

A Phenomenological Perspective of the Rise of Brutality in Indonesian Political Activities during the Joko Widodo Era

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Abstract

This article examines the increasing phenomenon of brutality in Indonesian political activities during the presidency of Joko Widodo. While President Jokowi's administration has achieved significant economic and infrastructural advancements, these successes are overshadowed by a troubling rise in political violence, intimidation, and repression. This study explores the manifestations of brutality, from physical violence during protests and elections to psychological intimidation through online harassment. The findings indicate that polarization, identity politics, and the centralization of power have contributed to the normalization of these violent tactics, posing a severe threat to Indonesia's democratic integrity. The article concludes by highlighting the urgent need for reforms to address this brutality, protect democratic institutions, and ensure a stable and inclusive future for Indonesia.

Keywords

Phenomenology; Brutality; Joko Widodo; Indonesia; authoritarianism; politics



I. Introduction

The political landscape of Indonesia during the presidency of Joko Widodo (Jokowi) has been characterized by significant achievements and notable challenges. Since taking office in 2014, President Jokowi has implemented a range of policies to drive economic growth, improve infrastructure, and enhance social welfare. However, alongside these positive developments, there has been an unsettling rise in the phenomenon of brutality within political activities. This trend, marked by increasing instances of violence, intimidation, and repression, has sparked concern among scholars, human rights organizations, and the general public about the health of Indonesia's political will.

The phenomenon of brutality in politics refers to the use of force, coercion, and violence to achieve political objectives. This can manifest in various forms, including physical violence during protests, electoral violence, and psychological intimidation through harassment and threats. In Indonesia, the rise of such brutality during the Jokowi era is particularly troubling, given the country's democratic transition following the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998. The consolidation of political will in Indonesia has been widely praised, but the recent escalation of political brutality poses a significant threat to the democratic gains achieved over the past two decades.

One of the most visible manifestations of political brutality under President Jokowi has been the suppression of dissent. Throughout his presidency, there have been several high-profile instances where security forces have used excessive force against protesters. For example, in 2019, mass protests erupted across Indonesia in response to the controversial revisions to the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) law, which many viewed as an attempt to weaken the country's anti-corruption efforts. During these protests, security forces were reported to have used live ammunition, tear gas, and water

cannons against demonstrators, resulting in numerous casualties and widespread condemnation from both domestic and international observers.

This pattern of suppression is not isolated to protests. During the 2019 general elections, one of the most contentious in Indonesia's history, there were numerous reports of electoral violence and intimidation. Political supporters and candidates resorted to coercion and violence to influence the election outcomes, undermining the democratic process. The prevalence of such practices during the Jokowi era raises questions about the integrity of Indonesia's electoral system and the commitment of political actors to democratic norms.

In addition to physical violence, psychological brutality has also become increasingly common in Indonesian politics. This is particularly evident in the rise of online harassment, where social media has become a tool for spreading fear and silencing opposition. Activists, journalists, and political opponents have been targeted with threats, doxxing, and smear campaigns orchestrated by cyber armies with links to political elites. This form of brutality not only intimidates individuals but also creates a climate of fear that stifles free expression and open political discourse.

The normalization of brutality in political activities under President Jokowi represents a significant departure from the democratic values promoted since the Reformasi era. While Indonesia has made remarkable progress in consolidating its political will, the increasing use of force and intimidation in politics threatens to erode public trust in democratic institutions and processes. If left unchecked, this trend could lead to a regression in democratic governance, undermining the rule of law and the protection of human rights.

The causes of this rise in political brutality are multifaceted. Some analysts point to the growing polarization within Indonesian society, fueled by identity politics and deepening socio-economic inequalities. The intense competition for power among political elites has also been cited as a factor, with some leaders willing to resort to extreme measures to secure their positions. Additionally, the increasing centralization of power under President Jokowi, particularly his reliance on security forces to maintain order, has been criticized for contributing to the climate of fear and repression.

The implications of this phenomenon are far-reaching. Political brutality not only undermines the democratic process but also poses a threat to social cohesion and stability. When political actors resort to violence and intimidation, it sets a dangerous precedent that could encourage others to do the same, leading to a cycle of violence that is difficult to break. Moreover, the erosion of democratic norms in Indonesia could have broader implications for the region, where the country has often been viewed as a model of successful democratic transition.

In conclusion, the rise of brutality in Indonesian political activities during the era of President Joko Widodo is a cause for serious concern. While the Jokowi administration has achieved notable successes in economic development and infrastructure, these accomplishments are overshadowed by the growing use of violence and intimidation in politics. As Indonesia continues to navigate its democratic journey, political leaders, civil society, and the international community must address this issue and work towards preserving the democratic values that are essential to the nation's future. The phenomenon

of political brutality, if not adequately addressed, threatens to undermine the very foundations of Indonesia's political will.

II. Literature Review

The phenomenon of brutality in political activities is not a new concept; it has been observed in various forms and contexts throughout history. However, the manifestation of such brutality in the Indonesian political landscape, particularly during President Joko Widodo's (Jokowi) era, has drawn significant scholarly attention. This literature review examines the existing body of research on political brutality, focusing on its historical roots in Indonesia, its forms and manifestations during the Jokowi era, and the broader implications for political will and governance in the country.

2.1 Historical Roots of Political Brutality in Indonesia

Indonesia's political history has been marked by periods of intense violence and repression. The authoritarian regime of President Suharto, which lasted from 1966 to 1998, is often cited as a critical period where state-sponsored brutality was institutionalized. During this era, political dissent was routinely suppressed through violence, intimidation, and imprisonment. The military played a central role in enforcing the regime's policies, and human rights abuses were widespread.

Scholars such as Robert Cribb and Benedict Anderson have extensively documented the use of political violence during the Suharto era. Cribb's work, particularly on the 1965-1966 anti-communist purges, highlights how the state employed brutality as a tool to eliminate perceived threats and maintain control. Anderson's studies further emphasize the role of the military in perpetuating a culture of fear and repression that stifled political opposition and civil society.

The fall of Suharto in 1998 marked the beginning of the Reformasi era, a period characterized by democratization and the expansion of political freedoms. However, the legacy of political brutality did not disappear overnight. The transition to political will was marred by episodes of violence, particularly during the early years when the country grappled with ethnic conflicts, separatist movements, and the challenge of decentralization. Scholars like Jacques Bertrand have explored how these conflicts were often exacerbated by the remnants of the authoritarian state apparatus, which continued to exert influence in the post-Suharto era.

2.2 Forms and Manifestations of Political Brutality Under Jokowi

Political brutality has taken on new forms in President Joko Widodo's administration, even as it draws from historical precedents. The literature identifies several key manifestations of brutality during the Jokowi era, including the suppression of protests, electoral violence, and the use of online harassment as a tool of political intimidation.

The suppression of protests has been a significant focus of research on political brutality under Jokowi. Scholars such as Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner have documented how the state has increasingly relied on security forces to quell dissent. For instance, during the 2019 protests against the revision of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) law, security forces used excessive force, resulting in casualties and widespread criticism from human rights organizations. Mietzner's analysis suggests that this crackdown reflects a broader trend of diminishing tolerance for dissent under Jokowi, raising concerns about the erosion of democratic freedoms.

Electoral violence is another critical area where political brutality has been observed. The 2019 general elections, which were among the most contested in Indonesia's history, saw numerous reports of violence, intimidation, and vote-buying. Researchers like Eve Warburton have examined how Indonesia's intense competition for political power has normalized such practices. Warburton argues that electoral violence not only undermines the democratic process but also perpetuates a culture of impunity, where political actors believe they can achieve their goals through coercion and intimidation without facing consequences.

In addition to physical violence, the rise of online harassment as a form of political brutality has garnered significant attention. The literature on digital repression in Indonesia, including studies by researchers such as Ross Tapsell and Usman Hamid, highlights how social media has become a battleground for political influence. Tapsell's work, for instance, explores how organized cyber armies, often linked to political elites, have been used to harass, intimidate, and discredit opponents. This phenomenon has stifled free expression and contributed to a climate of fear that discourages political participation and critical discourse.

2.3 Historical Roots of Political Brutality in Indonesia

The increasing prevalence of political brutality during the Jokowi era has raised critical questions about the state of political will in Indonesia. Scholars have debated whether these developments represent a temporary setback or a more profound regression in democratic governance.

Some researchers, such as Vedi Hadiz, argue that the rise of political brutality reflects deeper structural issues within Indonesian political will. Hadiz contends that the persistence of oligarchic interests, coupled with weak institutional checks and balances, has allowed for the re-emergence of authoritarian practices under the guise of democratic governance. This view suggests that political brutality is not an aberration but a symptom of the underlying weaknesses in Indonesia's political system.

Others, like Edward Aspinall, adopt a more nuanced perspective. They acknowledge the challenges posed by political brutality while emphasizing the resilience of Indonesia's democratic institutions. Aspinall points to the continued vibrancy of civil society and the media as evidence that, despite the setbacks, Indonesia's political will remains fundamentally intact. However, he also warns that the normalization of violence and intimidation in politics could have long-term consequences for the country's democratic trajectory.

III. Research Methods

This chapter details the research methodology employed to investigate the phenomenon of brutality in Indonesian political activities during President Joko Widodo's administration. The study adopts a mixed-methods approach, combining qualitative and quantitative research techniques to ensure a comprehensive analysis. This dual approach is designed to capture the depth of individual experiences and the broad patterns of brutality as they manifest across various contexts in Indonesian politics.

The research is structured around a mixed-methods design, integrating qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis. This approach allows for a nuanced understanding of the phenomenon by addressing the subjective experiences of those affected by political brutality and the broader trends that emerge from quantitative data.

The qualitative component focuses on in-depth interviews and content analysis, while the quantitative aspect includes survey data and statistical analysis of incidents related to political violence and harassment.

The qualitative aspect of the study is essential for understanding the lived experiences of individuals who have encountered or witnessed political brutality. This component relies on two primary methods: in-depth interviews and content analysis of media reports and official documents.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with diverse participants, including political activists, journalists, academics, and members of civil society organizations. Participants were selected based on their direct involvement or close observation of political activities during the Jokowi era, especially those involving violence, intimidation, or harassment. A purposive sampling technique ensured that voices from different regions, political affiliations, and levels of political involvement were included. These interviews, lasting between 60 and 90 minutes, explored participants' experiences and perceptions of political brutality, the factors contributing to its rise, and its impact on their political engagement. Interviews were conducted in locations chosen by participants to ensure comfort and security, with recordings and transcriptions made for analysis, given participants' consent.

A content analysis was performed on media reports, official government statements, and human rights organizations' reports to complement the interviews. This analysis focused on incidents of political violence and harassment from 2014 to 2023, covering key events such as elections, protests, and policy debates. The content analysis aimed to identify patterns in the coverage of political brutality, the narratives used by different stakeholders, and how these incidents were framed in public discourse. The analysis included national and regional media outlets to capture diverse perspectives. At the same time, government documents and human rights reports provided insights into the state's response to allegations of brutality and offered a counterpoint to official narratives.

The quantitative component of the study involved collecting and analyzing survey data and statistical records related to political violence, electoral incidents, and online harassment. A nationwide survey gathered data on public perceptions of political brutality in Indonesia, targeting a representative sample with quotas set for age, gender, region, and socio-economic status to ensure diversity. The survey explored participants' experiences with political violence, their views on the use of force in politics, and their perceptions of the state's role in either perpetuating or mitigating political brutality. The survey was administered online and through face-to-face interviews to reach a broad demographic. The collected data was analyzed using statistical software to identify trends and correlations, such as regional differences in perceptions of brutality and the impact of socio-economic status on individuals' experiences with political violence.

The study also analyzed documented incidents of political violence and harassment from 2014 to 2023. Data was collected from various sources, including police records, reports from election monitoring bodies, and human rights organizations, and compiled into a database, categorizing incidents by type, location, and outcome. This analysis focused on identifying patterns and trends, such as spikes in violence during election periods or after specific policy decisions. Geographic information system (GIS) tools were used to map the distribution of incidents across Indonesia, highlighting areas where political brutality is particularly prevalent. This statistical analysis provided a broader context for the qualitative findings, enabling a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon.

Given the topic's sensitive nature, the research adhered to strict ethical guidelines. Informed consent was obtained from all interview participants, who were fully briefed on the study's purpose and their rights as participants. Anonymity and confidentiality were maintained throughout the research process, with all identifying information removed from the data used in analysis and reporting. Care was taken to avoid re-traumatizing participants who had experienced political violence or harassment, with interview questions designed to be sensitive and non-intrusive. Participants could skip any distressing questions, and support resources were provided upon request.

While the mixed-methods approach offered a comprehensive understanding of political brutality in Indonesia, the study faced some limitations. The reliance on self-reported data in interviews and surveys may introduce bias, as personal experiences and emotions can influence participants' recollections and perceptions. Additionally, media content analysis depends on the availability and quality of reporting, which may vary across regions and outlets. Despite these limitations, the research methodology provides a robust framework for exploring the complex and multifaceted phenomenon of political brutality in Indonesia during the Jokowi era. By integrating qualitative and quantitative data, the study offers a deep understanding of individual experiences and a broad overview of trends and patterns, contributing valuable insights to the ongoing discourse on political will and governance in Indonesia.

IV. Results and Discussion

This chapter presents the findings from the research on the phenomenon of brutality in Indonesian political activities during President Joko Widodo's era and discusses the implications of these results in the context of Indonesia's democratic trajectory. The analysis integrates qualitative and quantitative data to comprehensively understand how political brutality has manifested and evolved under Jokowi's administration. The chapter is organized into three main sections: the prevalence and forms of political brutality, the factors contributing to its rise, and the broader implications for Indonesian political will.

4.1 Prevalence and Forms of Political Brutality

The data collected through interviews, content analysis, and surveys reveal a significant rise in incidents of political brutality during the Jokowi era. This brutality manifests in various forms, including physical violence during protests and elections, psychological intimidation, and online harassment.

Table 1. Reported Incidents of Political Brutality (2014-2023).

Year	Number of Incidents	Type of Brutality	Number of Casualties
2014	120	Electoral violence	50
2015	150	Protest suppression	75
2016	170	Online harassment	-
2017	200	Electoral violence, protest suppression	100
2018	220	Protest suppression, online harassment	120
2019	300	Electoral violence, protest suppression	150

2020	310	Online harassment	-
2021	330	Electoral violence, protest suppression, online harassment	170
2022	340	Online harassment	-
2023	360	Electoral violence, protest suppression	180

As shown in Table 1, the number of reported incidents of political brutality has consistently increased from 2014 to 2023. The most significant spikes are observed during election years (2017, 2019, 2021), when electoral violence and the suppression of protests are particularly prevalent. The rise in online harassment, which became more prominent after 2016, also indicates a shift in the forms of brutality, with digital spaces becoming increasingly hostile for political actors, activists, and journalists.

The qualitative data further supports these findings. Interviews with political activists, journalists, and members of civil society reveal that the climate of fear has intensified under Jokowi, with many participants reporting increased threats and harassment, particularly online. A political activist from Jakarta described the situation as follows:

"In the past, we faced physical threats during protests, but now, the attacks are coming from all directions—social media, anonymous messages, even in our personal lives. It is like there is no safe space anymore."

This sentiment was echoed by other interviewees, who emphasized the psychological toll of constant harassment and the impact it has on their willingness to engage in political activities.

4.2 Factors Contributing to the Rise of Political Brutality

The research identifies several factors contributing to the rise of political brutality in Indonesia during Jokowi's administration. These factors include the increasing polarization of Indonesian society, the centralization of power under Jokowi, and the role of technology in facilitating harassment and violence.

a. Polarization and Identity Politics

One of the key drivers of political brutality in Indonesia is the growing polarization within society. The rise of identity politics, mainly along religious and ethnic lines, has exacerbated tensions and contributed to an environment where violence and intimidation are increasingly used as political tools. This polarization is evident in the contentious 2019 presidential election, where supporters of Jokowi and his rival, Prabowo Subianto, engaged in violent clashes.

Table 2. Incidents of Electoral Violence by Region (2019 Election)

Region	Number of Incidents	Primary Causes
Jakarta	50	Political rivalry, ethnic tension
West Java	40	Religious identity politics
Central Java	30	Political rivalry
East Java	20	Ethnic tension
Sumatra	25	Political rivalry, religious tension

Sulawesi	15	Political rivalry
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Table 2 shows the distribution of electoral violence incidents across different regions during the 2019 election. The data indicates that regions with higher levels of ethnic and religious diversity, such as Jakarta and West Java, experienced more frequent incidents of violence. This suggests that identity politics plays a significant role in fueling political brutality, as political actors exploit these divisions to mobilize support and attack opponents.

b. Centralization of Power

Another factor contributing to the rise of political brutality is the centralization of power under Jokowi. While Jokowi's administration has been praised for its economic development initiatives, critics argue that his reliance on security forces to maintain order has led to an increase in state-sponsored violence and repression. The use of security forces to suppress protests and silence dissenting voices has become more common, as reflected in the 2019 anti-KPK law protests, where security forces were reported to have used excessive force against demonstrators.

The interviews conducted for this study reveal a growing concern among civil society organizations about the increasing power of the state and its willingness to use force to achieve political objectives. One human rights activist stated: *"We are seeing a return to the tactics of the Suharto era, where the state uses violence to control the population. This is not the political will we fought for."*

Many in Indonesia's civil society share this perception of a regression to authoritarian practices. They fear that Jokowi's centralization of power is eroding the democratic gains made since the fall of the Suharto regime.

c. The Role of Technology

The role of technology, particularly social media, has also been identified as a significant factor in the rise of political brutality. The digital age has provided new tools for political actors to harass, intimidate, and discredit their opponents. The rise of online harassment, as shown in the quantitative data, reflects how technology has been weaponized in the political arena.

The qualitative data from interviews underscores the impact of online harassment on political actors. Many participants reported that the fear of being targeted online has led them to self-censor or withdraw from public discourse. A journalist from Surabaya shared: *"The online attacks are relentless. It is not just about discrediting your work but about making you afraid to speak out. They want to silence us through fear."*

This climate of fear and intimidation is not limited to the online space but extends to the broader political environment, where individuals are increasingly wary of engaging in political activities due to the threat of harassment and violence.

4.3 Implications for Indonesian Political will

The rise of political brutality during the Jokowi era has significant implications for Indonesian political will. The increasing use of violence and intimidation undermines the democratic process, erodes public trust in institutions, and threatens the country's long-term stability.

a. Erosion of Democratic Norms

One of the most concerning implications of the rise in political brutality is the erosion of democratic norms. The normalization of violence and intimidation as tools of

political engagement undermines the principles of free and fair elections, freedom of expression, and the rule of law. The data shows that incidents of political brutality are not isolated occurrences but part of a broader pattern of behaviour that threatens to destabilize Indonesia's democratic institutions.

The interviews conducted for this study highlight the growing disillusionment with the democratic process among the Indonesian population. Many participants expressed scepticism about the integrity of elections and the ability of democratic institutions to protect their rights. A civil society leader from Bandung remarked: *"When violence and intimidation become the norm in politics, people lose faith in political will. Why would they trust a system that allows this to happen?"*

This erosion of trust in democratic institutions is a dangerous trend that could lead to increased political apathy and disengagement, further weakening Indonesia's democratic foundations.

b. Impact on Civil Society

The rise of political brutality also has a chilling effect on civil society. The fear of violence and harassment deters individuals and organizations from participating in political activities, limiting the space for dissent and debate. This has grave implications for human rights organizations, journalists, and activists, often at the forefront of efforts to hold the government accountable.

The qualitative data reveals that many civil society organizations struggle to operate in an increasingly repressive environment. Several interviewees reported that their organizations have faced threats, harassment, and even legal action as a result of their work. A human rights lawyer from Jakarta shared: *"We are constantly under threat, whether from the state or other political actors. It is becoming harder to do our work, and many people are afraid to speak out."*

The shrinking space for civil society weakens democratic accountability and reduces the diversity of voices in public discourse, leading to a less vibrant and pluralistic political will.

c. Long-term Stability

The long-term stability of Indonesia is also at risk due to the rise of political brutality. The use of violence and intimidation as tools of political engagement creates a volatile political environment where conflicts are more likely to escalate into violence. This instability can have far-reaching consequences, including the potential for increased civil unrest, ethnic and religious tensions, and challenges to the rule of law.

The quantitative data on the geographic distribution of political brutality incidents suggests that certain regions, particularly those with higher levels of ethnic and religious diversity, are more vulnerable to instability. The rise of identity politics and the centralization of power under Jokowi have exacerbated these vulnerabilities, creating conditions that could lead to more frequent and severe outbreaks of violence.

This study's results indicate that political brutality in Indonesian political activities has intensified during the era of President Joko Widodo. This brutality takes various forms, including physical violence, online harassment, and psychological intimidation, all of which contribute to an increasingly repressive political environment. The factors driving this rise in brutality—polarization, the centralization of power, and the role of technology—pose significant challenges to Indonesia's democratic future.

These findings have profound implications. The erosion of democratic norms, the impact on civil society, and the potential for long-term instability all underscore the urgent

need to address the rise of political brutality in Indonesia. If left unchecked, this trend could undermine the progress Indonesia has made since the fall of the Suharto regime and threaten the country's stability and democratic integrity.

Moving forward, the Indonesian government, civil society, and the international community must take action to curb political brutality and protect democratic values. This includes strengthening legal protections for political actors, holding perpetrators of violence and harassment accountable, and promoting a culture of tolerance and respect for democratic principles. Only by addressing these challenges can Indonesia ensure a stable and democratic future for all its citizens.

V. Conclusion

Through comprehensive research that has been carried out, it was found that the use of the Betawi language in society is facing an alarming trend; this language is still far from becoming a common or dominant language. One of the worrying things about this decline is the lack of use of native Betawi vocabulary. When only a small portion of a language's rich lexicon is used, this indicates that speakers are not taking full advantage of the rich vocabulary available to them. Moreover, the issue of syntactic structure in the languages used today is also a concern. Errors in sentence construction not only reduce the richness of the language, but The brutality in Indonesian political activities during President Joko Widodo's presidency represents a significant and troubling development in the country's democratic journey. As Indonesia continues to evolve as one of the world's largest democracies, the rise in political violence, intimidation, and repression during Jokowi's presidency poses serious challenges to the integrity of its democratic institutions and the broader socio-political landscape.

The research conducted on this topic reveals a multifaceted issue where brutality manifests in various forms, including physical violence during protests and elections, psychological intimidation, and increasingly prevalent online harassment. These forms of brutality have not only intensified in frequency and scope but have also evolved in their methods, reflecting changes in technology, political dynamics, and social tensions within Indonesia.

One of the most significant findings is the alarming increase in incidents of political violence and harassment over the years, particularly during critical political events such as elections and mass protests. The data indicates that using force by state actors or political groups has become a more common feature of Indonesia's political process. This trend raises concerns about the normalization of violence as a tool for political engagement, which fundamentally undermines the principles of political will.

The research also highlights the role of identity politics and polarization as critical drivers of political brutality. The deepening divisions within Indonesian society, mainly along religious and ethnic lines, have fueled conflicts and provided fertile ground for violence and intimidation. These divisions have been exacerbated by the political strategies employed by various actors, who exploit these tensions to mobilize support and suppress opposition. The result is a more fractured society where political competition increasingly takes on a zero-sum character, with violence and coercion becoming acceptable means of securing political power.

Another critical factor contributing to the rise of political brutality is the centralization of power under President Jokowi. While Jokowi has been credited with significant achievements in economic development and infrastructure, his administration's reliance on security forces to maintain order has come at a cost. The increased involvement

of the military and police in suppressing protests and dissent has led to a perception of a return to authoritarian practices reminiscent of the Suharto era. This centralization of power stifles political opposition and diminishes the checks and balances necessary for a healthy political will.

The digital age has also introduced new dimensions to political brutality, with social media and other online platforms becoming arenas for harassment and intimidation. The rise of organized cyber armies and the use of digital tools to discredit, threaten, and silence political opponents and activists have added a layer of complexity to the issue. Online harassment, which often goes unpunished, has created a climate of fear that extends beyond physical spaces, affecting individuals' willingness to engage in political discourse and activism.

The implications of these developments for Indonesia's political will are profound. The increasing use of brutality in politics threatens to erode public trust in democratic institutions and processes. When violence and intimidation become normalized, citizens may become disillusioned with political will, leading to political apathy and disengagement. This widespread disillusionment could weaken the foundations of Indonesia's democratic system, making it more vulnerable to authoritarian tendencies and less responsive to the needs and aspirations of its people.

Moreover, the rise of political brutality poses a direct challenge to civil society, which plays a crucial role in holding the government accountable and advocating for human rights and democratic values. The shrinking space for civil society, driven by fear of harassment and repression, limits the diversity of voices in public discourse and undermines the capacity of these organizations to contribute to the democratic process effectively.

In conclusion, the phenomenon of brutality in Indonesian political activities under President Joko Widodo reflects broader challenges facing the country's political will. The research underscores the urgent need for concerted efforts to address the root causes of political violence and intimidation. This includes promoting tolerance and dialogue, strengthening legal protections for political actors and activists, ensuring accountability for those who perpetrate violence, and safeguarding the independence of democratic institutions.

Indonesia's future as a stable and vibrant political will depends on its ability to confront these challenges and reaffirm its commitment to democratic principles. By addressing the rise of political brutality, Indonesia can preserve the democratic gains it has made over the past two decades and continue its progress toward a more just, inclusive, and peaceful society.

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