# **Cooperation of Farmers and Middlemen: Epistemological Studies' Perspective of Antonio Gramsci's Theory of Hegemony**

# Siti Fatimah<sup>1</sup>, Kosim Kosim<sup>2</sup>, Abas Hidayat<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1,2</sup>Institut Agama Islam Negeri Syekh Nurjati (IAIN) Cirebon, Indonesia <sup>3</sup>Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Kesehatan Cirebon, Indonesia sitifatimah@syekhnurjati.ac.id, kosimrusdi@gmail.com, abasstikescirebon@gmail.com

#### **Abstract**

The cooperation system between farmers and Middlemen is forced because the Middlemen made a unilateral cooperation system. The farmers are powerless because they need capital and income to meet the needs of their families. This research will question what kind of cooperation system was built by farmers and Middlemen and how the farmers' attitude to unilateral decisions made by the Middlemen. The author conducted field research using a qualitative approach with a grounded research method. The primary data sources are farmers in Cirebon, Indonesia. Technically, digging up data through in-depth interviews, observations in rice fields during harvest, and focus group discussions. The cooperation system was analyzed using Antonio Gramsci's hegemony theory. The research results are as follows: 1) The Middlemen make a profit-sharing agreement with the farmer. Farmers get loans for land rent, seeds, and planting costs. Paying debt after harvest, and farmers have to sell their crops to Middlemen. 2) Middlemen usually misbehave by lowering prices unilaterally in the middle of the cooperation process. 3) If conditions like this are analyzed using Antonio Gramsci's theory of hegemony, then the consciousness, reason, energy, and results of the farmers are hegemonized by Middlemen.

## Keywords

farmer; Middleman; patron client; cooperation agreement; Antonio Gramsci



## I. Introduction

Farmers and Middlemen are two parties who need each other, even though they are in different positions. Farmers need financial support for farming capital, while Middlemen need farmers who will borrow money to make a profit (Imaniar & Brata, 2020). Usually, if farmers have chosen Middlemen as partners to borrow from, they have no other choice. If this is the case, the farmers sometimes get lucky but sometimes suffer losses (Azizah, 2016). If they do not borrow, farmers are powerless to meet the needs of their families. If the farmer is forced to borrow capital, he must be willing to obey the rules of the middleman's game, wherein he suffers a loss.

The rules of the Middlemen are indeed complex for the farmers to follow, but with a loan of capital, the farmers can continue their family life. Naturally, the farmers do not experience an increase in welfare from year to year, even though they have worked very hard. The reason is that they are inside the 'game room' of middlemen (Fuad et al., 2015). At first glance, Middlemen seem like philanthropists, but they are very good at price games. That is as stated by one of the farmers 'Mrs. D' from Wanajaya Village, Cirebon, West Java, Indonesia:

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'Ari petani lo mengkenen-mengkenen bae, kang untung ya Bose, Pak Kaji Tengkulak, asale kalo petani jatuh, usahane gagal, maka rugi, sementara tengkulak bli rugi, tetep di bayar petani'.

(If the conditions remain like this, the lucky ones are the middlemen. If the farmer fails to harvest, he will receive a loss. However, the middleman does not lose because the farmer still has to pay his debt)

It is different from the above-mentioned economic cooperation system. Islamic religion provides the principles of social and economic life that are mutually beneficial (Syaifullah, 2014). Islam guides humans to do good deeds and stay away from evil deeds, for example, hegemonizing people who are unable, as described above. Islam teaches about the principles of a good economy, not just a set of rules (Susiawati, 2017), and provides welfare guarantees in a halal economy. In the principles of Islamic economics, Muslims are required to carry out all the teachings of Islam in all aspects of life. Islamic economics requires the Muslim community to continuously do good to Allah among humans and achieve real prosperity (Purwana, 2014).

The economic condition of the population is a condition that describes human life that has economic score (Shah et al, 2020). One of the factors supporting welfare and happiness is economic adequacy, including other supporting factors (Aqbar et al., 2020). The indicators of welfare measures can be seen from sufficient income, good population and health, high education, steady work, sufficient consumption, comfortable housing, and safe socio-cultural factors. In the concept of Islamic economics, happiness is given by Allah to someone whose deeds of worship are good and who has faith in Allah, as stated in Q.S. An-Nahl: 97. The indicators of welfare in Islam can be measured from divinity and the disappearance of all forms of fear and anxiety, as described in Q.S. Quraysh: 3-4 (Sodiq, 2015).

In this paper, the author discusses several essential things, namely the joys and sorrows of farmers in their lives and how to survive and meet the needs of their families. What is the cooperation system built by farmers and Middlemen, and What is the attitude of farmers to unilateral decisions made by Middlemen amid their cooperation that is detrimental to them? [focus group discussions (FGD) results, 21 July 2021]. What are the results of the analysis of the hegemony theory related to the Middlemen's unilateral decisions against the farmers? First, the research results are regarding the cooperative system for vegetable farming between farmers and Middlemen; second is the experience of farmers when working with Middlemen; third is analyzing the research data using Antonio Gramsci's theory and patron-client theory.

#### II. Review of Literature

Azizah (2016) examined the positive role of Middlemen in mangosteen fruit marketing: a study of the social network of Middlemen in Karacak village, Leuwiliang district, Bogor Regency. There were six informants in the research. They were selected through the snowball technique. The data collection techniques were in-depth interviews and observation. The findings show that Middlemen have extensive social networks and are used as the basis for economic exchange. The Middlemen market the mangosteen fruit produced by the farmers in their networks. The existence of Middlemen can help farmers through a positive role through an extensive social network that is easily accessible to buyers. Middlemen can provide farmers with large profits. The other positive parts of Middlemen in Karacak Village are collectors, buyers, Middlemen, and marketers.

Middlemen who have a positive role do not act as creditors/owners of capital and are not exploitative of farmers (Azizah, 2016).

The difference between Azizah's research and this research is that this research examines cucumber farmers using the FGD method to validate data through observations and in-depth interviews. Substantial differences are looking for indications of exploitation and domination of middlemen on farmers in the vegetable farmer cooperation system in Wanajaya village, Cirebon because the middleman has a role as a 'patron' who has capital. This domination and exploitation can be seen in the provisions of the Middlemen where the harvest must be sold to the middleman; the middleman determines the price; at any time, they can change the price agreement; and so the farmers become a powerless party.

Zaman (2009) analyzed the patron-client relationship (a case study of the relationship between toke and oil palm farmers with a self-help pattern in Tambusai Utara District, Rokan Hulu Regency). The method used was a survey method. Multistage random sampling was carried out sample for oil palm farmers. The study describes smallholder businesses in self-help schemes that depend on the seller. Farmers need distributors in their efforts to raise oil palm fresh fruit bunches (FFBs) so that they are marketed to palm oil mills. The seller (toke) and small farmers are described in a patron-client relationship. Wholesalers act as protectors, while small farmers act as clients. This research aimed to assist the marketing channel of oil palm FFBs for independent smallholders.

Zaman (2009) found and identified three marketing channels for FFBs. The first is marketing from farmers to small wholesalers. Second, small wholesalers sell to big wholesalers, and big wholesalers sell to factories. The third is from farmers to traders or big wholesalers and then factories. Another finding is that there are factors that influence the formation of a system of patron-client relationships between wholesalers (toke) and farmers, which are: 1) The marketing of fresh fruit bunches is very dependent on wholesalers. 2) Very high farm costs. 3) Farmers have a lot of debt with wholesalers due to their daily needs, education, and health expenses for their families. Therefore, farmers are highly dependent on wholesalers. That is very vulnerable to the domination and hegemony of Middlemen.

The difference in this study is in the research method. In addition to using observations, the author also uses interviews and FGDs. In Zaman's research, it is still very unclear whether the position of farmers in the cooperation is experiencing injustice or not. It is not explained in detail, while the author does explain the role of farmers who are, on the other hand, not being treated fairly.

Fuad et al. (2015) examined catfish cultivators in Batang, Central Java. They experienced shackles in their cooperation with the Middlemen. The finding was that the Middlemen assisted the catfish farmers in marketing their agricultural products. The relationship that is built develops into a patron-client pattern. The Middlemen control the peasants and oppress them. The strength of the Middlemen is as a position of investors, and the offer is submitted to the farmers. The practice started with the Ijon (buy catfish from a farmer by paying for it long before the harvest) system; Middlemen gave rent credits, which put the farmers into a lot of debt. In addition, the research found a process of patron-client between farmers and Middlemen, knowing the strength of the binding capacity of cooperative relationships in catfish cultivation in Siwatu Village, Wonotunggal District, Batang Regency, Central Java (Mahmudah, 2014).

The difference between this research and Fuad et al.'s (2015) research is that the research object is vegetable farmers, especially cucumbers, using the methods of observation, interviews, and FGDs.

Mahmudah (2014) examined farmers' bargaining position in dealing with Middlemen. This research identifies Indonesian farmers into two categories: 1) farmers who have extensive lands and 2) small lands. Farmers who have large land areas do not cooperate with Middlemen because they already have sufficient capital. However, farmers with limited land tend to cooperate with Middlemen due to a lack of money. The capital borrowed from the Middlemen is usually for land rent, buying seeds, and the production process.

This research answers the problem of how farmers' bargaining position is with Middlemen post-harvest.

## III. Research Method

This study aims to reveal facts about the cooperation system of vegetable farmers with middlemen (patron-client). Why is it done? Is it to determine whether the cooperation is mutually beneficial, or is it more beneficial to one party? In addition, this study aims to show the partiality of farmers. Therefore, the author's idea is to change the system to create mutually beneficial cooperation between farmers and Middlemen (clients and patrons). This research uses a qualitative approach through case studies on people who carry out agricultural processes. In-depth interviews became the instrument of this research with direct observation in their place of work. To get more adequate data, the author conducted an FGD (FGD, 22 September 2019).

This FGD was necessary for validating data together (Bruseberg & McDonagh-Philp, 2002). Data triangulation was used to maintain the validity of the data. After the data was collected, content analysis and other analyses were carried out. In digging up data with a field research approach, the researcher needs to go directly to the field and make observations, naturally on the object of study (Moleong, 2021). The data analysis used the reduction and display method, which is strengthened by triangulation (Bungin, 2009).

#### IV. Results and Discussion

# 4.1 About Wanajaya

Wanajaya is a village located in Plumbon subdistrict, Cirebon district, West Java Province, Indonesia. This village is an industrial area, including the rattan factory, good-foot factory, and other industries. Society's primary economic activities are in the public sector. Many productive lands are converted into industrial lands. The explanation of Mr. S, one of the residents of Wananjaya village, is as follows:

'In our village, there are very few houses. There are no other buildings, such as factories. There is sufficient land and water here to be fertile for agricultural land. There are many coconut trees on my house's left and right sides. However, many coconut trees have died after the construction of many factories, such as a rattan factory. There are no coconut trees here because they were exposed to chemicals like finishing paint from the rattan factory.'

Changes in the function of agricultural land to industrial land affect the residents' work. All farmers turned into factory workers. In addition, it can damage the environment, for example, by causing coconut trees to die. It is one of the causes of the community's reduced food supply, for example, coconut and other plants. Another impact of industrialization in the village of Wanajaya is that the agricultural area, for example, reduces the supply of water for agriculture. Previously, farmers could harvest three times. But now the farmers are finding it very difficult. That is as stated by Mr. J as follows:

'Three years ago, we could harvest three times in one year. The water quality is excellent and clear, and the water volume is sufficient for farming. High-quality yields, heavier rice, the average weight of 1 sack of rice is 45–48 kg. However, once there is a factory, the water becomes oily and smells terrible. The water became oily and smelled terrible like dirt and chemicals. The public did not dare to protest. In recent years, in 1 year can only harvest two times. It was also tricky because of the lack of water. We have to buy water from the dam key holder. One harvest can be up to 2 million rupiahs to purchase water. Due to limited capital and high operational costs, the harvest is unsuitable. Now, the selling price of the harvest is below the standard, and the average is 470–480 per quintal. In contrast to the previous lowest selling price of 490, this is a middleman's game.'

Mr. J added the following information:

'Our difficulty is due to the increasing number of housing and building constructions. All the farmers did not agree to build housing. The farmer protested, but the village gave permission. In our village, a scholar is a spokesman for the farmers. He is the one who often represents us to protest to the village head. However, they ignored it. Farmers protested because they built housing in the middle of the rice fields, causing water problems in our areas. The village head responded with, "that land is my land." Water from other fields cannot flow to our rice fields because the housing is blocked. It's been two years, and it's been causing us difficulties. The peasants did not dare to fight back. The farmer is screaming now. Every night they always look for water to the Cempaka dam on foot; besides, the farmers suck it from their wells. That makes it more difficult for us because it must cost more. First, it requires gasoline. Second, it requires money to pay for people waiting for the water pump if sucking water takes up to 4 days.

In addition, there is an increasing amount of plastic waste in the river, which disrupts water flow. Many trees were cut down, resulting in reduced water sources, and the supply of river water was getting smaller and not sufficient for farming, unlike before. Previously clean water, but now there is a lot of household waste, factories, and garbage. The government doesn't care, and many people sell their productive land to construct factories and housing. But I heard that now Jokowi President does not allow the fertile ground to be sold to residential developers.'

At the end of the interview, Mr. Johari said that the cause of the lack of water in the fields was the establishment of a good foot factory, headset, rattan, building material shop, residential Plumbon, and others.

## **4.2** Cooperation between Farmers and Middlemen (Client-patron)

The author's note about the joys and sorrows of vegetable farmers is about cooperating with Middlemen in Wananjaya village, Cirebon district. Mrs. Darti, a very persistent and enthusiastic farmer, explained that the Middlemen gave loans, capital debt for land rent, and production costs until harvest. In crop production, sometimes it does not work, and it means debts to Middlemen because they cannot pay their debts. The good thing is the Middleman; when the farmer suffers a loss and cannot pay the debt, the Middleman does not play around with confiscation of the house or anything but offers more capital to start another business. Even though the harvest is a loss, they still give a loan for the next capital; some even have a debt of 200 million. The bad thing about Middlemen is that they set prices arbitrarily; farmers do not have the power to set prices. But the farmers continue to run, even though their income is small. The Middleman always gains profit; it is like this if it is a farmer. However, this system does not make farmers dizzy because Middlemen are not like banks; banks confiscate buildings if they cannot pay their debts. In addition, the sale of the harvest must be to the Middleman to determine. For

the farmers to continue to cooperate, the Middleman dug four wells for the plants' water needs so that the harvest yields were maximum. Vegetables that are grown include bitter melon, eggplant, chili, and cucumber. In essence, the people behind the farmers are middlemen.

Mrs. D also explained that in Brebes, Central Java province, 'it is the same, behind the onion farmers are the middlemen. The capital is much larger than that of vegetable farmers; therefore, if there is a loss, there will be a bigger loss compared to vegetable farmers. Many farmers are depressed because of debts to Middlemen. The author then asks, 'Do the farmers who grow cucumbers always succeed? Are there pests?' Mrs. D answered: 'Yes, if the harvest fails, then the selling price is low, and the farmer gets a loss, but if the farmer is still willing to work on it, the middleman will give him more capital. Farmers, if they still sell for 2000 prices from Middlemen, then they are still making a profit. The sales order is from farmer to middleman, from middleman to agent, from agent to seller in the market'. The author asks: 'Are the parties who have never suffered losses are middlemen?'. Mrs. Darti answered: 'Yes.'

Mr. J explained that if it was the dry season, I couldn't grow rice because there was no water. It is used for increasing eggplant and cucumber. After the cucumber harvest is complete, the land is reworked to plant rice. The land of the former cucumber plant is of better quality and suitable for rice cultivation. Regarding fertilizers, farmers are also subject to the rules of the game of fertilizer traders. For example, they cooperate between one store and another. If type A fertilizer is sold at shop A, then fertilizer A is not sold at store B and vice versa.

Mrs. D stated that the positive value of working with Middlemen is not worrying about rotting vegetables because selling is hard. However, the Middlemen set the price for the farmers at 2,000/kg and still had to pay for the workers. If all the capital is sufficient, the payment uses the cucumber harvest. According to Mrs. D's narrative, the debt to Middlemen is paid off within ten times harvest. But usually, the next harvest time, the price is played by Middlemen again. When the debt has been paid off, the price is reduced to Rp. 1,000 or Rp. 800. The reason for the decline in prices by Middlemen is that prices have fallen, stock of goods, etc. Who determine the price changes are the Middlemen; they contact each other. Behind the farmers are the Middlemen.

#### 4.3 Farmer Troubles

The farmers cannot determine things themselves because they do not have the power of capital. They only have energy. Farmers want their own business but have no money, and if they borrow from a Middleman, they must obey the middleman's rules, even if they do not like it or even harm it. Even if some provide capital loans and give them the freedom to market their products, the farmers will still have difficulties because they do not have their market network. They can also suffer losses because the vegetables will not get sold and rot.

#### 4.4 Farmers' Hope

Mrs. D expressed her hope to provide solutions to farmers. The hope is that there is a cooperative institution that acts like a Middleman who provides capital loans. However, it does not require farmers to sell their harvests to Middlemen and does not set a price. In addition, it helps farmers build a marketing network so that it is easier to sell.

# 4.5 Analysis of the Islamic Law Perspective

Humans as social beings cannot live alone, meaning humans need interaction with each other to fulfill all their needs; one form of interaction is in question in the field of *Muamalah*. *Muamalah* is a part of Islamic law regulating the relationship between a person and another person. *Muamalah* concerns rights and assets that arise from transactions between a person and another person, between a person and a legal entity, or between one legal entity and another (Abdullah, 2014; Lewis, 2001).

It is an alternative source of sharia-based financing that is more suitable for adaptation to the agricultural sector. The rate of return that is set is based on the results obtained during one harvest period, not based on the size of the loan, so that the deposit for repayment of the loan will be by the size of the farmer's income during that harvest period. One of these schemes is agricultural production-sharing-based financing, also called *Muzara'ah* (Mashum & Marlina, 2020). The practice has existed since the Prophet Muhammad and was carried out by the caliphs and their companions. The hadith narrated by Imam Muslim from Ibn Umar explained, 'From Ibn Umar that the Rasulullah SAW, employ the people of Khaibar by returning half of the results that come out in the form of fruit or plants. *Muzara'ah* is the landowners and land cultivators with a share of the harvest of the half, one-third, or according to a mutual agreement (Hasan, 2003).

The long history of the practice of *Muzara'ah* still exists today (Oladokun et al., 2015). This practice can be found in the territory of Indonesia, especially in rural areas. Wanajaaya village, Cirebon Regency, is one of the villages that still uses agricultural product-sharing-based financing. This profit-sharing agreement is made because some have good agricultural land to cultivate but do not have the ability to farm. Some own land and also can produce it but lack capital. Some do not have anything except the skill and energy in farming.

Islam requires the owner to use his land to have even distribution, and no land is idle. If the owner cannot work directly or does not have the ability, then the management can be left to someone more skilled in his field. It is following the Qur'an Surah Al-Maidah verse 2: 'Help you with virtue and piety and do not help you with sin and enmity...'(SAİHU & Islamy, 2019). The Hadith narrated by Bukhari from Ibn Abbas r.a states that 'Whoever owns the land, let him cultivate it or let his brother cultivate it.' (Ngasifudin, 2017).

Trading or buying and selling come from the Arabic language, namely *Al-bai'*, *At-tijāroh*, and *al-mubādalah*, which means 'to take, give something or barter' (Nawawi & Naufal, 2012). In other terms, buying and selling are exchanging goods for goods or goods for money by releasing property rights from one to another based on mutual consent (Suhendi, 2002). Etymologically, buying and selling are derived from Arabic, namely *Al-bai'*, which means selling, replacing, and exchanging something with something else. This language is sometimes used to understand the opposite, namely the word *As-syira'* (buy). Therefore, the phrase *Al-bai'* means to sell, but at the same time, it also means buying and selling (Afandi, 2009).

The Islamic buying and selling law has a principle that is the form of *Muamalat* that is *Mubah* (permissible) unless otherwise stipulated by the Qur'an and Sunnah. *Muamalat* is done voluntarily, without containing elements of coercion. *Muamalat* is carried out based on considering bringing benefits and avoiding harm in people's lives. *Muamalat* is done by maintaining the value of justice, avoiding elements of persecution, and aspects of taking opportunities in narrowness (Basyir, 2004).

Buying and selling are considered valid if they meet certain pillars and conditions. The pillars and requirements are (Nawawi & Naufal, 2012; Tousiya & Surahman, 2021): 1) The person who has a contract, the situation is *Baligh*, Intellect (*Aqil*), with his own will.

2) The conditional object of the contract is legal goods; the contract parties know the object of the contract; the goods being traded are owned by the person who has the contract; objects that can be handed over. 3) Shighat (Ijab and Qabul). The conditions are that the Shighat must be clear and understandable. There is an agreement between Ijab and Qabul on the goods, the desire to perform the contract at that time and compatibility between Ijab and Qabul. 4) The purpose of the contract is that the Syara must justify it'. The objective must last until the end of the contract implementation. The purpose of the contract does not constitute an existing obligation on the parties concerned without the contract being held.

Buying and selling are prohibited in Islam because *Gharar* makes people eat other people's property. There is an element of deception that causes envy, conflict, and hostility between Muslims. The prohibited trading types are buying and selling goods that have not been received, buying and selling unclean, buying and selling unclean and unclean goods, and buying and selling *Gharar* (Nawawi & Naufal, 2012; Williams & Zinkin, 2010).

Linguistically, the word *Al-Gharar* has two meanings, namely that which contains a reduction in rights and leads to destruction and obscurity. Meanwhile, according to the term's meaning, buying and selling *Gharar* is selling goods whose appearance, nature, and size are not known. Buying and selling *Gharar* is the sale and purchase of merchandise whose conditions cannot be known. Buying and selling *Gharar* is prohibited because it contains elements of fraud that can cause conflict (Noor, 2017; Uddin & Ahmad, 2020).

The *Idz'an* contract is a strong party imposing prices or terms on consumers, which benefits the strong party. According to *Majma' al-Fiqh al-Islami's* decision at the 14th Congress, no. 132, 2003, the *Idz'an* contract is divided into two. First, the *Idz'an* contract has a standard price according to actual needs. The *Idz'an* contract is applied by applying fair principles, not oppressing weak parties. The price is based on real value. This *Idz'an* contract is permissible and binding on both parties. Second, the *Idz'an* contract contains injustice from the ruling party. Such as the *Idz'an* contract, which is essentially consumer fraud, has the tyranny of the weak party, applies excessive prices beyond the normal price (*Ghabn Fahisy*), or includes clauses that are very pressing and detrimental to consumers.

# 4.6 Analysis of The Perspective of The Critical Philosophy of Antonio Gramsci

Antonio Gramsci explained that hegemony is the power or domination of the norms of life and culture of a group of people, eventually becoming a provision that must be adhered to. In the language of religion, it is a doctrine by the other party which the dominated party consciously follows (Nezar & Andi, 2009). The patron-client relationship, which occurs in the farming community of Wanajaya Village, Cirebon Regency, when analyzed using the Gramsci theory above, shows a kind of dominance and hegemony in it. For example, what is experienced by farmers about their powerlessness to refuse the provisions of middlemen must sell the harvest to the middlemen at a price determined by the middlemen. In addition, there is a provision for a price reduction of up to 100% when the farmers can pay off their debts with half of their harvest. This provision makes the farmers desperate and helpless as there is no other way for the farmers expect to have to follow the requirements of the Middlemen.

Antonio Gramsci was born in 1891 in Ales Sardinia (Howarth, 2014). Antonio Gramsci is an intellectual and the greatest thinker after Karl Marx. His thinking about hegemony is a central and original idea that was developed. Hegemony ideas are brilliant ideas that encourage the development of social theories and foster critical political awareness (Alistair Davidson, 2016; Salamini, 2014). Associated with the economy, his idea of hegemony opened the mind again to the nature of the class, social forces, and the

meaning of power and domination. These things gave birth to the idea of hegemony (Cammett, 1968) – a process of dominating the dominant class over the lower class and the lower class actively supporting the ideas of the dominant class. At this time, the dominance of the dominant class over the weak class is carried out not by force but through efforts to control the consciousness of the weaker party so that they are complacent and agree to the domination of the dominant class. In Karl Mark's language, the weak class is alienated and thus agrees to the domination of the dominant class.

The concept of hegemony was born and developed in the flow of Marxist thought. Almost all discussions of hegemony lead to Marxist thought. The concept of hegemony has been recently positioned more neutrally, for example, in power relationships in the political, literary, economic, social, and cultural fields. Hegemony is closely related to the concept of power and ideology that work simultaneously. According to Gramsci, hegemony is seen in the two-way practice, from the subordinating relationship, namely the power of the bourgeois state and the working class (Alastair Davidson, 2008; Fontana, 2008).

Based on the above theory, the author analyzed and explored the concept of hegemony in the context of the power of Middlemen over farmers in building vegetable farming economic cooperation. Based on the farmers' acknowledgment of the treatment of Middlemen who make unilateral decisions, often make losses, and are helpless, the author concludes that Middlemen have hegemony against farmers.

## V. Conclusion

The village of Wanajaya, Cirebon, has changed from an agricultural village to an industrial village. This change also causes changes in the economic sector. People who originally lived as farmers have partly turned into industrial workers with all their problems. Agricultural land is depleting, and people who still maintain their lives as farmers are losing their ground. They rent by borrowing capital from Middlemen. The risk is that they have to comply with the provisions of the Middlemen even if it is heavy and helpless.

In the perspective of Islamic law, patron-client cooperation contains the value of unkindness. If analyzed using the thinking of Antonio Gramsci, the patron-client collaboration includes the value of hegemony and domination for farmers. The solution is that the government's participation and policies are re-invigorated to create capital cooperatives for farmers. Cooperatives also provide a way to market agricultural products.

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