

Community Policing by Police Intelligence: Analysis on the Empowerment of Islamic Organization in Preventing the Spread of Radical Islamic Movement

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Abstract

Police intelligence has not been known to conduct visible policing strategies such as community policing. However, this research has proven that the intelligence unit, through network building, has inherently the same concept as community policing. Community policing through police intelligence could reach issues uniformed police are deemed too sensitive to approach, such as radicalism. By empowering Islamic Organizations, they can have the power to prevent the spread of radical Islamic movements in Indonesia. Therefore, this research was conducted to analyze the empowerment of Islamic Organizations carried out by the Police Intelligence Unit by doing a case study in West Bandung. This research was conducted with a qualitative approach using descriptive research methods and data collection techniques with interviews, observations, and document studies. The study results found that the empowerment had been carried out but was not optimal. It is found that the intelligence unit does not understand the procedures for implementing community policing because there is no organizational procedure and limited organizational capability. Moreover, political, social, technological and natural factors also negatively influence community policing by police intelligence.

Keywords

Community Policing; Police Intelligence; Organizational Empowerment; Islamic Organization; Radical Islamic Movement.



I. Introduction

The concept of community policing has been defined differently in each jurisdiction, opting to utilize this novel policing strategy. The US Department of Justice (COPS, 2012) has considered the definition to be a synergy of community partnership, organizational transformation, and problem-solving. From this definition, police agencies worldwide have formalized their community policing strategies into written rules. Such as the Indonesian National Police (INP) Regulation 1/2021 defines community policing as "An activity to invite the community through partnerships between members of the Police and the community, so that they can detect and identify problems on security and order in the community and find solutions". However, research on community policing strategies worldwide has been solely focused on the work of uniformed police specially staffed as 'community officers' (Lewis et al., 2008; Mackenzie & Henry, 2009; Putt, 2010). Community policing as a strategy does not have exclusively be carried out as a noun. In other words, community policing is not the responsibility of a single police function but rather a technique that every police officer should incorporate into their day-to-day duties (Shinta & Logahan, 2018). The INP regulation clarified this in the community policing regulation, stating, "The agent of community policing is every member of the INP who applies community policing as a strategy in carrying out their duties".

Thus, as one of Indonesia's policing functions, the Intelligence unit (officially known as Security Intelligence) is also responsible for community policing. Then, a discussion arose over how the invisible element of covert policing could execute the same strategy of being "present" in the community to engage in partnership and problem-solving (Loftus & Goold, 2012). The concept of community partnership and intelligence network could be perceived as fundamentally similar; Seagrave (1996: 10) described community policing as "a more covert way to penetrate communities to acquire information". For the INP, the intelligence unit has three functions information gathering, covert security, and condition altering operations (INP, 2013). For this reason, community partnership and intelligence network building both serve the same purpose of helping the police maintain a secure and orderly community. The only difference being the former is that the two-party are fully aware of the cooperation (Tyler & Fagan, 2008). In contrast, the latter has one of the parties has limited knowledge (Nunan et al., 2020).

The distinctive advantage of community policing through intelligence networks is that it can do tasks that uniformed police cannot. The intelligence unit has the advantage of being able to carry out policing operations without being detected in situations that place personnel in vulnerable positions. The growing threat of Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism is one such concern. Bruce (2000) describes fundamentalism as a movement within a religion that attempts to return to the fundamentals or ideals. Therefore, groups who adhere to this view frequently clash with other factions within their religious community. They view themselves as purer and therefore more righteous than their adversaries, whose beliefs or religious teachings are believed to be corrupted. They also seek political power to restore glory to their traditions, and a larger degree of fundamentalism typically leads to pro-violence and radicalism to manifest this revolution. Consequently, radicalism is an attitude that motivates activities to weaken and replace the existing political order with a new one (Dawisha, 1986). A radical movement is a politically radical ideology or religious belief that adopts an extreme stance, desiring social and political transformation or regeneration through extreme violence (Epstein, 2013).

The Fundamental and Radical Islamic Movements continue to devise new ways to undermine the unity of the Republic of Indonesia, notably through acts of hostility and terrorism. These acts made it increasingly impossible for the INP to maintain state security on their own. The history of the Republic of Indonesia has recorded that Islamic Organization is a modality to prevent Fundamental and Radical Islamic movements and to guard the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia. Its formal existence in socio-political life is represented by the two largest Indonesian Islamic Organizations, namely Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah (Brown, 2019). Spalek and Lambert (2008) emphasized the government's need to involve the Islamic community in anti-terrorism and anti-radicalization efforts. The Islamic community's desire to join in counter-terrorism and counter-radical efforts stems from their love for their homeland; thus, they reject any notion of violently making radical changes to their country. Due to recent acts of terrorism and radicalism, the Islamic community desires to enhance its reputation and public image.

As empowering Islamic organizations is ultimately a policy chosen by the INP, Anggara (2014) noted how systems theory argues that public policymaking cannot be divorced from the policy environment's influence. The environment is the result of public demands, expectations, or aspirations. Environmental factors can generate and modify policy demands within a political system. Thus, policy actors must design policies based on community or public feedback. Therefore, this research involves three questions: What role do Islamic organizations have in preventing the spread of radicalism, how does community policing by police intelligence empower Islamic organizations, and what

factors influence community policing by police intelligence to empower Islamic organizations.

II. Research Method

The research process for this paper begins with a desk study of Indonesian laws, police regulations, and official data on Islamic Organizations and Radical Islamic Movements operating in the Regency. A qualitative research method will be utilized in this study to acquire a full grasp of the subject's experience and the empirical facts concerning community policing done by police intelligence (Pathak et al., 2013). After understanding the issue, the researchers will analyze the implementation of community policing by police intelligence using interviews, observation and official police data. To focus the scope of the research, this project will conduct a case study of the community policing done by the intelligence unit in West Bandung Regency. West Bandung was chosen because it is the area with one most rampant source of the radical Islamic movement. Intelligence data from the police detected several organizations with fundamentalist and radical Islamic beliefs in West Bandung; such as remnants of the dissolved *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia* (HTI) and Islamic Defender Front (FPI), Anti Shia Alliance, and *Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia*.

III. Result and Discussion

3.1 The Role of Islamic Organization in Preventing the Spread of Radicalism

Islamic Organizations have had a mass base in West Bandung since the pre-independence era. Muhammadiyah, founded by K.H. Ahmad Dahlan in 1912 in Yogyakarta, and NU pioneered by K.H. Hasyim Asy'ari in 1926 in Surabaya, is an Islamic organization that recognizes and supports the Indonesian state system based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. These Nationalist Islamic Organizations are the primary support for a social system that has been harmonious with Indonesian cultural values (Samson, 1968).

In West Bandung, NU, Muhammadiyah, and Islam Unity (Persis) have had a long history of being committed to protecting the Republic of Indonesia, and this has been shown throughout the history of the Republic of Indonesia. The spirit and commitment of these three mass organizations can be relied on to prevent the spread of the Radical Islamic movement in Indonesia. However, because the three Islamic organizations carry out different religious practices, they often move separately to prevent radical Islamic movements. While they all have anti-radicalism movements, they do not yet have a joint action plan or permanent cooperation. One of the reasons is that despite having traditional, socio-cultural backgrounds and not practising in politics, they do not anticipate real threats from political Islam movements that use modern and structured methods to seize the mass base. When interviewing the head of NU, he stated that they never even had official data on the number of members it has and is more focused on developing *pesantren* (religious boarding school). In comparison, Muhammadiyah is more concentrated on the welfare of education and social institutions.

The researchers found that there is a Religious Harmony Forum (FKUB) to unite all the religious organizations in West Bandung, Islam and non-Islam, moderate and fundamental. However, after observation, it is discovered that the FKUB is still only a symbolic activity and has not been used to discuss joint plans because each organization care more about their activity. Nevertheless, the three organizations are at the forefront of

the Islamic Organizations, whose existence best represents the cultural and traditional character of the Indonesian people. Therefore, they must be empowered by the Intelligence unit to prevent the spread of Radical Islamic movements that threaten the security of the nation. This is an advantage, as the researchers found that they are very cooperative with the police in every activity and always show an attitude of supporting the government. After several observations of their sermons and religious gathering, the researchers could conclude that these three organizations support nationalist values and strongly oppose the pro-violence movement seeking to force their belief on others. When interviewing the head of Muhammadiyah, he believed that change could occur if we work together to develop the nation, then the people will be more open to change rather than blatantly forcing beliefs on others.

3.2 Community Policing by Police Intelligence to Empower Islamic Organization

Based on the INP Regulation 1/2021, Community Policing by the Intelligence Unit is implemented through the development of intelligence networks. Intelligence networks are defined by the Chief of Intelligence Division Regulation 5/2013 as “people or communities who have been recruited through the process of network building who consciously provide information through the intelligence communication system”. Once recruited into an intelligence network, the unit can then direct the individual or community to create or change conditions in society to achieve favourable conditions for the implementation of the main tasks of the Police; the intelligence community knows this activity as “covert action” (Sirrs, 2016).

The intelligence unit’s scope of activities and interpretation of community policing was limited because there was no clear procedure on how the intelligence unit should implement community policing in its day-to-day activities. This has led to the implementation solely relying on verbal directions from the leadership position. Spoken directions, however, have zero accountability, and Police forces worldwide have to construct a clear procedure for conducting policing tasks so that their activity can be held accountable (Indarti, 2020). The Head of the Cimahi Police intelligence unit, Senior Inspector Agus, admitted that it is nearly impossible to construct a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) based on just two sections of a regulation. *“Currently, there is only one regulation concerning community policing, and out of all the section, only two mentions the intelligence unit. So, tell me, how can I make a clear SOP for my officers?”*. Though the limitation, Senior Inspector Agus managed to construct an SOP on community policing for the intelligence unit. However, the Intelligence Unit Head of Operations Inspector Doddy said that the SOP is nothing more than a formality, *“Our job is complex, and these SOP are just meaningless checklist for inspectorate and budgeting reason.”*

In terms of budgeting, the Intelligence Unit has one of the highest budgets in the department at Rp. 1,998,310,000 (\$ 136,255) per year. Inspector Doddy said that this sum is adequate for intelligence network building and cover actions. However, as mentioned for budgeting accountability, all policing activities are drafted into SOP, and each of those activities has its indexes concerning how much the budget covers them. The index only covers formal activities such as funding for religious activities or reimbursing officers’ lunches during operation. To be reimbursed, the officer must submit the receipt or invoice as proof that the activity did happen. Field officer, Brigadier Bondan mentions how some of the expenses are not covered by the budget:

“When you build rapport with your target, we do small things like buy them coffee or cigarettes. Those things don’t get reimbursed because there’s no

index for them in the SOP, so they mostly come from our pocket money. I hope God repay our sacrifices haha...”

The budgeting report is also done mainly by another unit member, a civil servant working in the administration section. At first, this does not perceive to be a problem as extensive paperwork could limit the time officers have for on-field operational activities. However, another field officer, Brigadier Egi, mentions that it is not just the budgeting report that is handed to the administration unit but also the field report: “*Budgeting and field report is tedious paperwork, I mean nobody reads them, so we just handed the task to Mrs Lenny at the administration.*” The result is that the field report is not the actual findings that officers experience and only serves as a formality. Admittedly, the researchers had difficulty disseminating past reports because most of them are just copies of another and were done half-heartedly for the courtesy. This could be fatal conduct as reports from the intelligence unit are acted upon by the whole police department. Thus, this entire time, the unit has been providing irrelevant information.

Senior Inspector Agus stated that one of the main functions of having an intelligence network is to harness information for early detection and early warning. The intelligence unit has to be able to predict any potential sign of disorder and present them to the Chief of Police Department so they can be acted upon and prevented. In this context Agus said:

We approach the leaders of these organisations in order to handle their members. Once the organisation as a whole is under control, we will utilise them as informants, in this case to identify any signs of radicalism in their region.

However, this method has left much to be desired. There is some information about radical Islamic movements that cannot be detected by the Islamic organization no matter how strong the organization have in that area. This was revealed by Mulyadi, a member of NU and neighbor to a man named JIS, a citizen with an ordinary life. Yet, it turned out that after the Kampung Melayu bombing in May 2017, it was finally revealed that JIS had been serving as Amir Qoriyah of JAD in the North Bandung area.

“He's always been normal; he gathers with others and prays at the same mosque. The only questionable aspect of his home is that it has a high fence and no one has ever entered. Even though many individuals in this region, including me, are members of NU, no one would have predicted the Anti-Terror Detachment Police would suddenly surround his home.”

Therefore, to effectively utilize the Islamic organizations as an intelligence network, the police must empower them to understand more about the nature of radicalism. According to Law 16/2017 section 40(3), empowerment for organizations covers the act of “policy facilitation, strengthening institutional capacity, and improving the quality of human resources”. Policy facilitation is excellent leverage for the intelligence unit to have. This is due to the authority the intelligence officers have in granting permits such as police records, firearms permits, explosive permits, and public event permits. Easing the bureaucratic process for Islamic organizations when requesting them could earn their rapport as a reliable information network. The intelligence officers inevitably will be able to know all of the organization's public events and could be present in them to influence its member. Inspector Dody admits this is the easiest way to penetrate the organization:

“By performing such favours for them, they naturally felt obligated to repay us. They seek our relationship more because it will facilitate all of their activities. Once they see how advantageous it is to be close to the authorities, we can drive them to do whatever for us in exchange.”

The second way to empower an organization is through capacity building. According to Milen (2004), capacity is the ability of individuals, organizations or systems to function properly, effectively, efficiently and continuously. In this context, the Intelligence unit provides periodic information related to the development of the threat of the spread of radical Islamic movements. These organizations can use this information to anticipate and ward off radical ideas. Inspector Suryo mentioned how this knowledge transfer mainly occurs in religious gatherings, religious schools and sermons. However, some officers perceived a questionable concept of differentiating these activities from those conducted by the uniformed community engagement unit. The community engagement unit generally openly strengthens the Islamic organization's institutional capacity through counselling or lectures. All of the officers interviewed are aware of the implementation of community policing in all police duties, but not all of them are aware of their particular application to the intelligence unit. Senior Inspector Agus stated, *"We are aware of implementing some sort of community policing akin to the community engagement unit; the only difference is they wear a uniform, and we don't"*. Moreover, intelligence officers interviewed realize that, unlike the community engagement unit, their unit has confidential information and has formulated predictions for the jurisdiction's situation. Therefore, their department best understands the problem of the development and spread of Radical Islam. The double activity of strengthening institutional capacity by both the community engagement and the intelligence unit has some unique aspects to offer.

Lastly, empowerment done for these Islamic organizations can be in the form of improving human resources. Martoyo (1992) argues that improving the quality of human resources benefits by increasing organizational members' abilities, skills, and attitudes to be more effective and efficient in achieving program goals. Inspector Suandi highlights the intelligence officer's efforts by training the leadership figure in the form of knowledge about radicalism and how to prevent it, aiming that the religious leader can embed this knowledge in every da'wah they provide. However, a major flaw that the intelligence unit has is that not all of their member are very knowledgeable in religious knowledge; admittedly, it will be awkward to influence a sensible way of religion without a proper understanding of the religion itself. Inspector Sandi admits that out of 45 intelligence officers in the Cimahi Police Department, only three are knowledgeable enough to discuss higher religious understanding. This dramatically limits the capability of the intelligence unit itself to influence any non-radical action in the community covertly.

Internally, the intelligence unit personnel experience a slight shortage of personnel quality and quantity-wise. As mentioned, only three officers are religiously knowledgeable; thus, it is challenging to make penetration of the religious figures who are targeted. Moreover, the unit also has limited technical capabilities and tactics because out of 48 officers, only 14 have undergone basic intelligence training. Senior Inspector Agus claimed that he has the luxury of handpicking newly-sworn officers to join the unit; he elaborated that he selects them based on the results of psychological tests and eliciting other members whether the said officer has the potential as an intelligence agent. In terms of their abilities, Senior Inspector Agus admits that all of them are still very lacking in intelligence functions; during basic training, officers only undergo four sessions of intelligence class with no on the job experience. In terms of quantity, there is also a shortage of members; according to Chief of INP regulation 23/2010, the Cimahi Police Department should employ 50 intelligence officers. However, only 45 officers are listed, with roughly a third of them unavailable due to temporary transfer as private assistants and other institutions like the National Security Agency, Anti-terror Detachment, and National Narcotics Board. The unit also has trouble keeping its officers; Inspector Doddy confessed

that not many newly sworn officers do not desire an intelligence officer's job as it offers little gratification.

“We work in silence. Unlike the detective who are congratulated every time they made a bust or the community engagement officers who are greeted everywhere they go, we do not receive such recognition. Just seeing that our work has kept our beloved nation safe is enough for us, but it's not for some and we could understand that.”

3.3 Factors Influencing the Community Policing of Islamic Organization

Implementing a policy will unavoidably be influenced by the environment of those policy actors (Anggara, 2014). Policy environment analysis will discover whether or who the most influential non-policy factors are and what implementation will hold the policy tightly or perhaps drive it. Moreover, analyzing the policy environment will produce more comprehensive facts to predict how the policies have been undertaken and face failure (Nugroho, 2014). As a result, the environment is very influential on the content of the policy because it is from the environment that policy actors can formulate a strategy or policy content in the public sphere. Based on Nugroho's theory, the environment is everything surrounding, namely around proximity, conditions that affect development. Those environmental factors affecting the community policing of Islamic organizations to prevent the spread of radical Islamic movement are as follows:

- a. **Political Factors** – 2019 was a very heated political year for Indonesia, where the presidential election has dramatically divided the populace through the rampant spread of hate speech, provocation, incitement and fake news (Jalli et al., 2019). The issues of hate speech or hoaxes have ever since circulated daily and are digested by people who are not selective in receiving the information. As a result, fragmentation in the lives of society have started to appear, and the citizen is becoming less and less tolerant of differences in political, religious, and societal values.
- b. **Cultural Factors** – The Sundanese culture is sympathetic and open to other parties, including law enforcement officers. In addition, the culture of the communities in West Bandung still upholds character in ennobling religious leaders; as a result, their role is very influential on the surrounding community. So far, the counter radicalism programs through the empowerment of Islamic Organizations implemented by the intelligence unit have been well received. However, a challenge in the future is the condition of West Bandung has become an idolized target for various migrants escaping the urban cities. In this case, West Bandung Regency every year experiences an increase in the number of migrants who come from Bandung City and the Greater Jakarta Region. According to BPS (2022), the population has mainly increased due to the increase in migrants, 10,790 people per year. A worker at the National Unity and Politics Agency has stated that the influx of immigrants has dissolved the bond inside communities. The migrants are apathetic toward religious leaders, let alone knowing who they are.
- c. **Economic Factor** – The percentage of poor people in West Bandung reached 12.67% in 2022; this figure is concerning because it is higher than the national average, 10.12% (BPS, 2022). Moreover, with the COVID-19 pandemics, the number of poverty is expected to rise. The low economic gain in rural communities and the high pressure of finding jobs have made many people more easily tempted by invitation by radical groups that promise better things for the future. Desperation over the inadequate state of the economy leads the individual to a romantic attitude toward the caliphate's past glory and blames the current administration for being a corrupt government, un-Islamic, and considered an accomplice to the western world (Jati, 2013). Golose (2014) has stated

that these conditions have triggered the younger generation to engage in radical activities and even conclude that martyrdom will end his suffering in the world and be replaced later in the enjoyment of life after death. This is an opportunity for radical groups to spread radicalism by helping the community's economy and then start instilling doctrinarism to become followers in the radical group to carry out activities under the goals of the radical group.

On the other hand, the low economic conditions can be used as a means for Islamic Nationalist Organizations such as Muhammadiyah to play a role in helping to improve economic conditions through charitable activities. The chairman of West Bandung Muhammadiyah has presented various ways that the Muhammadiyah has been present in the society in this time of hardship. Their program on developing organic fertilizer has proven to reach surplus during harvesting season. Through charitable activities carried out to improve the welfare of the surrounding community, Muhammadiyah can strengthen institutions both in terms of the number of followers and sympathizers in the community. The low economic conditions in West Bandung can lead to radicalization. However, this condition has also proven to be an opportunity to increase the influence of Islamic Organizations through charitable activities in the community.

- d. Technological Factor** - Real disturbances in the form of spreading hoaxes and hate speech through social media have been used by the Radical Islamic Movement. In an interview with Inspector Yuda, he stated that he has managed to join one of the ex-Radical Islamic WhatsApp groups:

"Yes, most of the content discredit the government using lies with the aim of shaking public trust in the government. Most of these messages were already forwarded many times so you can tell how many were provoked by these lies."

The spread of hoaxes and hate speech with a political background, primarily through social media, currently cannot be prevented or tackled by the Cimahi Police Intelligence Unit. Inspector Yuda has highlighted that while there are programs named 'Cybertroops' with the task of flagging and countering hoaxes and hate speeches, the unit does not have any capability beyond the surveillance of such contents. Moreover, the unit is not equipped with the technology to do any effective counter-discourse. As a result, radical Islamic movements have gained the upper hand in utilizing technology as the police could not retaliate to this new development.

- e. Social** – The education level in West Bandung is very low, with only 19.82% of the population being able to take high school education or the equivalent (BPS, 2022). With this low level of education, fear arose from the intelligence unit highlighted by Inspector Suryo that the populace would be more susceptible to radical teaching.
- f. History** – The Bandung area and its surroundings were the mass base for the Darul Islam/Islamic Armed Forces of Indonesia during the Kartosuwiryo rebellion (1949-1962). However, since then until now, radical movements have been a minority group and have only become popular because their actions have been perceived as harmful and damaging by other organizations in Indonesia. On the positive side, West Bandung residents also condemned these acts of terror and rebellion in the past, firmly rejecting the spread of the radical Islamic movement in the region. This is evidenced by the attitudes and statements of various components of the West Bandung Islamic organizations, such as NU, Muhammadiyah and Persis, which reject the spread of the Radical Islamic movement in KBB. The leader of NU has also shared his personal experience with the Kartosuwiryo Rebellion:

"I remember during Kartosuwiryo rebellion I was still in college. Indeed, at that time many Bandung residents were called traitors to the Republic, but at

that time not all of us followed Kartosuwiryo's thoughts. Neither Muhammadiyah nor NU supported him and we even closed our village every time they passed (Kartosuwiryo's army).

- g. Environment** – West Bandung has a wealth of rocks and agricultural land, which encourages the majority of the people to work in the farming sector and live in areas far from the city. This enables the population to spread to places far from urban areas. Some regions of West Bandung are isolated from urban areas and far enough to access other areas. This is an obstacle the intelligence unit experienced in reaching the area because of the long-distance, separated and challenging terrain. Inspector Suandi has highlighted the discrepancy between the number of officers available within the vast West Bandung jurisdiction. From official data compiled by the Cimahi Police Resort, the distance to West Bandung periphery districts could be as far as 35 – 62 Kilometres of village roads. Simply put, 45 intelligence officers could not cover the entirety of the regency, and the return distance to one target operation could take a day journey alone. This is still not counting the fact that counter-radicalism through community policing is only one of the many tasks the intelligence unit has to conduct.
- h. Other Policies** - Until now, the policies of the central, provincial and local governments outside the INP have received high support from the community. Despite the political turbulence, a survey conducted by Edelman (2022) has stated that the people's trust in the government is still high. This is evidenced by the low number of demonstration cases and the low number of riots due to dissatisfaction with the government. This condition strongly supports the community policing strategy carried out by the police, as ultimately, the INP serves as an executive branch of the *Tras Politica* concept of governance tasked with implementing the government's mandate in securing the nation (Tamrin, 2018).

Based on Nugroho's theory of environmental factors affecting policy, culture, economy, history, and supporting policies positively influence the community policing of Islamic Organizations. The communities in West Bandung have great respect for religious leaders; throughout history, West Bandung citizens have been vehemently opposed to a radical Islamic movement. The communities of West Bandung are also very sympathetic to the government program of anti-radicalization. Meanwhile, the political, social, technological, and natural factors have all hindered the implementation of community policing. Political conditions have heated up ever since the 2019 Presidential Election, and there has been some hostility inside the community. Furthermore, worsening economic conditions, especially due to the COVID-19 pandemics, could encourage people to be influenced by the Radical Islamic movement, which offers the false promise of eternal wealth in paradise. Members of the police, including the intelligence unit, have struggled to keep up with the advances in information technology, leading to more pathways of radicalization. Lastly, some West Bandung districts are very far away and challenging to access for the limited number of intelligence officers.

IV. Conclusion

The context of applying community policing strategy through the intelligence unit has been done by the Cimahi Police Department, though with limited understanding and influence by several environmental factors. The INP Headquarters needs to discuss to draw up new regulations or guidelines governing the matter; the newly drafted regulation will then be the basis for the regional police department to create clear procedures for their

officers under the environmental factors apparent in each jurisdiction. Currently, there is no clear regulation present; the field procedure is also severely outdated and only serves as a formality. Moreover, to make activities carried out by the intelligence unit more effective, there needs to be a proposal to increase the number of members, as well training program to increase the community policing, intelligence network building and improve capabilities in analyzing information technology and online media. Furthermore, the organizational culture needs to shift from policing activities based on budgetary financing to policing activities based on the results or outcomes. Then building the culture of creating written reports based on the on-field experience of officers instead of only a formality being written by the administration staff.

There are some limitations to this research. The first is that the time constraint has limited the scope of the study to only one police department at a city/municipality level. Further research could help by doing a comparative analysis of the subjects at a different police department, not just horizontally but also vertically, as the role and task of the intelligence unit varies greatly from police sectoral, police department, police provincial department, and the headquarters. Second, the research will undoubtedly yield different implications on the changing climate of INP leadership. Such different policing strategies may be approached every time leadership changes with varying priorities in policing. The community policing approach might be as deserted with a new leadership priority. However, this research could serve as an input for the INP on implementing community policing as a whole.

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