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Moderate Islamic Movement in the Midst of the Plurality of Indonesian Society

Iswahyudi
Universitas Negeri Yogyakarta, Indonesia

Abstract

The use of the term modernist Islam is to denote any activist, organization, or party that seeks to establish an Islamic state or to comprehensively reorganize Indonesian society according to Islamic values. In contrast, the term conservative Islam is used to denote a broader category of activists, organizations, and parties seeking to preserve, expand, introduce, or codify traditional Islamic practices as law or the application of sharia in a more stringent, situational or symbolic fashion. Islamists, in this sense, are by definition conservatives, although conservatives need not be Islamists. It should also be noted that Islamism is more narrowly defined as a specific revolutionary movement to replace westernized postcolonial states with authentic Islamic institutions and anything less comprehensive than those under the umbrella of Islamic conservatism or neoconservatism. This paper explores the various manifestations of pressure on religious pluralism in post-transitional Indonesia. Democratization, decentralization, and socio-cultural Islamization do not strengthen or dismantle the system of religious pluralism in Indonesia. Instead, they generate sharp and growing disparities in how pluralism is institutionalized and practiced: disparities across regions, localities, and groups.

Keywords
modernist Islam; Indonesia, pluralism; Nahdlatul Ulama; Muhammadiyah

I. Introduction

Islam in Indonesia is very diverse and tolerant of religious diversity. While this is an oversimplification, there is a lot of truth to that statement. In addition to a large and heterogeneous majority of Sunni Muslims, Indonesia is home to sizable Christian, Hindu, and Buddhist minorities, small groups of Shia and Ahmadi Muslims, and various Islamic heterodoxy, including Kejawen (Javanese), whose practitioners incorporate Hindu rituals. , Buddhism and animism into their daily observance of Islam. Moreover, for reasons that are complex and historically contingent, the practical realities of life in this multi-religious environment have spawned a pluralistic and even relativistic view of faith. This is what Clifford Geertz mentions as the difference between Indonesian Islam and what he observes in other places (Geertz, 1971: 9-25).

Throughout the period before Indonesia's independence in 1945, the people in the archipelago were already in diversity. Pluralism and diversity have been the fabric of the social fabric of the Indonesian people since time immemorial, since the time of the sultanate, several centuries ago and the former Dutch colonial era. Because of the complexity of the diversity of the archipelago, the founding fathers of the Republic of Indonesia chose a state government system in the form of a nation state, not in the form of an Islamic theocracy. The

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collective memory of the Indonesian people about diversity and plurality in various aspects of life is strongly embedded and embedded in Indonesian society in the subconscious of any religion. The unconscious collective memory of diversity and pluralism becomes an extraordinary force to be tolerant, inclusive, open-minded and so easily leads to solving complex socio-religious and socio-national problems. However, in the two decades since 1998 at the time of Indonesia's transition to democracy, religious pluralism has come under pressure from a series of developments that impacted Muslim and non-Muslim relations. These include campaigns to assert the superiority of Islam relative to other religions, purify Indonesian Islamic beliefs and practices and Islamize the country (Abdullah,2017).

Furthermore, through a historical approach, one can examine various Islamic dimensions, such as religion, culture, and other related Islamic dimensions. Religion is vividly brought out as a major theme and it seems to have a stronger influence on how the people (Eskandari, 2020). Religion has the potential to be used as a tool to achieve political power in a nation, which may lead to inter-religious and inter-religious conflict itself (Nuruddin, 2019). In the religious field, in particular, there are patterns of thought that have emerged in the view of theology, fiqh (Islamic study of laws related to ritual obligations), and Islamic Sufism since around the 7th century AD. Since then, Islam with various schools of thought has spread across various cultural areas and developed into unique religious patterns among ethnic and cultural communities. As seen in the spread of Islam in the archipelago since the 13th century (Abdurahman, 2017: 9).

The questions that will be developed in this paper will only focus on two perspectives, namely historical and cultural perspectives. This perspective is directed at the context of modernist Islam in Indonesia in general. Meanwhile, a more specific description of the sociocultural development of Muslims will be based on the local community's Sufism phenomenon. For now, the historical orientation of Islam's relationship with the cultural development of Islamic society can be broadly assumed as follows: Islam has adapted to local culture in the early days of its spread. After that, the local Islamic construction began to change as a result of the penetration of Western culture during the colonial period. Furthermore, the contemporary period of Islam is increasingly struggling with diversity as a result of the development of modern multiculturalism (Abdurahman, 2011).

II. Research Method

To find out about Moderate Islamic movement in the midst of the plurality of Indonesian society, it was carried out using the historical method or historical research method which can be interpreted as a systematic collection of principles and rules intended to help effectively collect historical source material, in assessing or studying these sources are critical, and present a "synthesis" of the results achieved. This method is qualitative in the form of literature study using written sources from the libraries in the form of books, journals, newspapers and other printed sources (Garraghan,1957:33).

Primary and secondary data collection techniques are carried out through literature studies conducted by visiting various libraries and agencies that store written material in the form of archival material at the National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia, Jakarta, written materials in the form of monographs, magazines and newspapers published at that time in the National Library of the Republic Indonesia and written materials in the form of reference books in other libraries. After the search for written material has been completed, the next step is to select and verify the data and compile it into writing (Iswahyudi, 2020: 469).

III. Discussion

3.1 The Modernist Islamic Movement in Indonesia

Ongoing Islamization is an integral part of this complex process of globalization. At this time, the influence of Islamization no longer reached Indonesia from a single center, as it had long ago. Apart from Mecca, Cairo has since the early 20th century been a major source of influence, with a growing number of Indonesians studying at al-Azhar or one of the other universities. Especially the reformist inclined people who went to Cairo, attracted by the fame of Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida. By the 1970s, however, al-Azhar had become a deeply conservative institution, which many Indonesians considered to be more backward than their own pesantren. However, they are also associated with more radical Islamic thought such as the Muslim Brotherhood. In this respect the works of Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, which were translated into Indonesian and widely disseminated, became very influential.

The number of impacting centers for the spread of Islam in Indonesia has multiplied. The initial center was British India; the Ahmadiyya movement sent its first missionaries to Indonesia in the mid-1920s, who succeeded in spreading modernist Islam among the traditional Javanese elite. The Indonesian Ahmadiyya Community currently maintains contact with centers in Lahore and Qadian. The Lucknow center based traditionalist education Nadwatul 'Ulama regularly attracts a number of Indonesian students and the works of the center's leading ulama are widely available in Indonesian translations.

After the Islamic revolution, Iran made a significant impact although the first contact with modern Shi'ite thinkers was through English and Arabic translations. The centre-periphery model, in which the periphery, namely Indonesia, develops under the influence of a dominant centre, has long been an adequate model to explain the ongoing process of Islamization. However, in the 1970s, not only were there more centers, but their influence became more diffuse, and the network model represented influence flows more adequately. One does not have to go to Mecca or Cairo to find stimulating Islamic ideas. Medical or political science students at an American university are likely to emphasize their Muslim identity and find new Islamic thinking interesting. journals and books, in international languages such as English and Arabic or Indonesian translations, became the main means of spreading Islam (van Bruinessen, 1999).

The relationship between the santri and the abangan was not always as antagonistic as it was in the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, it is questionable whether the existence of the three real patterns of santri, abangan and priyayi was not merely an artifact of the political struggle between Muslim parties (Masyumi, NU), the Communist Party and the nationalist PNI in those years. Several decades earlier, the first mass political movement in the Dutch East Indies, the Sarekat Islam, had mobilized both santri and abangan. The polarization of the 1960s ended with the mass politicization of 1965-66. The next two decades saw a remarkable Islamization of nominal Islam (abangan and priyayi), a process Indonesians sometimes refer to as "santrinization". One of the factors supporting this process is the political situation. However, there are other factors that have also contributed to the decline of abangan practice, the kebatinan movement, and the rise of scripturalist Islam. The most important of them was the social and economic transformation of Indonesian society that took place during those years. Societies that had been relatively closed have become open, mobility has increased, many people have migrated to cities. The country is open to foreign capital and tourism and diverse cultural influences, many but not all Western. Mass education broadens people's horizons and provides access to an unprecedented number of written texts. One of its effects

was the acceleration of secularization, but at the same time this development also strengthened scripturalist Islam.

During Sukarno's presidency, Islamic discourse and action in Indonesia was dominated by the major Muslim political parties, Masyumi and NU. Under Suharto, discourse-dominant was at least to some extent because the official sponsor was the so-called "renewal" (renewal) movement that emerged from the HMI Islamic Student Association, with Nurcholish Madjid as its most eloquent and charismatic spokesperson. This movement stands out for itself by its rejection of primordial Muslim politics embodied in the slogan “Islam yes, Islamic party no!” and with its tolerance of other religions, which are not regarded as wrong, but legitimate. alternative way of worshiping God (Abdullah, 2017). Impatient with religious externalities, the group stressed that Muslims should seek the essence of God's message to the Prophet and not be content with formal, literal reading of the holy book. This inevitably requires sensitivity to the contexts of revelation and the context in which the message is to be put into practice. Nurcholish's thought was initially influenced by American sociology of religion and liberal theology, and he later earned a doctorate in Islamic Studies in Chicago under the neo-modernist Pakistani scholar Fazlur Rahman (Madjid,1987).

More explicitly than any other Indonesian Islam, the movement sees "Indonesianness" as a legitimate dimension of their own Islamic identity. The concept of true Indonesian Islam, which is anathema to most modernist Islamists who insist on the universality of Islam, is of great interest to them. Although Nurcholish and his friends were careful to distance themselves from kebatinan, which most Muslim modernists regard as un- or even anti-Islamic, they held a positive view of Pancasila, which they associated with the idea of authentic Indonesian Islam.

Over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, the group gradually managed to establish itself among the professional, bureaucratic, and business elite. Their ideas received generous press coverage and patronage because they gave an Islamic view of legitimacy to the New Order's development efforts. This group is at the core of the emergence of the Muslim middle class, both the self-conscious middle class and the self-conscious Muslim. Very similar religious ideas, even more liberal, were developed by Abdurrahman Wahid and his circle. Wahid never belonged to that group, although he often met them. He has a very different background, coming not from a modernist Islamic family but from the elite of the traditional Islamic organization Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and combining modern secular education with traditional Islamic education. By staying close to traditionalist discourse on the one hand, he formulated bolder ideas about equal rights for women and religious minorities, secularism, national integration, and democratization than the group did. Since becoming chairman of NU in 1984 he has stimulated unprecedented intellectual activity among traditionalists.

Another person who deserves special mention is Munawir Syadzali, who served as Minister of Religion from 1983 to 1993. Although not a member of the group, he was close to their ideas and acted as their protector. In addition, he has the courage to formulate ideas that were previously dared not to be expressed by some Indonesian Muslims. He visited the country's Islamic universities with lectures on "no longer relevant verses of the Koran" and a radical proposal for a contextual interpretation of the Koran. Munawir also talked about the need to specifically formulate the Indonesian jiqh, a very bold affirmation from the local as a creative adaptation from the global. He led efforts to codify Islamic law and jurisprudence. What is interesting is that it is precisely the most cosmopolitan Islam and the most sophisticated intellectuals who speak in defense of Indonesian Islam. This kind of Islamic conservatism is nothing new as it has dominated Islamic politics in the two decades after independence and has experienced a resurgence in the 1990s. However, a more progressive

and in-depth view of Islam's relationship with the state became more prominent in the early days of democratization of government.

For many observers, the MUI fatwa symbolizes a shift in the balance of power between progressives and conservatives among the Muslim elite, and a broader conservative shift in Indonesian Islam (Fealy 2006; van Bruinessen 2013). The emphasis on pluralism is strikingly illustrated by a series of fatwas issued in 2005 by the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI). This state-funded council was originally set up by president Suharto to give Islamic legitimacy to government policies. In 2000, however, MUI redefined its role as providing guidance, through fatwas and lesser fatwas, to both the government and Indonesian Muslims. However, this does not signal MUI's withdrawal from politics. Instead, as explained in the 2005 fatwa, the MUI has been arrested by conservative Islamists, who are now using the organization to pull Indonesian Islam into a more rigid, puritanical, and exclusive position.

The MUI's most controversial 2005 fatwa targeted “pluralism, secularism and liberalism.” Both condemning secularism (defined in fatwas as the strict separation of religion from worldly affairs) and condemning Islamic liberalism (defined as the idea that the Quran and Sunnah should be interpreted by ordinary Muslims, not through the teachings of trained scholars) are utterly shocking. However, the fatwa's condemnation of pluralism surprised many Indonesians because Indonesia has instituted a system of religious pluralism, in which the state grants equal recognition, rights, and protections to followers of Islam, Protestantism and Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Chinese Confucianism. And most Indonesians associate the expression of religious pluralism with the concepts of tolerance, coexistence, and harmony of values which, furthermore, are idealized in the nationalist imagination as the essence of Indonesia (Brown, 2016).

The 2005 fatwa did not directly oppose this institutionalized system of pluralism or ideas related to tolerance, coexistence, and harmony between religious groups. On the other hand, under the rubric of pluralism it rejects an understanding that all religions are the same and therefore the truth of each religion is relative, the related belief that no believer of any religion should claim that there is only one true religion, and the idea that all believers will enter and live. side by side in heaven (MUI 2005a).

Since the MUI is only a consultative body, the fatwa has no legal impact on the practice of pluralism in Indonesia. However, it is widely assumed that the fatwa points to the legislative agenda (Bowen 2003: 243). This suspicion seems to be reinforced by another fatwa issued at the 2005 MUI congress, which prohibits Muslims from participating in interfaith prayer meetings, which declares interfaith marriages prohibited for Muslims (even when a Muslim man marries a Christian or Jewish woman, which is permissible in classical Islamic jurisprudence), and asked the government to ban such marriages. The Ahmadiyya sect with the excuse of being “outside of Islam”, “heretic”, and “misleading” orthodox Muslims (MUI 2005b). These four fatwas, moreover, seek to enforce, maintain, or reinforce religious boundaries. This shows that the real target of MUI is indeed the core of the idea of “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika” and not merely religious relativism.

The fatwa against pluralism, liberalism, and secularism, however, drew strong criticism from progressive and moderate Muslim groups, including in this case Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) figures, mass-member Islamic organizations that wield unparalleled influence over the people. socio-cultural practices and socio-political attitudes of Indonesian Muslims. These critics view the attack on pluralism even if the fatwa claims to be concerned only with matters of religious belief as dishonest and, furthermore, as an attack on Indonesian nationalism (Gillespie, 2007).

However, while fatwa opponents were able to counter the challenge of religious pluralism at the state level, an ambitious decentralization program called regional autonomy has created new political opportunities to assert the superiority of Islam over other recognized religions, and the superiority of orthodox Islam over heterodox and minority sects within Islam in Indonesia. regional and local levels. Like other programs of political decentralization, autonomy is boldly designed to reduce the distance between citizens and the state, improve service delivery, and reduce regionalism, which is a real concern in the vast archipelago. However, in doing so, MUI empowered local branches of the MUI and its allies including violent "street Islam" groups to push for a controversial set of sharia-based regulations, limiting the rights, protections and space given to religious minorities and in 2011 banned the Ahmadiyah in several provinces, cities and districts (Buehler 2010; Crouch 2011).

These episodes show that the interrelated processes of democratization and decentralization are re-contextualizing old questions about the extent of Indonesian Islam are or should be questions that are among the most vital and persistent in modern Indonesian history. Democratization has expanded freedom of speech, expression, and organization by reducing state restrictions on political parties and organizations, and decreasing the capacity and willingness of states to resolve conflicts by force. Decentralization has also broadened the structure of opportunities for socio-political challenges to religious pluralism at the regional and local levels, while drastically reducing the likelihood of state intervention in local and local regulations, by-laws, and executive orders.

Meanwhile, Indonesia has also experienced a process of sociocultural Islamization. This term refers to the increase in private and public religiosity among Muslims. It also refers to the degree to which individuals choose to identify as Muslim in private or in public (relative to other available social identities). Indonesian Muslims are now more likely to attend religious events (such as group reading the Koran), wear religious attire (such as women's headscarves), consume religious goods and services (such as Islamic banking), perform religious pilgrimages, send their children to Islamic schools, and instead act Islamic in public than at any time since independence. This sociocultural transformation is to a significant degree apart from the sociopolitical challenges to pluralism outlined above (Fealy 2008).

Yet they undeniably change the daily lives and public identity of Indonesian Muslims in ways that can impact the practice of religious pluralism in everyday life. In this respect this paper also attempts to answer these questions through an analysis of the emphasis on religious pluralism from a historical perspective, in the recent statewide political struggle over the widespread anti-pornography bill and the proposed statewide ban on the Ahmadiyya sect, in local protests against the construction of new churches, and in negotiating pressure on Muslims to adopt pious clothing in everyday life. In doing so, I seek to avoid privileging the dynamics of the state over the local and everyday experiences of Indonesians; instead, I examine each topic individually, but with a particular focus on identifying the relationships between them. Similarly, by avoiding ideologically answering the question of whether Islam is compatible with religious pluralism in favor of empirical investigations of the way Islamization generates a dual and distinctive emphasis on religious pluralism, I seek to provide a nuanced portrait of a society struggling to reconcile the increasing claim-making of Islam with long-established pluralism traditions.

This approach is not suitable for austerity, especially in a large and complex society like Indonesia. In contrast, the Islam-based emphasis on religious pluralism is multifaceted and diffuse; they manifest themselves in different forms and degrees in different settings. But

variations in the form, degree, and arrangement of stresses on religious pluralism are not simply a function of Indonesia's size, religious diversity, or its unique archipelagic geography. Instead, I would argue that this variation arises from several interrelated factors. First, I will show how a long-term historical process resulted in an important separation between conservative or Islamist and “civic Islam” or “civic pluralist” conceptions of how Islam should relate to the state and society. These schisms among politically active orthodox Muslims underlie and shape nearly every episode of sociopolitical conflict over Islam that has emerged since the transition. Second, I would argue that the distinctive political process in parliament reproduces religious pluralism at the state level and creates space for more comprehensive challenges at the regional and local levels. Third, I will illustrate, through the example of anti-church protests, how this regionalization occurs in areas characterized by very different opportunity structures for challenges to religious pluralism.

3.2 The Challenge of Modernist Islam: Religious Pluralism

In a broad sense, the term “pluralism” can describe any political or ideological system in which diversity of interest groups is, however defined, recognized, tolerated, and given some degree of legitimacy. In sociology and anthropology, pluralism is often used in a more specific sense, to refer to the recognition, tolerance, or institutionalization of socio-cultural diversity in particular, which was first introduced by this concept to describe the colonial society of the Dutch East Indies, where he observed colonialist groups. Culturally distinct Europeans, Chinese and Arab traders, descendants of freed Portuguese slaves, and the majority indigenous population, who lived on par with one another (Furnivall, 1948: 304). Furnivall's characterization of Dutch East Indies society corresponds to what is called structural pluralism, a mode of social organization in which social structures are compartmentalized into analogous, parallel, not complementary but distinguishable sets of institutions.

Different degrees and forms of religiosity, as well as different views on the relationship between religion and politics, are in themselves a form of religious pluralism, even when the dividing line lies within rather than between religious traditions. The cross-sectoral literature on religious pluralism and governance of religious diversity discusses how the state manages forms of religious difference. Although not a new phenomenon, the management of religious differences is becoming increasingly important as migration, travel, urbanization, literacy and the sophistication of information technology bring together individuals from different religious traditions in “historically unprecedented ways”. Since independence in 1945, Indonesia has gradually formalized the variant of the corporatist-pluralist model of religious governance described above. This system is based, through the national Pancasila (five precepts) creed and state institutions such as the Ministry of Religion, on the definition of Indonesia as a religious society whose citizens believe in “one and only God”.

In contrast, the Indonesian Constitution enshrines freedom of religion as a right of all citizens, while recognizing the six official religions (Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Chinese Confucianism) as equal in law, providing each bureau in the Ministry of Religion, and sponsoring religious institutions. and culture for each recognized group. subsequent post-independence states have tolerated a large number of differences in recognized religious categories. However, it has also contributed to the orthodoxy of official religious categories, and the consequent marginalization of heterodox and “heretic” sects within Islam (Hefner, 2001).

This variant of the corporatist-pluralist framework for religious governance also differs, both structurally and ideologically, from the Anglo-American model idealized in liberal

political theory in which rights are accorded to individuals rather than to groups. While Indonesia treats the six recognized religious groups as (theoretically) equal, it also provides rights and protections for groups over individual citizens, and leaves little room for non-religion. All citizens, regardless of creed (or level of religiosity), are required to officially join one of the state-recognized religions. This fact then determines the family, marriage, and inheritance laws they obey. Interfaith and non-religious marriages are not recognized by the state (unless they are carried out abroad), while changing religions, although legal, requires a long and expensive process, and must obtain bureaucratic approval from the Ministry of Religion.

However, Indonesia's distinctive system of religious pluralism not only trumps group rights over individual rights, but also the privileges that shape orthodoxy in recognized religions. Since the establishment of the Ministry of Religion in 1946, civil servants with ties to the traditionalist organization Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the modernist Islamic organization Muhammadiyah have dominated the Islamic bureau. This gives NU and Muhammadiyah a disproportionate voice over how the state regulates and bureaucratizes Islam, while also giving them special access to education funds and other perks from state sponsors. And although both organizations have officially rejected the idea of Indonesia as an Islamic state since the early 1980s, they or in this case the Ministry are historically ambivalent to "heretic" and Islamic heterodoxy and often hostile to the idea of a non-religious public.

On the other hand, NU followers tend to describe their approach to Islam as the only real and authentic heir to medieval Islam, and more suited to Indonesian conditions. On the other hand, the Islamic brand Muhammadiyah is seen as harsh and foreign goods imported from the Middle East are less suited to Indonesian conditions than traditionalism. Yet despite this clear disagreement about the "truth", nearly everyone claiming to be affiliated with these organizations recognizes the approach of other organizations as legitimate. Furthermore, the idea that the community or family is divided between these different approaches is completely normalized, resulting in good tolerance.

There is space given to those who wish to practice a religion other than one of these six personally, as well as to those who choose to disobey. But all must choose faith to associate, and this choice shapes many aspects of public and private life including family law. Second, every recognized religion is implicitly defined in terms of dominant orthodoxy, which results in long-term pressure on sects, cults, or tendencies outside the mainstream. Third, Indonesian Islam has historically practiced a good or ambivalent tolerance towards sects, cults, or non-normative tendencies, as well as religion.

Democratization has arguably contributed to the emphasis on formal equality among the six recognized religions, and on group tolerance and non-normative religious practices. It also arguably strengthened the religiosity of the state, and its orientation towards the dominant orthodoxy in every recognized religion. What this means is that the formal system of religious pluralism, which gives Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism the same rights and protections, has come under pressure from groups seeking to assert the superiority of Islam over other recognized religions, to limit the free practice of religious minorities in the local area, or who seek to apply restrictive laws stemming from very conservative interpretations of sharia. Meanwhile, the ongoing process of sociocultural Islamization may reduce the space for religion, casual religion, or non-orthodox religion.

IV. Conclusion

Since independence, Indonesia has gradually inaugurated a system of religious pluralism that provides equal recognition, rights and protection to various religious groups. Indonesian Muslims who make up about 88 percent of the population are often described as more tolerant of religious diversity than their co-religionists elsewhere. But in the eighteen years since Indonesia's transition to democracy, religious pluralism has come under pressure from a series of developments that impacted Muslims and non-Muslims alike. These include campaigns to assert the superiority of Islam relative to other religions, “purify” the beliefs and practices of Indonesian Muslims, and Islamize the country. They also include the increasing adoption of pious clothing by Muslims, which has made religious identity and religious divisions visible in a way they never experienced under Sukarno or Suharto. This development shows that the interrelated processes of democratization, decentralization, and sociocultural Islamization constitute a recontextualization of the question of how religious pluralism is institutionalized and practiced in Indonesia.

The socio-political thought of modernist Islam in Indonesia, which was initiated by Indonesian Islamic intellectuals, is an unfinished project. There are still many obstacles that always stand in the way of the long journey of the nation's life in Indonesia. If mapped, the area of thought and practice in the field is divided into three layers, namely first, the level of discourse. Second, the normative-regulative level, and the third is the real applicative-implementation level in people's lives in the field, so the contribution of moderate and progressive Islam in Indonesia has succeeded in raising the issue of the level of plurality, inclusiveness and tolerance in religious life and the nation-state at the level of public discourse. This is a remarkable and significant intellectual contribution because not many countries in the Muslim-majority world can accept such discourse.

At the normative-regulative level, there are still many stumbling blocks in the wider community, in various ministries, both the ministry of religion, the ministry of home affairs and the ministry of law and human rights. There is another at the application and implementation level such as at the leadership of mass organizations, legislative candidates, governors, regents, village heads and so on. The dynamics in each situation may vary. Some are successful and some are not, depending on the style and depth of one's religious literacy, mastery of the three initial thoughts.

The Indonesian nation has a strong socio-cultural capital that is able to bring life as a dignified and civilized nation-state. There are many problems that must be faced by the Indonesian people; free trade of Asian countries in 2015, greater inter-religious interaction in an increasingly cosmopolitan world with high levels of social violence, hatred and exclusive religious beliefs, social violence and religious differences, conservatism and religious fundamentalism, improvement and expansion of education. Equal access for women, development and improvement of the welfare of the lower community, social, political and cultural reconciliation, internal harmony of Muslims, religious harmony, social media that upholds the issue of religious plurality, eradication and prevention of corruption and so on.

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