

Why Collaborative Public Management Fails in Controlling Inflation? Study on Regional Inflation Control Team

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Abstract

This study aims to analyze the causes of collaborative public management in the form of the Regional Inflation Control Team (TPID) of Cilacap Regency which has members from various elements such as the government, NGOs and the private sector, has not been successful in overcoming food inflation in Cilacap Regency. By using the data collection method used are structured interviews and in-depth interviews with TPID actors supported by secondary data such as TPID annual reports, Cilacap Regency APBD, inflation data, and so on. The results of the study indicate that the cause of the current collaborative public management that has not been effective is because the collaborative model is characterized by the Reactive Model. This model has the characteristic that there is no dominant orientation in the strategy or collaboration activities that are not too high. This means that the TPID of Cilacap Regency is more likely to wait for policy directions from the central government and then move to determine the programs and activities that will be carried out.

Keywords

inflation; collaborative public management; society participation; reactive model.



I. Introduction

Musgrave as an economist highlights the importance of the government's role in the economy as a tool in achieving state goals and in order to maintaining the stability of a country. Musgrave stated that the government's role in the economy includes: a. Stabilization role; b. The Role of Income Redistribution; and c. The Role of Resource Allocation (Musgrave, 1996). These three roles are carried out through two main policies, namely monetary policy and fiscal policy. The role of stabilization means that the government is obliged to maintain economic stability, economic stability is very important to provide business certainty for economic actors. One of the things that becomes a parameter of economic stability is price stability. Stable prices make it easy for people to measure how much money they have to spend on shopping or determine how much money they have to invest compared to their income. However, if inflation occurs where prices tend to rise in general and continuously (Mankiw, 2015), it will result in a decrease in people's purchasing power. The decline in purchasing power will then have an impact on individuals, the business world, as well as the government's revenue and expenditure budget. In other words, a high inflation rate will have a negative impact on an economy as a whole (Astiyah & Suseno, 2010). This will result in a decrease in the purchasing power of the people. Economic actors, basically have very important functions. Because it has two functions at once, namely as a supplier of all the needs of the community, both primary, secondary and tertiary. At the same time, they also function as absorbers of community labor, which can economically increase purchasing power. (Ansari, T. 2019)

Inflation is one of the problems that can disrupt economic stability, therefore the government must find a way out because Inflation has various impacts, including a) The impact of inflation can inhibit or disrupt the growth process in the real sector. This is because inflation causes people's ability to buy (aggregate demand) will decrease and then this decline will cause producers to reduce production levels and if this happens for a long time it can lead to layoffs and increased unemployment; b) Inflation also has an impact on international trade, where inflation will cause the price of domestic goods to be expensive compared to the price of goods abroad. Therefore, the value of exports will decrease, causing a state financial deficit; c) For the government, the impact of prolonged inflation can trigger a heated political climate caused by people who think that the current government is unable to improve economic conditions, especially in the event of a crisis. This is one of the reasons behind the fall of Suharto as President of Indonesia in 1998, namely the economic crisis.

Inflation does not only occur in the capital city but also in all regions in Indonesia, although with different levels of variation. From the results of the study, it is known that the characteristics of inflation in Indonesia still tend to be volatile or fluctuating, which is mainly influenced by the supply side, among others, related to production, distribution, and government policy disruptions. Meanwhile, the source of inflationary pressure in Indonesia that can be managed by the government through Bank Indonesia is the demand side. In addition, shocks to inflation can also come from government policies related to strategic commodity prices such as fuel and other energy commodities (administered prices).

There are four causes of inflation, namely: Demand-Pull (pull demand), Cost-Push, Wage-price Spiral (wage-price spiral), and Excessive Monetary Growth, (Astiyah & Suseno, 2010; Bispham, 1982; Jongwanich & Park, 2008; Phillips, 1958). Of the four causes, many actors are involved; there is the community as consumers and sources of input, the private sector as producers and providers of goods that have a hand in playing with prices, and also the government which in the economic cycle can act as regulators, producers, and consumers. The rotating economic cycle involving the three actors can trigger inflation, but the government as the authority that has the authority to make policy and regulate is the most decisive in controlling inflation.

Furthermore, Agranoff and McGuire stated that collaboration is formed by various organizations that are interconnected and have specific goals. Collaboration is designed to address a problem that an organization cannot solve easily, so it requires a process of facilitation and operationalization in a shared (multi-organizational) setting. Collective arrangements can also be interpreted as cooperation agreements that often work across borders by involving multi sectors and multi actors, where the collaborative relationship is based on the values of reciprocity. Controlling inflation requires collaboration across government levels from the district/city level to the national level by involving multi-sectors and multi-actor who have reciprocal relationships.

The practice of collaboration within a country is also very appropriate in relation to the provision of services to the community because the government has limited resources in providing services to the community while the problems in society are so complex that the government needs assistance from various parties (including the private sector) to do so. As cited by Eriksson et al in their research (Eriksson et al., 2020):

Increased collaboration among organizations is required to deal with the complex reality of today's societies. Thus, the collaboration is not only needed to improve public services per se, but to create the capability of solving contemporary meta-problems of public sector service delivery. In addition to

The author uses the keywords public management and collaborative public management in the VOSviewer application to search for any themes that have been raised in scientific journals both in Google Scholar and Scopus. The results show that the words public management and collaborative public management are most often associated with policy themes (*policy*), administration (*administration*) and reform (*reform*). While those associated with the inflation theme are still very few, this can be seen from the very small inflation word circle. If it is related to novelty, based on the color of the circle (green Tosca) the inflation theme is also still relatively new because the green color of Tosca (circle of inflation) is in the range of 2015 to 2020, meaning that the inflation theme has only been raised in 2015 and above.

When the word inflation is enlarged (figure 1), it can be seen that the inflation theme is related to other themes such as *policy*, *variation*, *institution*, *consequence*, *use*, *survey data*, *choice*, *support*, *explanation*, *economy*, *cooperation*, *country*, *survey data*, *belief*, *policymaker*, *contribution*, and financial repression. However, what is most often raised is the inflation theme associated with the policy, while the author brings up the inflation theme with collaborative public management as shown in Figure 1 there is no link between the inflation theme and the collaborative public management theme.




Figure 2

II. Research Method

This study uses a qualitative research method with the type of case studies (case studies). The case study type is considered suitable because this research is intended to study intensively and in-depth, an institution (Regional Government of Cilacap Regency), and the research questions used are "what" and "how". In addition, the research focus of this study lies on contemporary (present) phenomena or events, namely examining the causes of collaborative public management prevailing in Cilacap Regency's failure to control inflation.

The data used in this study are primary data and secondary data. Secondary data required is in the form of documents such as Government Agency Performance Accountability Reports (LAKIP) for 2018 – 2019, Activity Reports, Various regulations ranging from Laws to Regional Regulations/Heads of Regions, Technical Instructions, and letters related to the scope of activities involved. carried out by members of the Cilacap Regency TPID and regional statistical data such as; inflation rate, economic growth rate, population data, and other data that describe the economic condition of Cilacap Regency are also needed to support the author's analysis.

III. Result and Discussion

Before concluding what causes TPID's collaborative public management to not succeed in controlling food inflation in Cilacap Regency, in the initial discussion the author will compare the collaborative public management model in controlling food inflation in Cilacap Regency with Agranoff and McGuire's public management model.

Agranoff and McGuire in their book *Collaborative Public Management New Strategies for Local Government* which examines the practice of Collaborative Management in several cities in the United States make a collaborative management model as the intersection of two variables or dimensions: (1) the level of collaborative activity (Collaborative Activity) and (2) expansion/development of these activities as a strategy (Collaborative Strategy). The results of the combination of collaborative activities and collaboration strategies produce several models, namely: Jurisdiction-based, Donor-recipient, Top-down, Contented, Reactive, and Abstinence.




Figure 3. Collaborative Public Management Model According to Agranoff

The explanation of the above model is as follows:

a) Jurisdiction-Based Management Model

The essence of this model emphasizes how local managers implement strategies together with various actors and agents from various government agencies and the private sector (other sectors). As the name implies, this model describes how local managers are driven by strategic reasons, namely based on jurisdiction. For such managers, the attainment of local goals and the completion of specific tasks is paramount. In an interconnected world, jurisdiction-based managers have the highly complex strategic behavior of finding and linking actors with power over multiple resources (including

legitimate power, financial, organizational, expertise, and information) that is able to support the achievement of the goals of local managers.

Jurisdiction-based managers in a region/region can identify various programs, actors, and agencies that may become donors who are stakeholders of local policy, but only contact agencies that can provide targeted, place-oriented resources that directly and strategically influence jurisdiction managers. By calculating the costs and benefits of each of the available programs, managers from a jurisdiction-based model are strategically searched for grants.

b) Abstention Model (Abstain Model)

Another management model which is the most extreme model seen in Figure 1 is the abstention model, which is described as passive management, meaning that the actors in this management model do not carry out any activities or strategies. This model illustrates that some local governments do not participate in the collaboration process. The local government can choose not to be involved in the activities/programs of the central and provincial governments, especially those related to discretion which are part of the internal programs/internal policies of the local government. The decision to abstain was made for a variety of reasons including the decision to do everything on their own, to reject outside interference, and the lack of ability to participate in the collaborative process.

There are many factors that cause the emergence of unwillingness to collaborate. First, is the issue of jurisdictional areas and levels of government, especially those related to the central government, both in terms of politics and the scope of government. Second, the local government tries to resist, avoiding excessive workloads due to lack of resources both in terms of ability or time for its employees, long-winded procedures, and avoiding rules and policies that or avoiding cross-regional sanctions. Third, the reluctance to collaborate vertically and horizontally because they have several views does not want to be involved.

The abstention collaboration model in practice can be done consciously or unconsciously. In the abstention model, in the jurisdiction no one takes part, making the scope "smaller" and the management environment more inviting for others to exploit.

c) Top-Down Model (Model from top to bottom)

Cities/regions that apply this management model are quite active in a collaborative environment but rarely use a collaborative approach in strategy. This model is based on two normative premises: that the Federal system should be considered as a single system and that the factual interdependence of the Federal system mandates applying executive-centered logic to the system (Sundquist and Davis 1969). This model is a bureaucratic resolution to the basic dilemma of "how to achieve goals and objectives that are established by the national government, through the action of other governments, state and local, that are legally independent and politically may even be hostile". "(Sundquist and Davis, 1969). The main aspect of top-down management is local compliance. This top-down model illustrates the emphasis on central (vertical) government control over local (local) governments. In this style, there is a debate on how to realize the national program through local governments, while legally local governments have autonomous rights. Therefore, the most decisive aspect of this style is voluntary obedience, as well as the suitability of local government programs in implementing central government programs.

d) Donor-recipient Model (Donor-recipient Model)

Activities in Bargain City are consistent with the donor-recipient model of collaborative management, where collaborative activity may be moderate or even high, and the strategic orientation of the city is not as strong as in jurisdiction-based cities or as in top-down cities. The top-down collaborative management model is based on the idea that

multiple actors have the information, expertise, and skills to control policy outputs that are consistent with multiple social interests. Alternatively, the Beneficiary model involving Grantees and Grantees is based on actors in a collaborative system who rely on one another rather than operating with control at the top of the system. It recognizes that program collaborators must rely on each other in program parameters involving varying degrees of interdependence, and two-party control. The donor-beneficiary model is vertically active in carrying out collaborative management, although the horizontal component that may be present in the donor-recipient community is minimal.

Utilities looked at intergovernmental relations in terms of donors (actors providing resources) and recipients who first identified Jeffrey Pressman's sick Federal program and city politics (1975). Researching federal aid at the local level, he concludes that each Federal partner is dependent on the actions of others to achieve its own goals: Recipients may need money but donors need applications and capabilities that can be applied at the local level. Donors do not have the time, resources, inclination, or, in many cases, the authority to intervene regularly in the Recipient's territory. While donors recognize their dependence on recipient actions, leading in part to cooperation, conflict is also a common aspect of managing the donor-recipient relationship. Pressman argues, "donors and recipients need each other, but do not have complete control over the actions of the other. As such, the relief process takes the form of a bargaining chip in cooperative, partly antagonistic, and actor-dependent activities" (1975, 106-7).

e) Reactive Model

This style is characterized by the absence of orientation dominance in collaboration strategies or activities and the approach used is maybe, maybe not. We also hypothesize the management model at the center of the activity-strategy continuum, although we cannot be as specified in the description as in other models. This model recognized a "Catchall" category for describing several cities. Our basic premise of the hypothetical model is that a city can be identified by the dominant managerial response as a particular type of collaborative management model of the city. A reactive city is one without a dominant orientation—moderate for small activities and moderate for small strategies. In our formulation, the reactive model of collaborative management is consistent with Centerville's "maybe, maybe not" approach. Sometimes a city can choose to participate, sometimes not. The decision to participate may be strategically based, or it may not.

When such a city decides not to collaboratively participate in a program or project, it resembles a kind of abstinence from capacitance, a whisper occurs when a jurisdiction chooses to vote on a particular occasion or situation. Even though these jurisdictions accept games and official fees, their ability as Intergovernmental actors leads them to somehow decide not to play games in certain situations or a series of situations. For example, a city may choose not to underwrite a suitable part of the state-of-the-art venture capital loan offered to local entrepreneurs because it has decided that the risk factor is too high.

The reactive city will see the potential for engagement and decide that "this program is not for us." There does not appear to be a single managerial legacy that leads to non-involvement, but several may be contributing. One would be the principle of autonomy and integrity of jurisdiction as an entity with boundaries. For many officials, each unit of government should be autonomous and left free to make decisions on the basis of citizens' preferences, not Federal dictates or mandates. Thus, these external stimuli pose a potential threat to public demand as well as organizational integrity. The second justification may be the dichotomy of the old political government. That is, the Council and/or the mayor decided that Intergovernmental activities were undesirable,

A third justification may be that the activity is not mission-driven. Some officials view the city's mission in terms of basic specialized services and infrastructure: economic activity is the role of the private sector, human services are from the state, cultural events are from the non-profit sector, and so on. As a result, activities other than basic services are considered to be out of bounds. A final managerial justification might be that some other agency or organization is already providing the service. The avoidance of duplication and overlap means that another organization, the city, in this case, should not become involved because of these pants of poor management.

This model is based on the idea that a number of actors have the expertise and information to consistently control policy by accommodating various social interests. This style requires the involvement of grantors and grantees because the actors in this collaboration system are interdependent with each other. This style has the main characteristic of minimally combining vertical and horizontal collaboration.

f) Contented Model

This style emphasizes the strategy of collaborating rather than the collaborative activity itself. In other words, this style is more opportunistic and seeks to understand the environment according to the preferences of the local government or the organization itself.

A city whose residents feel satisfied (financially prosperous) like Richburb is one that is opportunistic and chooses to exploit its environment of economic development that is strategic by our definition. However, it takes a bit and it's trying very little if any collaboration with other actors. The collaborations pursued by cities are satisfied usually with cities and other development organizations whose policy choices affect the city itself. In other words, spillovers are managed through a horizontal collaborative mechanism, but vertical activity is minimal.

A relatively well-off city in an affluent suburb worries less about industrializing or "globalizing" the economy. It relies on the development of more expensive real estate, both residential and commercial. This assists investors in paving the way for new developments and cooperates with adjoining cities on issues such as land annexation, shared services, and possibly special districting. But it doesn't feel so pressured to seek external vertical grants, loans, or the myriad of tax adjustments the poor need to attract economic investment. Private investment is more likely to come to cities with less promotion. They do not encourage the types of industries that are considered strategically undesirable. The city usually has the staff capacity to pursue the intergovernmental game, and occasionally opts for programs such as tax adjustments. They do not focus their energies on public dollar investments, but on inter-local facilitation of investment by the private sector.

Satisfied cities are relatively wealthy and experience strong growth curves, both in population and in colonies. Every government activity is designed to maintain the city's profitable pace of economic development. Activity is low, and local strategy consists primarily of policy decisions that minimize development costs and involvement of the public sector, particularly federal and state governments.

Thomson et al have other opinions regarding models in collaboration and even call it a multidimensional model in collaboration and call it the five key dimensions of collaboration (five key dimensions of collaboration). The multidimensional model is the result of their research which developed the following understanding of collaboration:

Collaboration is a process in which autonomous actors interact through formal and informal negotiation, jointly creating rules and structures governing their relationships and ways to act or decide on the issues that brought them together; it is a process involving shared norms and mutually beneficial interactions (Thomson & Perry, 2006)

Based on the above definition, it can be concluded that there are five key dimensions in collaboration, namely: governance, administration, mutuality, norms, and organizational autonomy. Each of these dimensions involves interrelated processes such as: making joint decisions about the rules for managing collaboration (governance); getting things done through an effective operational system that supports clear roles and effective communication channels (administration); overcoming the implicit tension shown in the collaboration between the organization's self-interest and the group's collective interest (organizational autonomy); working through differences to arrive at mutuality, and finally developing trust and norms of mutual commitment; all these dimensions require a commitment to process from time to time.

The following is an overview of collaborative public management in controlling food inflation in Cilacap Regency which is illustrated through several indicators of collaborative activities and collaboration strategies. Collaborative activities include horizontal and vertical collaboration activities.

3.1 Horizontal Collaboration Activities

Horizontal collaboration activities are various activities carried out by the Cilacap Regency Government that involve fellow TPID members in the context of controlling food inflation. The first horizontal collaboration activity is making policies and strategies related to inflation control efforts in Cilacap Regency. The strategy of the Cilacap Regency TPID in controlling inflation is contained in the 2020-2023 Inflation Control Roadmap, which contains four key strategies, namely; Price Affordability, Supply Availability, Smooth Distribution, and Effective Communication as shown in the following table.

3.2 Vertical Collaboration Activities

In the book written by Agranoff, vertical activity involves two things, namely how lower government institutions seek information (information seeking) and seek conformity (adjustment seeking) with government institutions above them or those with higher authority. Some of the information sought is related to general (complete) program information, information for funding new programs and projects, interpretation of standards and regulations as well as technical assistance. Meanwhile, the search for conformity is related to statutes, regulatory flexibility, policy changes, model involvement in the program, innovation for program funding and discretion based on performance.

Regarding the Cilacap Regency TPID, vertical collaboration activities are collaborative activities carried out by the Cilacap Regency Government with higher levels of government such as the Central Java Provincial Government and the central government in order to control food inflation in Cilacap Regency.

Associated with Agranoff's theory, one of the vertical collaboration activities is to seek information from related vertical agencies. The Cilacap Regency Regional Inflation Control Team (TPID) is an inseparable part of the National Inflation Control Team (TPIN), so efforts are needed to dig up information related to the steps to be taken in controlling inflation so that there is a match between the Cilacap Regency TPID and the TPIP so that the goal of controlling inflation is achieved. In seeking information, representatives of the Cilacap Regency TPID tried to coordinate with Bank Indonesia and various relevant ministries that are members of the TPIP.

The Cilacap Regency TPID is also trying to make adjustments with the Central Inflation Control Team (TPIP). This can be seen from the similarities between the TPID Cilacap Inflation Control Roadmap and the TPIP Inflation Control Roadmap (Table 2). In the Roadmap for controlling inflation in TPID Cilacap Regency, it is stated that there are

four (4) strategic keys to controlling inflation in Cilacap Regency, namely; affordability of prices, availability of supplies, smooth distribution, and effective communication. The four strategic keys turned out to be fully adopting the Roadmap from the Central Inflation Control Team. This is done to maintain continuity and similarity of steps between TPID and TPIP. The difference lies in the sub-program and the actors of the sub-program.

Table 1. Central Inflation Control Team Program

KEY STRATEGIES 4K		PROGRAM	SUB-PROGRAM 2018-2019
1	2	3	4
1	Price Affordability	Price Stabilization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Issued the Regulation of the Minister of National Development Planning/Head of Bappenas as a derivative of PP 17/2017 and Presidential Decree 23/2017 concerning the Mechanism of Coordination and Synchronization of Planning and Budgeting in the Context of Central and Regional Inflation Control. ▪ Alignment of K/L programs/activities related to national inflation control through planning coordination forums. ▪ Optimizing the use of e-planning and e-monev to oversee the planning process up to program/activity implementation related to inflation control. ▪ Optimization of Cheap Markets/Market Operations for 10 strategic food commodities*, taking into account the demand between time and region**. ▪ Reformulation of Market Operations into KPSH (Supply Availability and Price Stabilization) ▪ Maintain exchange rate volatility through the development of interest rate and exchange rate derivative instruments to support the implementation of hedging, including financial market infrastructure.
		Manage Requests	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintaining the internal balance of the economy • Monetary Policy Implementation • Diversification of food consumption diversification through the use of programs in villages, sub-districts, health centers, and schools
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ increased production (through increased productivity and area expansion). ▪ optimization of production facilities assistance (seeds, fertilizers and machineries) supported by the Development of Alsintan Services (UPJA) in production center areas by the Regional Government. ▪ improvement of the cultivation system (planting calendar). ▪ construction and rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure.

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ increased investment for cattle.
2	Supply Availability	Strengthening Production, Government Food Reserves, and Management of Food Imports	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Accelerate the use of Bulog's PMN for post-harvest infrastructure. ▪ Acceleration of realization of Transfers to Regions and Village Funds (TKDD) for agricultural infrastructure development and acceleration of infrastructure development including land acquisition by Regional Governments. ▪ Strengthening Government Food Reserves. ▪ Maintain CBP levels and support the strengthening of the mechanism for increasing CBP to 1-1.5 million tons. ▪ Strengthening reserves of certain staple foods other than rice, among others, through optimizing the use of the Food Price Stabilization Reserve***** ▪ Strengthening Import-Export management ▪ Continuing the mechanism for formulating food import-export policies through the Economic Coordination Meeting and its determination at the cabinet meeting.
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ adjustment of Agricultural Insurance provisions
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ optimizing the Utilization of the Warehouse Receipt System ▪ adjustment of the provisions of Agricultural KUR for inf. Post-harvest (al can be related to Warehouse Receipt System) ▪ expanding the implementation of the Farmer's Card
3	Supply Availability	Strengthening Institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Encouraging the transition of farmer institutions to become farmers' economic institutions, e.g. through contract farming ▪ Strengthening the supply of fuel with non-fuel
4	Smooth Distribution	Encouraging Trade Cooperation Between Regions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Development of a business model of inter-regional trade cooperation and inter-regional cooperation facilities, for example by optimizing the role of the private sector and BUMD

		Improving Trade Infrastructure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establishing an innovation lab, including a digital business incubator, fintech village, and encouraging MSME facilitation and advisory to take advantage of digital farming platforms Development of rice wholesaler market and facilities connectivity in production centers in Java and Outside Java (needs further study)
5	Effective Communication	Improve Data Quality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Policy formulation of one map of agricultural land Improved correlation of PIHPS and BPS data* Strengthening integrated PIHPS data from consumers, producers, and wholesalers, including stock data** Improved quality of inflation statistics for food and other strategic goods, including production and stock data
		Improve Data Quality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establishing AP policies that are in line with the CPI inflation target (including reviewing the policy on the upper limit of the lower limit of air freight rates) Conducting TPID coaching

In relation to the various vertical collaboration activities above, although the TPID of Cilacap Regency has attempted to seek information and make program adjustments with the Central Inflation Control Team, the financing related to the implementation of the program does not come from the central government but comes from the Cilacap Regency APBD.

3.3 Collaborative Strategy

In the collaborative public management model created by Agranoff, the collaborative strategy is divided into two extreme points, namely passive and opportunistic. Where the collaborative strategy is said to be passive if there is absolutely no effort to carry out collaborative activities even though they already have some kind of commitment with various parties to collaborate and are said to be opportunistic if the collaborative activities carried out are too active to ignore the applicable regulatory norms and only prioritize the interests of the agency alone.

Seeing the various horizontal and vertical activities carried out by the Cilacap Regency TPID which always coordinates both vertically and horizontally as well as the Cilacap Regency TPID's ability to develop programs from the Central Inflation Control Team by trying to collaborate with other Regional Governments, it can be concluded that the strategy implemented by TPID Cilacap Regency is quite active.

Then if the public management model in controlling inflation in Cilacap Regency is juxtaposed with Agranoff's public management model, it can be concluded that the collaborative public management model implemented by TPID Cilacap Regency is included in the Reactive Model.

This model has the characteristic that there is no dominant orientation in strategy or collaboration activities that are too high. This is what according to the author makes the collaborative management of TPID not successful in controlling food inflation because, as the word reactive means, TPID Cilacap Regency does not have many self-initiative

strategies in controlling inflation because all have been given guidelines by the central government, even there are no additional strategies or activities. other than those listed in the TPID manual. The reactive attitude was also shown by the fairly quick response of the TPID of Cilacap Regency to any information or instructions from the TPIP. This is influenced by the nature of the formation of the TPID which is indeed a mandate from the central government.

The reactive model is also based on the idea that a number of actors possess the expertise and information to consistently control policy by accommodating multiple social interests. This also applies to the TPID of Cilacap Regency where the Regent of Cilacap as a public manager as well as acting as the head of the TPID determines several selected actors in the TPID who have the expertise and master the information to enter the TPID technical team and become the motor for the overall activities and programs of the Cilacap Regency TPID.

However, there is a difference in Agranof's research where a city that collaborates with a reactive model can choose whether to participate or not participate in a program/activity from the federal government. Meanwhile, as part of the TPIN, the TPID of Cilacap Regency must always participate in TPIN programs and activities because the position of the local government is under the central government. In fact, because it has been mandated by the central government, the Regent of Cilacap as a public manager must inevitably form a TPID. This is inseparable from the Indonesian government system in the form of a unitary state where the relationship between the central government and local governments is dependent and subordinate (Yuda, 2013), while the relationship between the states and the federal government that adheres to the principle of federalism which is independent and coordinating.

IV. Conclusion

The reason why TPID has not been successful in controlling food inflation in Cilacap Regency is because the current collaborative public management when compared to the Collaborative Public Management Model developed by Agranoff is in a reactive position. This position is characterized by the absence of a dominant orientation in strategy or collaboration activities that are too high. This can be seen from the strategies and activities vertically and horizontally TPID Cilacap Regency does not have many strategies outside of those listed in the TPID manual and tends to move after instructions or directives from the central government.

It is recommended that the Cilacap Regency TPID be more active in activities and develop activities and collaborations with other local governments, as well as innovate to find more effective ways to control inflation, while still paying attention to the TPIN roadmap so that harmony in controlling inflation nationally is maintained. The important thing for collaboration to run smoothly is the sharing of resources. Each member of the collaboration needs to share resources in terms of funding, knowledge, human resources, technology, and so on. So that programs and activities in controlling inflation can be developed in a wider and more effective scope.

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