Thai Police Commissioner is appointed by the military junta government. In Thailand, in addition to internal oversight mechanisms within the Royal Thai Police, the Ombudsman and the National Commission on Human Rights also play a role in investigating complaints regarding law violation by police. Under the 2009 Organic Act, the Ombudsman is given the authority to investigate complaints and to find facts related to the violations committed by the police.

The establishment of the RTP has a long history. RTP formed in 1455, around 500 years ago. The first modernization of the RTP system took place during the reign of King Rama IV, which was designed by an Englishman Captain Joseph Byrd Ames (ASEANAPOL, 2022). Captain Ames was brought in to form a police brigade to operate alongside the traditional Siamese patrol brigade in Bangkok in the mid-19th century. From 1875, the new brigade operated under regulations and was assigned to guard Siam City. Dr. Eric Lawson, Minister of the Interior advisor, combined and modernized police and patrol brigades to form a municipal police force with a British model in the early 1900s. Provincial brigades were set up separately along military lines for internal security and the security of the Siam border. The two were united as a single department on October 13, 1915, which was later celebrated as 'police day' (Phongpaichit dan Baker. 2004).

However, modern police forces essentially emerged in the 1950s under the leadership of Police General Phao Sriyanon - where Thai police were funded, equipped and trained with the United States’ support for strategic objectives against the threat of communism in Southeast Asia (Fineman, 1997). At that time, the police and military forces in Thailand were equally strong and large, but the rivalry between the factions in the armed forces ended when Phao Sriyanon was dismissed in 1957 after being proven to deviate his authority. Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat later became the Prime Minister through a military coup in 1958, and eventually performed as the Thai Police Chief (Chaloemtiarana, 2007). In the hands of Sarit Thanarat, the Thai police were weakened and overshadowed by the strength of the army (Chambers, 2013).

RTP received the attention of the Thai people when the students' protest took place against military forces in 1972-1973. The protest led to the death of demonstrators and showed the brutality of the military apparatus — and also the police — which became known as Black May tragedy. The tragedy contributed to Thai’s history line which encouraged the enactment of the 1997 Constitution-- known as the most democratic constitution in Thai history (Connors, 1999). The involvement of RTP in the tragedy was reviewed in 1979 but the adjustment and modification of the RTP did not lead to a massive re-transformation (Poothakool and Glendinning, 2013). Under the democratic reforms of the 1997 Constitution, RTP went through massive changes. First, the Law for the National
Police Council was presented to provide more representation through elected officials. Second, the RTP was removed from the Ministry of the Interior to be directly under the Prime Minister. In this case, all matters concerning the police became the responsibility of the elected Prime Minister. Third, Parliamentary Ombudsman, an external oversight body was formed to receive complaints about civil services and the performance of the RTP. Finally, the Regional Police Council was formed to encourage public involvement (Poothakool and Glendinning, 2013).

Likewise Indonesia and the Philippines, Thailand's police reform issues continue to occur until today. In 2001, Thaksin Shinawatra, a former RTP lieutenant colonel, became Prime Minister of Thailand. Under his leadership, Thaksin began to revive the police force which police funding then politicized for his political interests. After the 1997 Constitution, the RTP was directly under the Prime Minister which confirmed Thaksin’s authority as a Prime Minister over RTP. Later in 2004, the Thai Police Act was introduced and regulated the existence of local councils formed at the level of the police station that applies in Thailand. The main goal of the local council is to encourage community involvement in law enforcement. However, in practice, the council was used to support the operation of informal networks among police, officials, politicians and local businessmen, rather than representing the interests of the people in the region (Poothakool and Glendinning, 2013). Thaksin's re-election in 2005 led to a 2006 military coup in which was described as a 'good coup'. It was triggered by the politicization of RTP as a political tool by Thaksin for his personal and political interests. This fact is supported by the Head of the PRC which stated that RTP is a legacy product of the feudal government system which was adopted by Thailand for a long time. The RTP is seen as a centralized force led by the Commission General who reports directly to the Prime Minister. Judging from its history and militaristic style, RTP is often regarded as the 'fourth branch of the armed forces'.

After the 2014 military coup, the military junta took control of Thailand once more. It directly affects the development of RTP police reform agenda. Led by Thai’s army commander, the whole structure and political system of Thailand underwent changes, including the police. The National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) states that police reform agenda is one of the top priority policy issues. Subsequently, the RTP was supervised by the military junta. Although the reform agenda became the junta’s priority, RTP is still haunted by numerous obstacles such as lack of transparency, corruption, even becoming a political tool by the military junta. Wasant Lueangprapat stated police reform in Thailand is impossible to accomplish due to military exploitation for personal’s interests. Furthermore, Wasant mentioned NCPO exploits the police to implement its policy and to ensure its authority. Both are proven by lack of junta’s involvement in RTP’s development such as its offices’ welfare or its institutions’ developments (Fernquest and Ngamkham, 2016.). Essentially, RTP is left dying slowly by the military forces.

3.3 Police in Philippines

The Philippines National Police (PNP) was established based on Republic Act Number 6975. Its main goal is to conduct arrests and investigation and crime prevention. PNP is under the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) under the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) (Aguja and Born, 2017). NAPOLCOM is mandated to control PNP administratively. NAPOLCOM is mandated by the 1987 Constitution, formed by Republic Act Number 4864, and was reorganized by Republic Act Number 6975. Its authority was expanded under Republic Act Number 8551 to carry out investigations into anomalies and irregularities in the police. NAPOLCOM is a collegial body consisting of ex-officio chairperson, 4 regular commissioners, and PNP heads as ex-
officio members which are elected by the President of the Philippines. The PNP is led by an appointed Director General by the President of the Philippines with confirmation and recommendations from NAPOLCOM. The PNP Director General serves for 4 years (Philippines Republic Act Number 6975 Department of Interior and Local Government Act 1990).

Historically, the establishment of Philippines police today is a combination of colonial influences from Spain and the United States. The police in the Philippines has a long history since the Spanish colonial period, with the first police institutional body established along the Spanish Civil Guardia military line by Royal Decree in 1852 (Campos, 1991) Besides Spain, the United States occupation also contributed to its current police’s situation. The United States took over the Philippine from Spain after Spain and the United States War. Under United States’s colonialism, The Philippines people rebelled into the United States and their resistance at that time was carried out guerrilla. To deal with it, the United States eventually established the Insular Constabulary under the leadership of Henry T. Allen, who recruited 3,000 troops from the Philippines with the goal of combatting the Filipino rebellion itself. Insular Constabulary changed its name in 1901 to Philippine Constabulary which later became a national police institution after World War II — which consist of military and police power. In 1976, Philippine Constabulary (later Integrated National Police) was given operational and administrative control over the Philippines civilian police institution as part of President Marcos martial law policy. He wanted full control over the military and police in order to prevent differences of opinion within the ranks of the security services (Abueva, 1988). This puts the Integrated National Police under the control of General Command Philippine Constabulary, a part of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (Federal Research Division, 2009).

Philippine Constabulary finally changed its name to PNP in 1990, with the enactment of Republic Act 6975 by the Philippines Congress (Nolledo, 1988). This was the result of the restoration of the Philippines’ democracy since the 1986 EDSA Revolution. The EDSA Revolution invoked the 1987 Constitution embodies democratic values to replace President Marcos’s authoritarian era. The 1987 Constitution states “the police is national in scope and civilian in character”, which is the turning point of the civilian-characterized in the Philippines. Although constitutionally it has been stipulated that the police are legally defined in civilian character, however it is still somehow militaristic. In response, Republic Law 6975 was amended by Congress on February 251998 to Republic Act 8551. Republic Act 8551 regulates the reform and reorganization of the Philippine National Police (Manalo, 2003).

As a unit in the security sector with broad, powerful authority and functions, PNP could not be separated from various obstacles in achieving its police reform agenda. PNP politicization is one of the main factors. First, under the Philippines administrative system, police forces at all levels from national to local, are under of political control. For example, the 1987 Constitution stipulates all appointments for senior military and police ranks and positions (from colonels or equivalent to the police; senior police supervisors up to the highest rank and position) are carried out by the President of the Philippines. It must be confirmed by the Congress body known as the Commissions on Appointment. Furthermore, the 1987 Constitution gave the authority to the President to supervise, control, disseminate and employ both the military and police as part of the executive commander based on the principle of public interest and safety. Through this authority, the President can declare martial law, declare war, and impose limits on civil liberties (Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Quezon City: National Government
The President's vast power is not accompanied and balanced with checks and balances from other institutions such as the Philippine Congress. Another obstacle faced by the PNP is political patronage. Political patronage allows the President and his supporters to use the PNP as a tool to achieve political goals, not as a mechanism for maintaining public order. Political patronage in this case is defined as the relationship between the police and the broader government structure. Political patronage within the Philippine National Police is still taking place to this day.

Although PNP may still be hindered by numerous issues, PNP through its own institutional program settling towards police reform. One of its reform agenda is the integrated transformation program which is considered quite comprehensive by scholars. The project was established in 2003 and is planned to run for ten years from 2005 to 2015. Funding for this program is estimated up to 2.21 billion Philippine Pesos (around US$4.8 million), which originates from the allocation of public revenue for PNP, foreign donors (such as the United States Government), and through projects carried out by PNP itself (Reformag. 2009).

IV. Conclusion

Examined from the background, structure, development, and obstacles of police reform in Indonesia, Thailand, and Philippines, there seems to be a common thread that can be drawn. The National Police of the Republic of Indonesia (Polri), the Royal Thai Police (RTP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP) have a long history and a large contribution to the formation of their countries. In Indonesia and Philippines, Polri and PNP became a part of the struggle during the colonial period. Whereas in Thailand, the police force exerted an influence on Thailand's social and politics. In addition, the police in Indonesia, Thailand, and Philippines also share similar phases. Before the 1997 economic crisis in Southeast Asia, police in all three countries were part of the armed forces. Those became paramilitary wings with limited authority, shadowed by the military forces, and shared militaristic style. However, after 1998, police in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines underwent structural changes along with political changes that occurred in its countries. This is due to the democracy transition, from an authoritarian to a democratic state in the late 1990s which contributed to changes in the police force.

Apart from that, police in Indonesia, Thailand, and Philippines also have similarities in the development and progress of their police reform agendas. It appeared that each police force has similar problems, the politicization of the police and corruption. These two certainly hinder Polri, RTP, and PNP in accomplishing police reform agenda. Moreover, the position of the police which is directly under the executive leadership--where Polri and PNP directly reported to the president and the RTP under the Prime Minister or now the military junta-- consequently led the police institutions tend to be easily exposed to political intrigue and are often used as political tools by political authorities to gain personal and political interests. Their positions which are directly under the leadership of the state cause the Police institutions to be very vulnerable to politicization. Not only politicization, police in those aforementioned countries are susceptible to corruption which led to low public trust and discouraging the relations between civilians and the police themselves.

In contrast to Indonesia and Philippines, where police reform is still underway, the RTP was interrupted by the 2014 military coup. The military coup changed the political system and the development of democratic Thailand. As a result, the thai police are supervised by the military junta which acts as Prime Minister. In addition, RTP also tends
to be militaristic due to its auspices of the military junta. It implies its police reform agenda to be failed because it no longer reflects the main idea of police reform which is a civilian character. However, despite several limitations, Thai Police are still at the forefront of law enforcement in Thailand.

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